The newly-chosen Indian Army chief, Gen Bipin Rawat, recently had the cheek to say that the Indian Cold Start Doctrine could be implemented if a political decision to launch such strikes was taken.
According to Indian experts, “Cold Start is the Indian operational plan for rapidly mobilising infantry and armour to launch lightning strikes across the plains and deserts of Pakistan. The aim is to break into Pakistan before its defensive formations can prepare and occupy defensive positions along the border.”
The Cold Start was developed following the failure of Operation Parakram in 2001-02. Following a staged attack on Indian parliament, India had moved three mechanized strike corps on Pakistan border but measures taken by Pakistan had foiled the plan.
Meanwhile, General Rawat’s admission of Cold Start on January 6, in an interview to India Today, was sharply criticised by strategic analysts Vipin Narang and Walter C Ladwig III, who as a matter of fact admitted: “The Indian Army simply lacks the material and organisation to implement the more aggressive versions of Cold Start.” They argued that India has too few troops and tanks, it faces critical equipment shortages, and the army and air force do not coordinate air support.
Before that, WikiLeaks had produced some interesting reports about the Indian Army’s Cold Start strategy. According to a cable sent on Tuesday February 16, 2010 by US Ambassador Tim Roemer to State Department, Washington, subject Cold Start: A mixture of myth and reality “The Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results.”
The US envoy pointed out that India had failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai. He said this called into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. “At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan's existence than in any real world application.”
On the other hand, it has been already reported that Pakistan will thwart such drastic yet foolish Indian attempts. The Pakistani armed forces have taken up a position where no such doctrine of enemy could work in any manner and have also developed proven defensive strategies through military exercises in the Cholistan Desert and elsewhere under the Southern Command.
Moreover, the Indian doctrine has also lost the element of surprise. The Pakistan Army has simply nullified the very concept of the doctrine through various weapons and strategy.
Boasting about the Cold Start has put India “in the worst possible strategic position” Narang and Ladwig wrote in The Hindu, claiming a capability that it does not have, but which provides justification for Pakistan’s aggressive expansion of its conventional and nuclear forces. The statement is certainly not a misfire -- and cannot backfire.