any forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

This quote is from a speech by former British prime minister, Winston Churchill, to the House of Commons in 1947. This was the year Pakistan got independence from the British. While the country experimented with various styles of governance in the first few years after its independence, it chose to adopt a parliamentary style of governance in the 1973 constitution. However, the transition has been anything but smooth.

The civil-military relationship in Pakistan has always remained under spotlight since a martial law was imposed by Gen Ayub Khan in 1958. During that time, the country also adopted a presidential form of government. Even during the civilian regimes, there has been frequent interference by the establishment. This has frequently caused obvious friction. Several attempts have been made during the country’s history to find the right balance between civilian governments and the powerful establishment.

The term hybrid regime became popular during the PTI government when even the then prime minister, Imran Khan, and his cabinet members started highlighting the advantages of such a system. The succeeding PDM government has been described by some people as hybrid plus because of the strong establishment backing. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif seems to relish the idea. In a recent statement, he not only defended this arrangement but also said that it should have been put in place in the 1990s when civil-military conflict was at its peak and successive governments of the PML-N and the PPP were ousted because of it.

Dr Alexander Schmotz, a senior fellow in the Department of Global Governance at the Berlin Social Science Centre, has studied the concept of hybrid regimes. In one of his essays published in the Oxford Handbook of Political, Social and Economic Transformation, he has described hybrid governance model as a mixture of democratic and autocratic institutional features. He believes that most political regimes in the modern world display some form of such arrangement.

“All hybrid-regime concepts can be sorted into either one of the two categories of defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism; how all hybrid-regime concepts are constructed along the two institutional dimensions of electoralism and constitutionalism; and how explanations of hybrid-regime persistence and change fall into four categories: electoralist, nested game approaches, neo-institutional and non-electoral explanations,” says Dr Schmotz.

But why does a world that takes so much pride in democratic norms entertain such an arrangement in countries like Pakistan? To start with, the United States has always found a trusted ally in the Pakistan establishment even during troubled and short-lived civilian tenures. The US doesn’t want to lose Pakistan as a strategic partner in the region, a mistake they made after the first Afghan War. Several American officials have echoed the sentiment since. There is a sense in the Western world that the military is not only disciplined but also the only constant in Pakistan where political turmoil is always around the corner. Secondly, the Western world’s paranoia about Pakistan’s nuclear programme is also kept in check by the military establishment. They have assured the world that the nukes are safe with them at the helm and stand no chance of falling in the ‘wrong hands.’

Hybrid regimes also allow the powerful military establishment to have their say in the functioning of the state and in shaping the narratives on the domestic and foreign fronts. Dr Matthew Nelson, professor of politics at The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, has answered this question in his latest essay, Pakistan in 2024: Reconstituting a Hybrid Regime, for the Asian Press. He believes that the nature of internal and external challenges necessitated such an arrangement.

“In 2024, Pakistan was focused on four Is: (a) military and civilian pressure on former prime minister Imran Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf; (b) a constitutional amendment, facilitated by Supreme Court Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, aiming to reduce judicial independence; (c) the successful pursuit of a fresh bailout from the IMF that helped to stem inflation; and (d) expanding insurgencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—the former associated with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and the latter, with the Balochistan Liberation Army: both groups enjoyed cross-border support from Afghanistan and (alleged) covert support from India,” Dr Nelson notes in his article. “To constrain the populism of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and the autonomy of the superior courts, in a context characterised by critical economic and security challenges, government and military officials collaborated to shore up Pakistan’s civil-military (democratic-authoritarian) ‘hybrid regime’,” he adds.

Pakistan’s recent diplomatic outreach—both civilian-led and military-driven—in the wake of the recent war with India and the ensuing Iran-Israel conflict, was focused on engagements in the US and Europe, and aimed to achieve a global positioning through dual-track diplomacy. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif sent a delegation led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari to Europe and the US to further Pakistan’s narrative. This mission aimed to reclaim narrative control in the wake of sharp global attention during the conflict, and to reinforce Pakistan’s listing as a “responsible regional actor.”

Field Marshal Asim Munir’s high-profile lunch invitation with President Donald Trump at the White House gained global attention. Trump publicly commended the army chief’s role in defusing the May India-Pakistan escalation. The luncheon marked the first time a Pakistani military official attended the White House in such fashion without a head-of-state status. After the meeting at the White House, the Pakistani government officially nominated Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize for his key role in the Indo-Pakistan war.

Apparently, the US views the Pakistani establishment as a conduit to security cooperation on counterterrorism, crypto-regulation and regional stability amid Iran-Israel tensions. With rising concerns regarding China and the Global South, a military-to-military channel is seen as a reset from the years when bilateral ties weakened apparently due to Pakistan’s pivot to China following the US exit from Afghanistan.

Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has presented Field Marshal Asim Munir’s Washington visit as a direct and visible result of the hybrid governance model. His candid embrace of the “hybrid model” signals recognition by political bigwigs that power-sharing—not confrontation—best ensures institutional survival and global credibility.

The country’s ruling elite are increasingly presenting this blend as pragmatic—a dual-track diplomatic carriage combining civilian negotiation skills with military leverage and command in moments of crisis.

Even former prime minister Imran Khan, who claims to be striving for “haqeeqi azadi” (real freedom) to rid the country of alien interference, recognises the importance of military establishment as the real decision makers. That is why he insists on talking only to the army chief when it comes to negotiating the way forward.

For now, the hybrid arrangement has paid dividends. President Trump’s overtures reflect a US appetite for Pakistan’s strategic connectivity: counterterrorism, trade routes and regional crisis management. Some analysts warn that this warmth may be personalised and contingent and lack institutional depth. India, meanwhile, sees Field Marshal Asim Munir’s recognition and President’s Trump’s praise of him as a threat to its regional standing. New Delhi also views Pakistan’s bilateral diplomacy surge as a challenge to its own influence in Washington and Brussels.

The road ahead for the incumbent hybrid regime has its own risks and rewards.

At home, critics see the hybrid model as a compromise on democratic culture, even if defended as “pragmatic.” Historically, the country has not had much success with over-reliance on personalities. The much-touted Trump-Munir chemistry is just another episode in a long list of Ayub-Kennedy, Zia-Reagan, Musharraf-Bush personal relationships that fizzled out quickly once the US interest waned.

For the time being, though, this approach has tapped into Pakistan’s hybrid governance model, which the defence minister says is “doing wonders.” The world’s reaction—cautious interest in Washington; scrutiny in Brussels; and outcry in Delhi—highlights that this is a high-wire balancing act.

While the strategy might yield some gains in trade access, investment and military cooperation, it also raises fundamental questions about democratic norms and civil-military relations in Pakistan. The sense that this is a personality-driven moment suggests that stabilising and institutionalising this initiative will require a deep shift within Pakistan: more transparency, stronger civilian oversight and credible assurances on civilian rights and governance.

The writer teaches journalism at Lamar University in Texas. His X handle: @awaissaleem77