Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) is a religious party that stands out alone among all other religious parties in many ways: It is the only religious party that has been in the government no matter who ruled the country, whether it was the regime of a military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, a left-leaning PPP or a right-leaning PMLN. It is the only religious party that has always bagged more seats in elections than any other religious party, and the only one to have suffered terror attacks from the militants.

What made it a target of the militants’ wrath when its basic policies and ideology are in no way opposed to what these militants claim to aspire for. This mystery becomes more complicated when the JUI-F itself denies that it is being targeted by militants.

From 2011 to this date, nearly 87 persons have lost their lives in terror attacks targeting the JUI-F while another leading religious party Jamat-e-Islami (JI) lost 24 people during the same period. These numbers do not say enough about the horrific violence the JUI-F experienced compared to JI. Of the 87 fatalities of the JUI-F, 36 were victims of bomb explosions, 31 of suicide attacks, and only 16 were victims of target killings. The number of those injured in these attacks was higher than the death count.

In contrast, all the JI activists who lost their lives to violence were victims of target killings by unidentified persons for unknown reasons. Moreover, no militant outfit ever claimed responsibility for such attacks. In this sense, the JUI-F wasn’t as lucky as the JI was.

From 2011 to this date, violence against the JUI-F took the shape of five suicide attacks, eight bomb explosions, two hand grenade attacks, and more than 15 target killing incidents. The militant organisations that claimed responsibility for some of these attacks against the JUI-F included TTP, Jundullah - a splinter group of TTP, and Daish (Islamic State).

The first major attack on the JUI-F was reported on March 30, 2011 when a suicide bomber on a motorcycle blew himself up near a JUI-F convoy in Swabi. The target was JUI-F chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman but he escaped unhurt while two policemen and eight civilians couldn’t survive this attack. On the very next day, another suicide attack targeting the JUI-F chief’s convoy took place in Charsadda wherein 12 persons were martyred including three security personnel. The party chief was lucky again to have remained safe. No group claimed responsibility for these attacks but Maulana Fazlur Rehman blamed the US and ‘some other elements’ citing his policies of opposing drone attacks, criticising the release of Raymond Davis and captivity of Aafia Siddiqui as the reasons behind them.

During the 2013 election campaign, TTP had openly targeted three mainstream political parties -- MQM, ANP, and PPP but it was the JUI-F that lost more of its activists to militant attacks than the PPP.

From January to May 2013, MQM lost 114 activists followed by ANP’s 78, JUI-F’s 38, and PPP’s 19. What caused militant outfits to target JUI-F was revealed in TTP’s statement on May7, 2013 as blast ripped through the election rally of JUI-F’s candidate for NA-38, Munir Orakzai leaving 23 people dead and injuring 70. The spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan took responsibility for the attack and said that the target was Munir Orakzai and not the JUI-F party activists.

Ehsan also claimed that they had been trying for long to kill Munir Orakzai as he had remained an active member of the coalition government of the PPP, MQM and ANP. Earlier, in a video tape, TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud was also seen personally shooting dead former ISI official Col Amir Sultan, commonly known as Col Imam, while accusing Munir Orakzai of selling the Arab fighters to the US. To everyone’s surprise, the JUI-F candidate for NA-37 in Kurram Agency, Maulana Ainuddin Shakir claimed that TTP was not behind the blast at their rally. On the next day, another attack using a remote-controlled bomb was carried out in Hangu against JUI-F candidate Mufti Syed Jannan that left 12 persons dead and 35 injured. Nobody claimed this attack.

On Oct 24, 2014, Jundullah, a splinter group TTP, claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Quetta that had targeted JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman. Three persons were killed and 15 were injured; luck favoured Maulana again as he remained unhurt. The claimants of this attack, however, proudly admitted that he was their target and reiterated that their hunt will continue. The reason they quoted was: "He has been speaking against us and doing actions against us for which he was targeted."

For a religious party that has always remained in the parliament and has enjoyed a strong influence on Pakistan’s militant groups like Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Waliur Rehman Meshud and his successor Sajna, these terror attacks and accusations of militant organisations are indicative of the fallouts the JUI-F often suffered while playing balancing games with different forces which caused resentment within some factions of these militants who eventually took to violence against them in retaliation. Yet, luck sided with Maulana and he came out unscathed.

Besides facing terror attacks, JUI-F had some other problems as well. Soon after coming into power on June 5, 2013, the PML-N government began talking of holding peace negotiations with the TTP but it wasn’t until the beginning of 2014 that the momentum picked up. Being a federal minister, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, attached great hopes of becoming the government’s best option to lead such an endeavour. To his utter dismay, neither the lists of names shared by the PM nor the one offered by TTP included him. Instead, his political rivals like Imran Khan, Maulana Samiul Haq, Munawar Hasan and Professor Muhammad Ibrahim Khan from JI, Maulana Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid, and a JUI-F’s former lawmaker Mufti Kifayatullah were there. It was a great shock for Maulana.

While the efforts were on to hold peace talks with the TTP, some unpleasant incidents also took place. Right in the initial stage of negotiation offers, a drone attack killed the TTP chief, Hakeemullah Mehsud creating a power struggle between different warlords. Mullah Muhammad Omar was reported to have intervened and handed over the TTP leadership to a non-Mehsud, Mullah Fazlullah of Swat to save the TTP from further disintegration. The loser was Khalid Mehsud, alias Khan Said Sajna, who was considered to be influenced by Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F. In the past, this position was always held by a militant hailing from the Mehsud clan of South Waziristan but this historical tradition was not followed this time.

What caused this unconventional overture at this particular time is unknown but it reduced the Mehsud tribe’s hold on TTP; and with it, Maulana’s position became insignificant for the upcoming negotiations with the TTP.

The rift between the TTP and its disgruntled Sajna group caused infighting that killed more than 60 militants during April-May 2014 period. This and other factors led to a stall in the ongoing peace talk process ensuing criticism between JUI-S and JUI-F. On May 16, 2014, Maulana Samiul Haq of  the JUI-S blamed ‘some parties’ and so-called Maulvis doing everything to compromise negotiations with the Taliban. The JUI-F, on the other hand, reiterated that if the peace negotiations with the Taliban were conducted under the grand jirga held by the JUI-F, it would surely have succeeded.

In addition to these accusations and counter-accusations, it became quite evident that three major religious parties, JUI-S, JI, and JUI-F, enjoyed some sort of influence on militant groups in the country. JI’s former chief is famous for calling the TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud a ‘shaheed (martyr)’ when he was killed in a drone attack while the chief of the JUI-S, Maulana Samiul Haq never hesitates to call the Taliban his ‘children’. The JUI-F is the only religious party that agrees with the militants on many points. However, there were some disagreements too: The JUI-F’s stance on sectarian violence against the Shia Hazara in Balochistan had once incited a wave of condemnation from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi who called them ‘Iranian agents’ and ‘secular leaders.’

It was JUI-F’s MNA Asiya Nasir, who questioned the constitutional provision that disallows minorities to become the PM or President of the country. The decision of JUI-F not to join Difa-e-Pakistan Council - an alliance of religious parties, jihadi groups and retired military officers, led by Jamaat-ud-Dawa was a step that further separated JUI-F from a large group of religious parties whose main components included its arch rivals - JUI-S and JI.

The latest attack on JUI-F convoy in Mastung was the deadliest in terms of casualties, 27 dead and 40 wounded. It was a reminder to the JUI-F that violence against them would continue unless they mended their ways. The price the JUI-F paid for its courage to pursue a policy that is not fully compliant with the militants’ approach is phenomenal.

On the other hand, the relative safety from violence enjoyed by the JI and the JUI-S conveys a very loud and clear message: to stay safe, avoid defying the militants. How will the government be able to muster support from the nation on the war against terror when the militants have been successful in threatening those who dare to (marginally) defy them? All claims of success in the war against terror become futile when even an ally of the government like the JUI-F is not safe from such threats.