he sharpening of religious identities in British India is older than the post-colonial states themselves. This was driven by a number of factors such as communal interpretation of medieval history; repeated religious identification and enumeration of communities in decennial censuses; the separate electorates; and pervasive use of religious symbolism in politics; appropriation of Hindi as language of the Hindus and Urdu as language of the Muslims; introduction and dissemination of print culture and use of the print for churning out communal literature; and eventually, the general public perception of political parties – the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League – as communal contenders particularly in the last decade before the transfer of power. Most of these factors spilled over in the post-colonial South Asian nation states.

South Asia has developed a mixture of religiosity and nationalism or religious nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s assertion that nationalism is an imagined community and this imagination is reinforced day-and-night, 24/7 through the media, public education and every forum available to a nation state, while at the same time vigorously pursuing the process of ‘otherisation’ with equal and matching intensity holds true in India and Pakistan. It feeds an ideology of hate towards ‘the other,’ particularly neighbours.

It is a pity since the two countries are home to communities that share history and heritage of thousands of years. Even during eras of political fragmentation in the subcontinent such as in the twilight of the mighty Mughal empire, independent states produced a rich and inclusive tapestry of culture, cuisine and music. What is generally termed as decline was in political terms only, not in other socio-cultural spheres. Rather, the cultural richness and diversity had kept growing.

However, the two have now anthropomorphised each other as ‘satanic’ and ‘devilish’ ‘others.’ The unhelpful indoctrination generation after generation is making hatred part of the social psychology. There is inadequate realisation of the need to change this. As the saying goes: one can choose one’s friends and enemies but not one’s neighbours. Both the nations must realise the necessity and urgency of preaching mutual peace rather than war. India, in particular, must realise that the very creation of a separate state of Pakistan embodied the rejection of hegemony of a particular religious community. Although it is a huge country with a larger economy, it cannot establish hegemony vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The dispute over water has now renewed with more intensity and presented a threshold of yet more possibilities of war between the nuclear armed neighbours.

Mutual mistrust has been a defining feature of the relationship between the two states. Its seed was sown at the time of partition through dislocation and massacre of millions of people. The hostility has been rising with the passage of time. During the first two decades of their existence, the relations between the two countries were a lot better despite the brief war in 1948 over the Kashmir issue. The hostility increased enormously after the 1965 war. The damage could have been controlled by promoting engagement and trade between their peoples. In the absence of people to people contact, the mistrust grew. The trust gap cannot be bridged unless people to people contacts are encouraged and visa policies relaxed. More trade too can contribute to the development of cordial relations and trust building.

The Kashmir conflict, arising out of the integration of princely states with either India or Pakistan, became a perennial problem and remains the core unsettled issue. Besides the people and territory, the major river systems of Indian subcontinent flow from Kashmir and Himalayan mountains. These irrigate the fertile plains as well as fulfil most of the drinking water requirements on both sides. An agreement on division of waters, brokered by the World Bank and known as the Indus Waters Treaty, was reached in 1960. Despite some wrangling, it has counted as a success story. However, it was pushed in abeyance unilaterally by India after a terrorist attack in Indian Occupied Kashmir.

In the wake of increasingly depleting water resources due to environmental and other reasons, highly populated India and Pakistan are beset with increasing water shortages. At the same time, the population is increasing at high rates in both countries. The dispute over water has now renewed with more intensity and presented a threshold of yet more possibilities of war between the nuclear armed neighbours. Challenges of such proportions demand that sane voices be heard on both sides and rational as well as inclusive leadership be elected for the settlement of outstanding issues.

Democratic representative structures in both countries currently lack maturity in terms of their ability to debate and aggregate national interest. The governments, unable to deliver uplift in economic terms, are tempted to seek to divert attention of their electorates by war mongering, jingoism and hostile discourse. The general public on both sides, more often than not, is carried away by emotionalism and war hysteria detrimental to a rational discourse. For several decades now, space for the peace and inclusivity lobby has been shrinking.

The writer heads the History Department at University of Sargodha. He has worked as a research fellow at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He can be reached at abrar.zahoor@hotmail.com His X handle: @AbrarZahoor1