With the sudden collapse of President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Afghanistan one may ponder whether The Great Game has finally come full circle. It appears that it has but the situation harbours new tipping points. The emerging situation is burdened with competition as in the past. The difference is that it is more complex and may be more unsettling. Essentially, what happened in Doha and how the Taliban took control of Kabul point to secret games played out within the framework of geopolitics. As the Confidential Annexures to Doha Agreement remain secret, full facts about how the Kabul government funded and supported by the US and its allies for 20 years collapsed so suddenly are not known.

Whether or not the new situation can prevent ethnic conflicts and the endemic violent instability will be clear once the negotiations currently under way for forming an inclusive government conclude. Till then, the situation will remain highly fluid. One of the positive signals so far is that Mullah Baradar has met some key stakeholders including a few women representatives. They include Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah. The talks are meant to build consensus for peace, stability and national reconciliation. Abdullah has confirmed: “We discussed the current situation and ways of helping to provide the right security for the people of Afghanistan, especially for the citizens of Kabul.” According to some unconfirmed reports, consultations are also being held with Ahmad Massoud —son of Ahmad Shah Massoud — although there are rumors that opposition forces are rushing to Panjshir valley for a showdown against the Taliban. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has also been approached. As of August 25, an agreement had not been reached on forming the government.

The Taliban have rejected elections and popular vote as a basis for forming the government. They want to establish an Islamic Emirate but have not so far named a head of government or announced how they intend to install its key institutions. They have been saying that the future government will be “inclusive.” Whether this inclusive government will be transitional to allow the state institutions to resume normal functions or a permanent political set-up is open to conjecture. Will it be a repeat of the 1990’s Taliban government?

The Taliban have often said that the legal system will be shariah based and that the issue of “what kind of laws and political system it adopts will not be discussed.” Recently a senior leader has said, “We will not discuss what type of political system we should apply in Afghanistan because it is clear. It is shariah law and that’s it.” They have also said they plan to respect women’s rights “within the norms of Islamic law.”

The Taliban can achieve a lot if they carefully formulate their policies and are able to build up national consensus. Bad consultations will spoil everything. The entire region is positively inclined to help an intra-Afghan reconciliation process to end instability but national interests alone will define policies and relations with the Taliban-governed Afghanistan. There are tricky questions about its recognition as a valid Afghan government, especially if an elected entity stakes a rival claim. Some of its leaders are still designated as terrorists. Those granted amnesty may again face sanctions in September. Their assurance that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used against any country, has failed to cut ice with the countries that will matter in removing the UN sanctions against Taliban leaders. As for the state, no fresh recognition is required.

The neighbouring countries are watching the new developments keenly. The most likely scenario points to no haste in formal recognition. Ground conditions can result in a shift in declared positions. The Russian Federation that hosted Afghan Talks twice with Taliban said on August 25 that the situation was very tense and that the terrorist threat was “very high.” The establishment of an Islamic State in Afghanistan as well as the presence of the Taliban in Kabul was cited as a factor. Russia has no intention to intervene militarily but it is concerned about the drugs and extremism threats. It appears ready to engage with Afghanistan. It has not issued any protest at the overthrow of the recognised government.

China can help Taliban government the most in securing recognition at the UN and help it the most in financial terms. It seems to have a soft corner for them.

State Councillor Wang Yi met Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on July 28 and described the group as a “pivotal military and political force.” In the wake of the fall of Kabul, it has reiterated that it “respects the choice of Afghans” and is “ready to develop good-neighbourliness and friendly cooperation” with the Afghanistan. . Nevertheless, it “shares the same fears that Central Asian countries have over neighbouring Afghanistan: the rise of Islamic terrorism, a new wave of refugees and increased narcotics trafficking”. It will want that Afghanistan not become a safe haven for terrorist organisations like the ETIM. Another factor is China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects and the safety of Chinese nationals. There are vast opportunities in fields like reconstruction, mining and manufacturing. China may offer training facilities for security authorities at an appropriate time but will not rush formal recognition prior to lifting of UN sanctions on Taliban leaders. Turkey can regain influence by early recognition that is not in sight. Iran is ready to forget the past. If the Taliban strike a deal with the Northern Alliance, then Iran will not have any difficulty in seeking strategic alignment with the Taliban. India is almost out and suffered the most due to the sudden fall of Ghani’s government. It has been a major development partner in Afghanistan, but its contacts with the Taliban were sporadic and low level. Due to economic assistance, training and scholarships it had offered in the past, it retains sufficient influence to stage a comeback if Pakistan lowers its guard.

Pakistan may have reasons to gloat over the new situation for a short while but may face serious challenges while dealing with old tensions and inability to extend economic relief and diplomatic support to prepare the ground for an early recognition at the UN. Its special relations with the Taliban bring with it some unintended challenges. If proxies wars continue, development and economic interests might not last long.

It has to be watchful of what the Taliban government means for its internal security. Pakistan’s influence may hinge on Afghan’s perception of how helpful Pakistan is? Pakistan may take time to provide official recognition to the Taliban government. It may coordinate with several countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE in the hope that it can accord the recognition along with other states.

The US might have suffered a historic humiliation but its support will pave the way for formal recognition of the Taliban government and direly needed removal of formal and informal economic constrictions including bank deposits and IMF aid.

The writer is a former ambassador and advisor to CRSS, an Islamabad-based think tank. He can be reached at mian.sana@gmail.com