What was the raison d’etre of Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s dharna (sit-in) is the question that has left many in an utter state of quandary. Ideological positions of Maulana and the person he was campaigning against (Imran Khan) were not markedly different.

Khan probably poses a threat to religio-political groups with his rhetoric of establishing a state on the principles of Riasat-i-Madina. The religious right might feel that their (political) slogan is being appropriated. Thus, the acrimony was likely caused not because a difference in ideological positions but the affinity of the ideologies that might have bred ill-will between the PTI and the Jamiat-i- Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rahman), obviously supported (though halfheartedly) by the rest of the opposition parties.

One fact that became far too obvious in the dharna was the phenomenal ignorance of the leaders of JUI-F, it was as if they had just descended into the 21st century from the medieval ages. It is immensely significant that the rightist parties face a dilemma after the left-liberal parties and groups faded away. The challenge for the religious right is even steeper now.

Ever since the left-liberal politics has taken a back seat in Pakistan, the right-wing parties are finding it hard to distinguish themselves from the rest because all of them seem to be embracing the same ideological norms. They try to distinguish themselves by underlining their social agenda, mostly by projecting their policy to alleviate the lot of the poor and launching of mega projects. Here the difference between the political and social becomes quite stark.

In their political ideology, they are somewhat reactionary. Socially, these parties try to appropriate the agenda of the liberal-left. The PTI and Muslim League (Nawaz) both focus on ameliorating the state of the deprived and the dispossessed. But it is more said than done. It is the sameness of the political idiom and monotony of political action which has become an abiding feature of Pakistani politics. These parties also have a sprinkling of liberals who matter very little in terms of formulating the strategy and objectives that these parties set themselves achieve.

All said and done, with ideology having been rendered superfluous in our politics, the charismatic personalities have become the decisive factor in determining the course of Pakistan’s electoral politics. Therefore, barbs are exchanged at the personal level. An informed critique on policy thus seems quite alien to the political culture.

Besides charismatic personality, the personal (material) gain is another factor, galvanising Pakistan’s politics. Since Sharif family’s venture, politics has virtually become a business. Thus, ideology and idealism are nothing but eccentricities with no practical utility. Material gain is a mantra that has overtaken even Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his colleagues.

But my main concern in the remaining part of this column is Maulana’s jeopardised status in the current political scenario. The dharna was, in fact, an attempt in sheer desperation to demonstrate that he and his party are still relevant despite the fact that national political scene has hardly any space for parties with an ideology (religious or otherwise).

In order to make sense of the role of religious right in Pakistan, it is important to underline the ambivalence about the nature of Pakistani state. Despite best efforts, I can still not define Pakistani state in definitive terms; whether it is a nation state or ideological polity remains a niggling question to me.

An ideological state tends to transcend geographical frontiers and, define its culture, value system and worldview in the light of certain fundamental postulates which constitute the foundation of the ideology. Such dispensation offers a space to right-wing politics and squeezes out liberal or leftist groups and factions. In Pakistan, right-wing parties and persons draw substantial support from countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. The network of religious right spreads beyond the north western borders of Pakistan.

The operations of various kinds in Afghanistan are absolutely justified if viewed from an ideological standpoint. The nation state, however, holds the frontiers sacrosanct and cultural ethos that its proponents adhere to must have local roots. In its evolved version citizens are equal, irrespective of their caste creed and religion. A person from any religion can be elected to the highest position (at least in theory). That’s one reason why the religious right (or ultra-right wing) politics mostly exist on the periphery.

The politics of exclusion is not permissible the way it is done in an ideological state. Pakistan, to my reckoning, is a bit of both. It is an ideological state in peculiar circumstances, such as in the 1980s. The state institutions favouring ideology over the state, were in fact the legatee of the nation state system. They were essentially meant to serve Pakistan, first and the foremost, but under Ziaul Haq, these institutions started peddling an ideology that was transnational.

However, under Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan, in the wake of 9/11, was defined as a nation state when the slogan of sab sey pehley Pakistan(first of all, Pakistan) was raised. The outcome of Lal Masjid operation in the form of suicide attacks against state institutions forced the army and the establishment to act against the ideological elements (religious militants). This amounted to reinforcing the nation state system, which was no less than a paradigm shift in the military leadership’s approach.

After a long-drawn struggle, the religiously motivated ideologues were brought low to a considerable extent. Concurrently, the religious parties were discredited in the eyes of the general public because of the reign of terror unleashed by the terrorists with their implicit support. Now the border on the northwest is being fenced to check the free flow of Afghans into Pakistan’s territory.

Besides, state institutions have become exceedingly vigilant in monitoring foreign funding that religious parties had been receiving from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. This was the last straw on the camel’s back. On top of that all, Fazlur Rahman was routed in the last year’s elections. In view of all this, the dharna was an effort to stall the existential threat, which despite all his efforts seems inevitable. In a nation state and the political dispensation it ensures, the religious right will hardly have a significant role.