The more things change…

The long march has highlighted that commitment to the constitution is the only guarantee against economic and political crises

The more things change…


F

rench writer Alphonse Karr wrote in 1849 that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Pakistan has been mired in deep and intractable political and economic crises. A careful scrutiny of the events unfolding on a daily basis recently suggests that Pakistan’s political crises have almost been as old as its existence. Meanwhile, the economic crises have become just as compelling.

A massive intellectual effort has been devoted to explaining why Pakistan has failed to shed the straitjacket and achieve a modicum of economic and political stability. It is difficult to adequately summarise all the factors contributing to Pakistan’s dismal performance over time but a few stand out, nonetheless.

The overlap in the domains of various national institutions has created mant of the challenges. Pakistan gravitates among at least four sources of power: the military establishment, judiciary, civil bureaucracy and the political elite. The constitution clearly spells out the scope of these institutions and suggests penalties for any aberration or encroachment by one institution on the domain of another.

The May 25 long march has highlighted once again that a firm commitment to the constitution in letter and spirit is the only guarantee against economic and political crises. Before we identify how different institutions infringe on one another’s sphere of activities, let us look at some facts about the nature of these institutions in isolation.

Contrary to their sloganeering, the political class is creating more space for the other institutions. Former prime minister Imran Khan never made a secret of the establishment’s role in installing and propping up his government. His jibes in recent months at the establishment for remaining neutral when the opposition was launching its vote of no confidence against him, are in line with the narrative.

It would be instructive to analyse Imran Khan’s conduct. He has several unique characteristics with significant implications for the bodypolitic. First, his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf is a democratic party. There is hardly any question about its democratic character. In this respect, the PTI is indistinguishable from other mainstream political parties. However, Khan also conducts himself as an individual with a Messianic mission. Some of his speeches are heavily punctuated with religious vocabulary. That his slips of the tongue in his references to religious concepts often expose him to sharp criticism is another matter.

Things took an embarrassing turn during the long march when the former deputy speaker of the National Assembly urged him to add an “Islamic touch” to his speech. The microphone picked up the suggestion. Khan did not disappoint Suri.

Yet another dimension of Imran Khan’s politics is his belated assumption of a revolutionary role. He demands unreserved allegiance from his followers for the cause of “real freedom.” Not many of his supporters bother much with the fact that he has hardly ever categorically spelled out from whom he wants “freedom”. The US? His role in making the central bank aautonomous and throwing spanners in the CPEC works are seen as measures supportive of and promoting the interests of the United States.

The more things change…


Even if the former prime minister’s regime was largely a failure in terms of development and governance, and, ironically, transparency standards, he has deviated from the general political culture with respect to confrontation with the establishment.

Does he want freedom from the allegedly corrupt political parties in Pakistan? Does he want freedom from frequent interventions of state institutions in political affairs?

Did he do something substantial during his prime ministership to create the right circumstances for the country to assert itself? He may have realised that it is best to keep the concept of freedom ambiguous.

The other major stakeholders in the political class are the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakitan Peoples Party. The PML-N received establishment support to counter the influence of the PPP. The party had rarely challenged the power equation until Nawaz Sharif called out certain individuals in the establishment by name and publicly blamed them for his exit from office. He also introduced the narrative of respect for the vote. He has appeared before the courts and, at least at one point, landed in jail of his own volition. He could have stayed away in 2018, but he chose to come to Pakistan and was incarcerated.

However, except for a few individuals, the top leadership of the party has not shied away from looking for the establishment’s blessing. The PML-N vote in favour of the PTI-led bill in the parliament seeking an extension for the incumbent military chief is a case in point.

In addition to its inability to assert itself as a genuinely democratic party that relies on mass popularity, the PML-N has failed to distance itself from dynastic politics. What made Shehbaz Sharif choose his son for the top slot in the Punjab? Is there no one else in the PML-N good enough to run the largest province?

The genesis of the PPP was not much different from the PML-N. Its founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had served in Ayub Khan’s cabinet. However, the love-hate relationship between the PPP and the establishment has been more extreme.

Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was probably the only democratic leader in Pakistan who never had a good relationship with the establishment. Like her father, Benazir Bhutto she came to a violent end during a military dictator’s regime. History has been exceptionally kind to Benazir Bhutto, rare by Pakistani standards, as only a few politicians have been revered by friends and foes alike after their demise.

The PPP today is a shadow of what it used to be. Asif Ali Zardari is a master of realpolitik. Few people can rival him in determining the opportune time for a political move. Widespread poverty and underdevelopment in Sindh, the bastion of the PPP’s political power, shows that public welfare remains secondary to the exigencies of the power game. This accentuates the irony that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto mobilised the masses with his popular slogans about basic human needs.

Even if Imran Khan’s regime has largely been a failure in terms of development and governance, and, ironically, transparency standards, he has widely deviated from the general political culture with respect to confrontation with the establishment. No political party in the past has been as vociferously opposed to the establishment’s role in the country’s political affairs as the PTI.

Pakistan’s security establishment has rarely been subjected to such vile attacks on social media as has been done in recent weeks and months. The biggest irony, however, is that the resentment of the PTI is not directed at the intervention of the establishment in political affairs. It is primarily directed towards the army chief for not rescuing the PTI’s fledgling regime.

It is time for all stakeholders to put their act together and commit themselves to their constitutional duty of operating within their spheres of activities as spelled out in the constitution.


The writer is an associate professor in the Department of Economics at COMSATS University Islamabad, Lahore Campus

The more things change…