May 10, 2025, will go down in the annals of modern history as a case study of war between two nuclear powers. It will be extensively examined worldwide by present and future scholars, nuclear and military strategists, as well as war practitioners for decades to come. It will cast an impression on existing nuclear doctrines of states and prompt rethinking on the concept of a limited conventional war under a nuclear overhang. Never in the contemporary living memory of mankind have two nuclear powers tested such lethal weapons backed by cutting-edge technology and platforms. It was an ultimate test of opposing “wills” to dominate the escalation ladder.
As Pakistan launched its offensive response, ‘Bunyan-um-Marsoos’, in the early hours of May 10, it was clear that the nuclear-armed state was determined not to allow its conventionally superior adversary to establish the new normal it desired. Encouraged and pampered by the U.S. and the West for decades, Pakistan’s offensive strikes on 20 military sites across multiple regions in India were no less than a thunderbolt from the sky for New Delhi.
As war clouds dissipate for now and the toxic but pulverised Akhand Bharat mindset of Modi and his cabal struggles to recover, it is abundantly clear that it was India that panicked and approached Washington, Riyadh, and Ankara pleading for intervention and a ceasefire settlement. At no stage did Pakistan ever seek a ceasefire but did exercise strategic restraint even against repeated attempts of unprovoked aggression.
In their groundbreaking work, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization, published several years back, renowned authors Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta brilliantly argue, ‘India’s military modernisation lacks strategic planning. Thus, despite having resources to modernise, the country’s efforts are hindered by a lack of strategic military planning resulting in haphazard military change.’ The account clearly indicts India for its pursuit of technology without clearly defined military-strategic objectives. Delays and cost overruns affecting the Indian Navy’s operational preparedness, besides technical issues impinging on operational effectiveness, are examined and underlined in the narrative. It seems no lessons were drawn by strategic minds in the Indian Navy.
In late 2015, the Indian Navy published its apex document, titled the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS). It importantly lays down, among other things, India’s maritime security imperatives and influences, strategy for deterrence, and strategy for conflict. Interestingly, the Indian Navy also crowns itself with the title of “Net Security Provider” (NSP) for the Indian Ocean region. Under the ‘Principles of Net Security’, it says, ‘The principles of net maritime security will guide the broad methodology to reduce common threats and challenges, and build conditions whereby these will be monitored, contained, and countered’. The foreword recognises a change in the national outlook towards the seas and the maritime domain, and a clearer recognition of maritime security being a vital element of national progress and international engagement. ‘More than 90 percent of India’s international trade by volume and 70 percent by value is carried over the seas,’ according to IMSS.
Fast forward to 2025. In the press release issued by the White House earlier this year following a meeting between President Trump and PM Modi in Washington, India’s position as a “Net Security Provider” is treasured in the following words: ‘The US appreciates India’s role as a developmental, humanitarian assistance, and net security provider in the Indian Ocean region.’
In the days following the incident at Pahalgam and the events unfolding thereafter, the Indian Navy received a reality check. It found itself to be far less combat-capable or competent to dominate than what it has been professing to the world. The reverberations of the consequential developments in the North Arabian Sea have now gone beyond the Indo-Pacific-more importantly, to Washington and perhaps other world capitals as well.
A new chapter has been written in the waters of the North Arabian Sea of the Indian Ocean. It is authored by a small, networked, well-integrated, and resolute Pakistan Navy. Despite towering claims and years of partnership in mega naval drills with the United States Navy, besides navies of QUAD member countries, the self-importance and hubris of the Indian Navy lies in ruin.
As one of the few world navies operating aircraft carriers, the conflict was an ideal opportunity for the Indian Navy to showcase these mega platforms. Fundamentally, a powerful instrument for power projection, sea control, and maritime dominance, the aircraft carrier is meant to create deterrence, awe, and fear. Its defensive employment runs counter to the raison d’être of an aircraft carrier in the first place. Here, the Indian Navy was found placing a carrier almost 700 km (over 380 nm) south of Pakistan’s coast. Putting a carrier battle group at such a distant location from the coast of Pakistan clearly indicated the protective (defensive) and wary nature of its employment. This was a safe sanctuary away from the main battle theatre. And here was a navy claiming to be a ‘Net Security Provider’ for the region and aspiring for global ambitions.
To be fair, however, the Indian aircraft carrier faced numerous threats. It lacked enough fighter aircraft on board for the concurrent conduct of defensive (protective) operations as well as offensive operations. The threat of Pakistan Navy’s long-range maritime patrol aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles posed a challenge. The submarines of the Pakistan Navy, armed with sub-surface-to-surface missiles, presented yet another formidable threat. This is not to mention the long-range carrier-killer missiles on the coast of Pakistan, capped with robust air defence systems.
Pakistan Navy’s strategy of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), with compelling employment of platforms and weapons systems, instilled enough fear and fright in opposing ranks. Thus, despite being several times larger and holding intimidating platforms, the Indian Navy blinked.
War, according to the widely read Prussian general Clausewitz, is a clash of wills. The side that shatters the enemy’s will to fight gains significant advantage-a lesson that was perhaps ignored by the Indian Navy at its own peril when it set sail to take on the Pakistan Navy.
With “will” depleted, the Indian Navy had little choice except to settle for keeping assets in safe haven, fearing Pakistan Navy. Satellite images clearly showed INS Vikrant, earlier stationed at sea, only to be suddenly withdrawn and berthed inside the Indian port of Karwar. Whither I.N. strategy for deterrence and strategy for conflict?
Far from establishing dominance, the Indian Navy made all attempts to stay out of harm’s way in the North Arabian Sea, outclassed by the Pakistan Navy. The massive disinformation and blatant lies about targeting and damaging Karachi port, blockade of Karachi, etc., now lie fully exposed. Truth reminds us one of the Sanskrit and national motto
of India: “Satyameva Jayate” truth alone triumphs.” Indeed, this time, however, it certainly did not hold true for India. It seems the Pakistan Navy has turned the Indian Navy’s self-proclaimed title and national motto on its head. The key takeaways of the just-concluded war in the North Arabian Sea are:
a). Pakistan Navy’s A2/AD strategy stands verified and established
b). The myth of Indian Navy’s invincibility and ‘Net Security Provider’ status stands broken
c). Indian Navy’s carrier task group proved an abject failure in establishing conditions for local sea control, let alone dominating the North Arabian Sea
d). Indian Navy’s fleet of carriers, battleships, and modern submarines failed to dent the resolve and deterrence potential of the Pakistan Navy
e). The operational and other aspects of capacity building of the Indian Navy by the U.S. Navy and partner navies, vis-a-vis its recently demonstrated combat capability, raises serious questions on such investments
Will this trigger a rethinking in Washington-whether or not to outsource its strategic responsibilities in an important region to a partner navy that, despite huge investments, hardware, and operational support, stands outclassed by a tiny Pakistan Navy? This verdict can be safely left to time-and perhaps to the next round. However, India’s fallacy of being a regional policeman and Net Security Provider stands knocked down and completely fractured.
The author is an independent researcher with an abiding interest in maritime security, strategic, and naval issues.