The possibilities in a Sino-centric world order

Tahir Kamran
June 8, 2025

The possibilities in a Sino-centric world order


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s Western-led global dominance begins to show signs of decline, a growing discourse is taking shape around the contours of the emerging world order. The rise of China, alongside the diffusion of power across the Indo-Pacific, is forcing a re-evaluation of global governance.

Whether this is a straightforward power transition or a deep civilisational shift remains an open question. Henry Kissinger, in his deeply reflective book, On China, carefully traced the philosophical and strategic traditions underlying China’s statecraft, painting a picture of a power that prefers patience, continuity and ambiguity.

On the other hand, thinkers like Samuel Huntington have argued that China’s resurgence is part of a broader “clash of civilisations,” wherein the Sinic civilisation will seek to assert itself against Western dominance. Peter Nolan has added another dimension, highlighting how the West fundamentally misunderstands China’s political economy by clinging to outdated binaries of market versus state and liberalism versus authoritarianism. Nolan has emphasised that China’s model is not merely functional but also ideologically coherent in ways the West has failed to grasp.

China’s rise invites serious inquiry into whether a Sino-centric world order is plausible, and what such a global configuration might mean for countries that have traditionally operated at the periphery of global power centres. Pakistan, geopolitically vital but perpetually unstable, is a compelling case study. The central question is whether China can—or will—engage with Pakistan in a way similar to the way the US and its allies have done in the past.

This writer believes in the importance of geography as a vital determinant in the formulation of any country’s foreign policy. The answer to this vexed question is thus complex and rests on shifting assumptions about power, influenceand patronage.

Based on realist international relations theory, especially the power transition theory of Robert Gilpin, it is evident that China’s ascent challenges the long-standing hegemony of the United States. The global system, once unipolar after the Cold War, is now moving towards multi-polarity or bipolarity, with China positioning itself as a central pole.

This is not merely a challenge of military or economic scale, but one that also reconfigures cultural and ideological legitimacy. Huntington’s civilisational theory, criticised for its deterministic lens, provides insight into how China views itself—not as a new power on the rise, but as an old power returning to its rightful place at the centre of global affairs. Peter Nolan’s analysis further complicates this picture by illustrating how China’s unique hybrid of state control and capitalist integration has enabled it to expand globally without adopting the Western liberal order.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its leadership role in BRICS+ and its establishment of institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank suggest an ambition to recalibrate global governance away from the Washington-centred norm. Rather than universal values, China offers infrastructural connectivity, strategic non-interference and a highly pragmatic vision of international cooperation. Yet this vision, while ideologically lighter than Western liberalism, still places China firmly at the centre, with peripheral states becoming nodes in a vast economic and logistical web—a modern reincarnation of the tributary system adapted for global capitalism.

In this matrix, Pakistan occupies a uniquely ambivalent position. On one hand, its strategic geography makes it a valuable partner for China, particularly as a corridor to the Arabian Sea via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. On the other, Pakistan’s chronic institutional dysfunction, economic fragility and political volatility limit its ability to be more than a client state.

Although the CPEC has been championed as a transformative venture, its benefits have been asymmetrically distributed, with Chinese firms and priorities often taking precedence. Beijing’s approach to Islamabad has been largely transactional and tactical: it possibly sees Pakistan as a counterweight to India, a buffer to unrest in Xinjiang and a logistical route—not as a partner in development in the way the US engaged with Western Europe or East Asia during the Cold War.

Unlike the US, which is usually perceived to frame its support in ideological terms and often engaged in institution-building—albeit with mixed results—China’s patronage is interest-based. In terms of security, China has supplied military hardware and support, but is unlikely to unconditionally underwrite Pakistan’s defence needs. Its security calculus is defined by its own regional priorities, not alliance obligations.

Developmentally, China does not seek to export a governance model, nor does it invest in institutional reform. It offers roads, ports and loans—tools that can catalyse growth but also deepen dependence. This model presumes a level of recipient state capacity that Pakistan, currently, does not possess.

Despite these constraints, the relationship between China and Pakistan has gained renewed vigour, particularly in the aftermath of the Pahalgam incident that briefly drew regional attention to tensions with India. This episode reminded both Beijing and Islamabad of their strategic alignment against a common regional rival.

China’s diplomatic overtures and reaffirmed commitments post-incident reflect not just solidarity but also strategic messaging: in a world of shifting alliances, Beijing is willing to shield its allies when doing so serves its broader interests. For Pakistan, the episode provided a temporary boost in relevance and reassurance that China remains invested in the bilateral relationship, at least as long as the regional rivalries persist.

However, this renewed engagement should not be mistaken for a fundamental shift in the nature of the relationship. China’s calculus remains primarily self-serving, and its support contingent. It is not a long-term developmental vision for Pakistan but a strategic hedge. Unlike the ideological patronage by the US, China’s support will not push Pakistan toward democratic reforms, institutional consolidation or social development. If anything, it may enable the status quo, as long as that status quo does not obstruct China’s regional agenda. This is important as an impetus for socio-political reform from within Pakistan does not appear likely.

A Sino-centric world order may indeed materialise as the West, faced by internal crises and geopolitical fatigue, retreats. This new order will be markedly different. It will not evangelise liberal values or offer deep partnerships. Peripheral states like Pakistan will have to navigate this world with caution. The opportunity is real—geo-economic relevance, strategic alignment and access to Chinese capital. So is the risk: dependency, loss of sovereignty and marginalisation if internal reform remains elusive. Pakistan is at a crossroads. Without an internal transformation, its role in a Sino-centric world risks being that of a mere conduit, not a stakeholder. In such a scenario, the levers of its destiny will be found not in Islamabad, but in Beijing.


The writer is a professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.

The possibilities in a Sino-centric world order