ISLAMABAD: On the request of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Arab countries to mediate end to the Arab-Israel war.
Mr. Bhutto even refused to meet the then Syrian President El Assad and rejected his request for military assistance against Israel, a CIA declassified document reveals. The 1973 Arab Israel war was significant for the United States because the Soviet Union being the arms supplier of Egypt and Syria directly sent a hotline message to President Nixon and threatened him with unilateral action if the US continued its military assistance to Israel.
The US administration feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. But Mr. Kissinger was playing a double game. According to State Department’ Office of the Historian, after finalizing ceasefire deal with the help of Soviet Union, Mr. Kissinger visited Tel Aviv and told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington.
In the meantime, he also engaged Bhutto to convince Arab leaders for ceasefire. When Bhutto returned after visiting several Arab countries, he wrote a letter to Kissinger, Assistant to US President for National Security Affairs on October 20, 1973 which was delivered to him through the US Embassy in Pakistan.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s declassified letter to Kissinger shows how the Americans were serious about ending the Arab-Israel crisis because on one hand it could damage America’s standing in the Arab world, on the other it could undermine the prospects for US-Soviet détente. Under these circumstances, Mr. Bhutto on request of Kissinger visited some Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries to convince them for ceasefire.
After reading the letter which has been declassified recently by the CIA, Mr. Bhutto visited some Arab countries as well as Turkey and Iran on the request of Mr. Kissinger to convince them to end the Arab-Israel war. However, Mr. Bhutto got no positive response from Arab leaders including King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.
The secret letter was directly addressed to the US Secretary of State and Assistant to US President for National Security Affairs Mr. Kissinger. The letter says, “I thank you for the reply to my message of 16th of October from Tehran which was delivered to me at Ankara on 18th morning. I have returned to Pakistan this afternoon after visiting Riyadh to deliver yet another appeal to me from the President of Syria for military assistance. He also conveyed to me that President El Assad was anxiously looking forward to my meeting with him. I have instructed my Ambassador to convey to the Syrian leader the content of your message and told him to emphasize your determination to promote a speedy and just settlement in the Middle East”.
Mr. Bhutto also visited Saudi Arabia and conveyed Kissinger’s message to King Faisal but he refused to accept any offer until Israeli forces withdrew from all the occupied territories.
The letter further says, “I also put your point of view forcefully to King Faisal. He was insistent on guarantee of Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories as a condition precedent to cease-fire. I asked him specifically whether Arab position on Security Council Resolution 242 left room for flexibility on the extent of withdrawal. Faisal repeated that Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories”.
Mr. Bhutto was stunned at the blunt reply of King Faisal and termed his remarks significant. “I was struck by the emphatic manner in which Faisal said to me that any Arab leader who agreed to ceasefire while Israel remained in occupation of Arab territories was bound to run into trouble with his own people. It was significant that Faisal should have made such remark”.
However, Shah of Iran and Turkish Prime Minister responded him positively to play their role positively to end this crisis.
Mr. Bhutto further informed Kissinger in his letter, “My talks with the Shah of Iran and Prime Minister of Turkey turned on how our three countries might be able to help in promoting an equitable solution of the present crisis. The Turks put to us certain ideas for bringing about a cease-fire and implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which they had discussed with the diplomatic representatives of countries member of the Security Council and some other members”.
Z.A. Bhutto informed Secretary of State Kissinger that non-Arab Muslim countries were ready to play their constructive role to end this crisis on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242.
The letter further says, “My impression after talks in Tehran, Ankara and Riyadh is that non-Arab Muslim countries like Turkey and Pakistan and perhaps Iran and Indonesia, might be able at some stage to play a constructive role in promoting a just and lasting solution of the Arab-Israel conflict on the basis of Resolution 242”.
Prime Minister Bhutto informed Mr. Kissinger that even in Pakistan there is an agitation and the public opinion is with the Arab cause however even then he is ready to play his positive and constructive role to end this crisis.
“I should like you to know that despite the fact that public opinion in Pakistan continues to be greatly agitated over the just cause of the Arabs, in my talks with the leaders of three countries I have endeavored throughout to find how we could all play a constructive and responsible role in this crisis. Please convey my warm regards to the President”.
According to State Department’s Office of the Historian, the 1973 Arab-Israel war was a watershed for US foreign policy toward the Middle East.
The Arab-Israel standoff over the fate of the occupied territories could damage America’s standing in the Arab world and undermine prospects for U.S.-Soviet détente.
It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States.
On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
Despite initial Israeli setbacks, Kissinger believed that Israel would win quickly. He however feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. Thus, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union call for an end to the fighting and a return to the 1967 ceasefire lines.
The Soviets, who were uneager to intervene on behalf of their clients, agreed, but the Egyptians rejected the ceasefire proposal. Wanting to avoid both an Arab defeat and military intervention, the Soviets then began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons.
By October 9, following a failed IDF counter-attack against Egypt’s forces, the Israelis requested that America do the same for them. Not wanting to see Israel defeated, Nixon agreed, and American planes carrying weapons began arriving in Israel on October 14.
With the American airlift underway, the fighting turned against the Arabs. On October 16, IDF units crossed the Suez Canal. Sadat began to show interest in a ceasefire, leading Brezhnev to invite Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate an agreement.
A US-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22.
Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington.
When Kissinger returned to the United States, he agreed to a Soviet request to seek another ceasefire resolution, which the Security Council adopted on October 23. Yet the Israelis still refused to stop.
On October 24, Brezhnev sent Nixon a hotline message suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops to Egypt to “implement” the ceasefire. If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25. By the end of the day, the crisis abated when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces to their October 22 positions, and U.N. observers and peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire. This time, the Israelis accepted the resolution.
Though the war did not scuttle détente, it nevertheless brought the United States closer to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis.
The American military airlift to Israel, moreover, had led Arab oil producers to embargo oil shipments to the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval.