Written and unwritten peace deals with Taliban since 2004
February 07, 2014
LAHORE: It has been nearly nine years and 10 months since Islamabad has been inking futile peace accords with the Taliban, but instead of bringing about any peace and tranquility, these short-lived agreements resulted in severe clahes of violence including attacks on national installations, security forces and civilians.
It was the same official enthusiasm, media frenzy and public optimism each time the Pakistani government had gone on to hold parleys with the Taliban from a position of weakness. The result was always the same as Islamabad could never enforce its demands of disarmament or the surrendering of foreign militants. It is hence time to revisit the oft-reported deals with the warring Taliban.
Pakistan had first inked the Shakai Peace Pact of April 2004 with Nek Muhammad Wazir of the Taliban, whereby the then General Musharraf-led regime had agreed to release the militants in captivity, pay compensation to the concerned tribes for property damage as a result of its military operations and provide money to the militants so that they could repay their debt to al-Qaeda.
However, immediately after the signing of this particular agreement, Nek Muhammad Wazir had refused to surrender foreign militants to the government and numerous elders in favour of this deal were assassinated.
Newspaper archives suggest Nek Muhammad had initially agreed to register foreign militants and stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
The infuriated government had then revoked Nek Muhammad’s amnesty deal and launched another military operation against his forces in June 2004.
This deal, the first of its kind, had come after a military operation was launched in March 2004 to pressurize Nek Muhammad to cease supporting foreign militants such as the Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks residing in the safe havens of South Waziristan.
After the April 2004 Shakai agreement had proved to be a mere failure, Nek Muhammad was killed by an American drone in June 2004.
Following the failed Shakai agreement, the February 2005 peace deal with Baitullah Mehsud was signed, whereby the government had just wanted the Taliban to cease attacking Pakistani targets and stop sheltering the foreign militants.
The militants were neither required to lay down their weapons, nor were they made to surrender foreigners breeding in their rank and fold. The deal only strengthened Baitullah Mehsud’s position as a leader, and fizzled out in smoke…as expected by most analysts.
By July 2007, Abdullah Mehsud was killed by the Pakistani forces, while Baitullah Mehsud was eventually sent to the cemetery by a US drone in August 2009.
The Swat Agreement of May 2008 had proved no exception to the rule. A 16-point agreement was certainly to restore peace in the serene valley, but disagreements soon arose as the Taliban had refused to surrender their arms as per the deal. They also demanded the release of their prisoners languishing in jails. A relatively successful military operation “Rah-e-Haq” was then launched, rendering millions of civilians homeless though.
It may be recalled that even after the military strikes, Swat had witnessed a lot of Taliban-led violence, which had only ceased temporarily after the then Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government had agreed on February 15, 2009 to implement the Islamic law. Whether it was cowardice or expediency—-it is hard to be judged.
Again, the pact was just a water bubble, compelling Pakistan Army to launch a decisive military operation against Maulana Fazlullah and his men.
Apart from these three major above-mentioned peace agreements in Shakai, Waziristan and Swat, there have been quite a few written and unwritten peace deals like the ones negotiated with the North Waziristan-based commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency after the August 2008 military operation.
But, had any one of these agreements yielded any fruit, the talks currently being held with a lot of caution and amidst the customary optimism, would not have been required to be brokered.?
It was the same official enthusiasm, media frenzy and public optimism each time the Pakistani government had gone on to hold parleys with the Taliban from a position of weakness. The result was always the same as Islamabad could never enforce its demands of disarmament or the surrendering of foreign militants. It is hence time to revisit the oft-reported deals with the warring Taliban.
Pakistan had first inked the Shakai Peace Pact of April 2004 with Nek Muhammad Wazir of the Taliban, whereby the then General Musharraf-led regime had agreed to release the militants in captivity, pay compensation to the concerned tribes for property damage as a result of its military operations and provide money to the militants so that they could repay their debt to al-Qaeda.
However, immediately after the signing of this particular agreement, Nek Muhammad Wazir had refused to surrender foreign militants to the government and numerous elders in favour of this deal were assassinated.
Newspaper archives suggest Nek Muhammad had initially agreed to register foreign militants and stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
The infuriated government had then revoked Nek Muhammad’s amnesty deal and launched another military operation against his forces in June 2004.
This deal, the first of its kind, had come after a military operation was launched in March 2004 to pressurize Nek Muhammad to cease supporting foreign militants such as the Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks residing in the safe havens of South Waziristan.
After the April 2004 Shakai agreement had proved to be a mere failure, Nek Muhammad was killed by an American drone in June 2004.
Following the failed Shakai agreement, the February 2005 peace deal with Baitullah Mehsud was signed, whereby the government had just wanted the Taliban to cease attacking Pakistani targets and stop sheltering the foreign militants.
The militants were neither required to lay down their weapons, nor were they made to surrender foreigners breeding in their rank and fold. The deal only strengthened Baitullah Mehsud’s position as a leader, and fizzled out in smoke…as expected by most analysts.
By July 2007, Abdullah Mehsud was killed by the Pakistani forces, while Baitullah Mehsud was eventually sent to the cemetery by a US drone in August 2009.
The Swat Agreement of May 2008 had proved no exception to the rule. A 16-point agreement was certainly to restore peace in the serene valley, but disagreements soon arose as the Taliban had refused to surrender their arms as per the deal. They also demanded the release of their prisoners languishing in jails. A relatively successful military operation “Rah-e-Haq” was then launched, rendering millions of civilians homeless though.
It may be recalled that even after the military strikes, Swat had witnessed a lot of Taliban-led violence, which had only ceased temporarily after the then Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government had agreed on February 15, 2009 to implement the Islamic law. Whether it was cowardice or expediency—-it is hard to be judged.
Again, the pact was just a water bubble, compelling Pakistan Army to launch a decisive military operation against Maulana Fazlullah and his men.
Apart from these three major above-mentioned peace agreements in Shakai, Waziristan and Swat, there have been quite a few written and unwritten peace deals like the ones negotiated with the North Waziristan-based commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency after the August 2008 military operation.
But, had any one of these agreements yielded any fruit, the talks currently being held with a lot of caution and amidst the customary optimism, would not have been required to be brokered.?
