Qadri's movement: A response to the rise of Deobandi groups?

August 31, 2014

Will Qadri's emergence lead to sectarian balance or confrontation?

Qadri's movement: A response to the rise of Deobandi groups?

The future of Tahirul Qadri’s quest for a revolution is uncertain, but his scuffle will certainly add to persisting sectarian polarisation in the country. Small Barelvi and Shia groups and parties struggling to go up against their Deobandi sectarian rivals may come under the influence of Qadri’s Pakistan Awami Tehreek.

Though Tahirul Qadri claims he does not have any sectarian agenda and vows to eradicate sectarian hatred and persecution from the country, he seeks support only from the Barelvi school of thought and factions of Shia community, who admire his oratory.

One apparent reason for not giving sectarian colour to his recent agitation and sit-in was Qadri’s desire to emerge as a non-controversial ‘revolutionary’ leader in the country, which is his longstanding dream. A review of his earlier publications suggest that he has been following this dream since late 1980s, when he started revealing his controversial dreams.

His dreams had created anger among religious scholars including those belonging to the Barelvi school of thought. However, he has gradually succeeded in influencing a segment of middle-class communities in central and northern Punjab. Interestingly, migrants from these regions constitute a bulk of Pakistani diasporas in Europe and North America, particularly in the UK, Nordic countries and Canada. Through his followers belonging to central and northern Punjab, Qadri has been able to hold influence among Pakistani diaspora communities. Also, this influence helped him strengthen his image of a modern religious scholar.

Though most among Pakistan’s credible religious scholars have serious concerns about his dreams and religious interpretations, he has successfully managed to sustain his popularity through rhetorical claims and rabble-rousing. Another reason for his sustained popularity among diaspora communities is that the latter interpreted his dreams by themselves without consulting some credible experts of Islamic law.

He decided to transform his day dreaming into reality by converting his religious support base into political support base. He formed a political party and contested four consecutive elections. But only once, during General Musharraf’s reign in 2002, he could manage to win a seat from the Jhang district of Punjab. However, during his political career he has remained part of alliances of opposition parties. But that too was perhaps not enough to achieve his political ambitions.

Qadri’s failures in Pakistan’s politics and growing resentment among his followers over his political adventures convinced him to quit politics and settle in Canada.

It provided an excellent opportunity to small Barelvi and Shia parties to pool their resources in Qadri’s movement to maximise their impact and to protect their interests. Sunni Tehreek, Sunni Ittehad Council and Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen have already joined Qadri.

During the early years of his political career, Qadri had tried to stay away from the Barelvi political parties; the Barelvi political leadership also did not take him seriously. Though Barelvi parties themselves were not performing well in electoral politics, they were considered part of the religious-political mainstream. The Barelvis were not alone in their weak electoral performance; Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) were facing similar crisis. Most importantly, the Barelvis were not facing any serious sectarian challenge, unlike Shias. Their representative party Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) was part of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of religious-political parties, which led governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces in 2002.

Now the situation is different. The JI and JUI still enjoy shares in power, either in federal or provincial governments but, after the death of its senior leadership, JUP has weakened over time; the Taliban and sectarian groups have created a survival challenge for them as well.

As his supporters were against any repeat of earlier failed political adventures, particularly those among Pakistani diaspora communities in the West, Qadri came up with the slogan of revolution and found the space to continue his political adventures.

Read also: The sectarian angle of Inqilab March

On the other hand, it provided an excellent opportunity to small Barelvi and Shia parties to pool their resources in Qadri’s movement to maximise their impact and to protect their interests. Sunni Tehreek, Sunni Ittehad Council and Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen have already joined Qadri.

Tahirul Qadri has emerged as a flicker of hope for these parties, which may not be very hopeful of Qadri’s revolution but look up to him and his movement as a fitting response to the rise of Deobandi groups in Pakistan. They hope they can create some sectarian balance in the country.

The Deobandi organisations also see Qadri’s adventure in the sectarian perspective and take it as a challenge. Their reaction suggests they have taken these developments very seriously. It is not a good sign for the society, which is already fragmented on sectarian, religious and ideological bases. These developments will increase sectarian divide and confrontation, which may further disturb the sectarian balance in the country. How can Qadri avoid this situation? It will be a tougher challenge to confront than his revolutionary movement.

This article was printed with the title “Qadri’s Dreams” in The News on Sunday on August 31, 2014. 

Qadri's movement: A response to the rise of Deobandi groups?