Pakistan’s crisis management remains fundamentally reactive, mobilising only after a disaster unfolds rather than anticipating and mitigating its impacts.
Despite legislative reforms and the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and its provincial counterparts under the 2010 Disaster Management Act, the state primarily operates in bursts of urgency rather than maintaining sustained preparedness.
The 2010 floods, which exposed the country’s weak disaster response, triggered structural reforms on paper. Yet, over a decade later, the recurrence of similar lapses, most notably during the devastating 2022 floods, underscores the persistence of institutional inertia and a governance framework that has matured in name more than in practice.
The floods of 2022 serve as a stark example. Between June and October, torrential rains and glacial melt inundated one-third of the country, taking over 1,700 lives and displacing 33 million people. Billions were pledged for relief, yet aid distribution faltered, coordination between federal and provincial authorities remained fragmented, and in many rural districts, local communities were forced to organise their rescues.
Fast forward to the summer of 2025, when cloudbursts triggered flash floods in Swat and Gilgit-Baltistan, resulting in dozens of deaths, including those of stranded tourists. The pattern remained unchanged: warnings were issued, but material rescue capacity was inadequate, roads remained blocked for hours, helicopters were delayed and local authorities were quickly overwhelmed. These events exemplify a reactive governance model in which institutions act only in the face of immediate crisis rather than in anticipation of it.
This reactive approach was similarly evident in Pakistan’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. In early 2020, testing capacity was minimal, lockdown decisions came late and public messaging remained inconsistent. While the Ehsaas Emergency Cash programme emerged as a global model for rapid social protection, much of the broader health response relied on military logistics and enforcement. This reliance on military intervention has become a recurring feature of Pakistan’s crisis management, filling gaps left by underprepared civilian structures. While effective in the short term, such reliance slows the long-term development of resilient civilian institutions.
The energy sector reflects the same vulnerabilities. On January 23, 2023, a nationwide blackout left much of Pakistan without electricity for up to three days, causing an estimated $100 billion in economic losses, including major disruptions to the textile industry. Investigations revealed a lack of operator training, insufficient contingency planning, and chronic underinvestment in transmission infrastructure. These failures represent not merely operational shortcomings but more profound governance weaknesses, a lack of foresight, and systemic planning for predictable vulnerabilities.
These crises, floods, pandemics and blackouts share common underlying causes: fragmented institutions that struggle to coordinate effectively across federal and provincial levels, chronic underfunding of resilience measures, overdependence on military intervention and a communication strategy prioritising reactive updates over proactive community engagement.
A social media analysis of disaster authority communications during the 2022 floods revealed that over 70 per cent of the NDMA’s posts were reactive updates, with minimal proactive alerts to at-risk communities. This is not simply a communications problem but reflects a governance philosophy focused on managing fallout rather than preventing catastrophe.
Breaking this cycle requires a paradigm shift from crisis response to resilience building. First, early warning systems must transition from ceremonial to genuinely predictive, using available flood forecasting technologies and mobile-based dissemination tools to reach remote communities. Second, institutional coordination needs to evolve beyond ad hoc arrangements. Permanent, real-time integrated command centres bringing together the NDMA, provincial DMAs, health departments and local governments are essential. Third, the civilian disaster response apparatus must be empowered with resources, training and autonomy, rather than remaining subordinate to military deployments in every major emergency.
Infrastructure resilience also demands urgent investment. The national grid cannot afford recurring collapses, and riverine systems require strict regulation against encroachment and deforestation that exacerbate flood devastation. Climate adaptation funding, such as pledged during the Geneva Climate Resilient Pakistan Conference, must be transparently allocated to long-term structural defences rather than short-term political appeasement. Similarly, public health readiness should be institutionalised through stockpiling essential medical supplies, establishing mobile clinics and incorporating epidemic simulations into medical training programs.
At its core, this challenge is not merely about managing disasters but rethinking governance. Pakistan will continue to face crises from climate shocks to pandemics to infrastructural breakdowns, yet without a decisive shift towards proactive planning, transparent coordination and strengthened civilian institutions, the country will remain trapped in a cycle of perpetual reaction. Building resilience requires investment not in the days following a disaster, but in the years preceding it.
The writer is the head of the Governance and Reform Unit at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad
