he fears of a dangerous escalation between India and Pakistan last week were real, given an explosive mix of militant violence, threats of retaliation and mutual provocations. Following the killing of 26 tourists in the Indian-administered Kashmir, which India blamed on Pakistan, Islamabad claimed it had “credible intelligence” suggesting India might launch a military strike within 36 hours. This raised alarm in capitals around the world.

The situation worsened through rapid tit-for-tat actions by the two governments: cancellation of visas, diplomatic withdrawals, suspension of the crucial Indus Water Treaty and displays of military might, including India’s test missile strikes and Pakistan’s reported downing of an Indian drone.

Given that the nuclear-armed neighbours have been prone historically to conflict over Kashmir, any miscalculation could spiral into a major confrontation. International powers, including the US and China, have urged restraint. However, the rising nationalist pressure in India and the deepening mistrust between the two sides have created an unstable environment.

India and Pakistan have had an antagonistic relationship since the 1947 Partition. There have been wars, border skirmishes and unresolved disputes such as Kashmir. Bilateral ties have significantly worsened under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party, particularly following the 2014 and 2019 elections.

One of the most consequential moves has been India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 in August 2019, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status—causing outrage in Pakistan, prompting a downgrade of diplomatic ties, the suspension of trade and military escalations along the Line of Control. This deterioration in cross-border relations parallels a sharp rise in domestic hostility towards Muslims within India.

Since BJP’s ascendance, there has been a documented increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric, discriminatory citizenship laws such as the Citizenship Amendment Act, widespread vigilante violence and institutional marginalisation of Muslims. All of this has been linked to the BJP’s ideological leanings rooted in Hindutva. This ideological hostility appears to extend to foreign policy, where Pakistan—India’s Muslim-majority neighbour —is increasingly cast as both a security threat and a civilisational adversary. To fully understand this trajectory, it is important to understand the genesis and ideological foundations of the BJP, and how they inform its hard line against Muslims and Pakistan.

The ideological roots of the Bharatiya Janata Party lie in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu nationalist organisation founded in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. Conceived as a response to both British colonialism and growing Hindu-Muslim tensions, the RSS drew significant inspiration from the writings of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who advocated the formation of a culturally and politically unified Hindu nation.

The RSS functioned as a highly disciplined cadre, initially comprising mostly upper-caste Brahmins, committed to the protection and promotion of Hindu interests. Although it has portrayed itself as a cultural rather than political force, the RSS has always propagated the ideology of Hindutva, or Hindu-ness, through paramilitary training, religious symbolism (notably the worship of Hanuman) and calls for unity across caste lines. Over time, the RSS has played a central role in shaping India’s Hindu nationalist movement. Many of the BJP’s leading figures, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have been closely affiliated with this organisation.

The ideology of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is deeply influenced by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’s conception of Hindutva, as articulated in his 1923 text, Essentials of Hindutva. While the RSS describes itself as a cultural organisation, its ideological commitment to building a Hindu Rashtra (nation) places it firmly within a nationalist framework that marginalises non-Hindu communities. Central to this worldview is the assertion that only those who regard India as both their Pitribhu (fatherland) and Punyabhu (holy land) can be considered full members of the Indian nation.

This spatial and civilisational criterion automatically excludes Muslims and Christians, for whom many sacred sites lie outside India. Islam, in particular, is portrayed not as an indigenous faith, but as the legacy of violent foreign conquest. According to Savarkar, Islam entered India not through organic cultural synthesis but by way of “the sword”—an instrument of domination, destruction and humiliation inflicted upon a resistant Hindu civilisation. The RSS has inherited and institutionalised these narratives, celebrating Hindu resistance heroes while framing Muslim rule—especially under figures like Aurangzeb—as a period of national humiliation and subjugation.

Savarkar’s critique of Islam in the Essentials of Hindutva constructs Muslims as both historically oppressive and currently alien. Although he acknowledges shared racial ancestry, he insists that Indian Muslims have severed their cultural connection to Hindu Sanskriti, replacing indigenous heroes, festivals and ideals with foreign ones rooted in Makkah and Madina. Conversion to Islam is depicted not as a free act of faith but largely a result of coercion, which for Savarkar implies a civilisational rupture that can only be repaired through re-assimilation into Hinduism.

Savarkar treats Muslims as a political liability, warning of their potential loyalty to a global Islamic fraternity (pan-Islamism) that transcends national borders. This casts Muslims in India as a potentially disloyal “other,” whose integration is conditional upon their complete acceptance of Hindu primacy. These ideological positions form the cultural and political backbone of the RSS and, by extension, the BJP’s approach to nationhood, secularism and minority rights in contemporary India.

In contemporary India, Muslims face an increasingly hostile and precarious existence, marked by both institutionalised discrimination and vigilante violence—much of it stoked by the ideological machinery of the BJP and its affiliates. Following the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, a wave of Islamophobic cultural content—particularly “Hindutva pop” songs and AI-generated propaganda—rapidly emerged, inciting hatred, dehumanisation and calls for communal violence.

These digital artefacts, often glorifying Hindu retaliation and framing Muslims as traitors, coincided with real-world assaults, evictions, medical neglect and economic boycotts targeting Muslims across the country. This orchestrated backlash was not an isolated reaction but part of a broad, strategic mobilisation of hate that has become a feature of India’s political culture under the BJP. The government and its ideological allies have used communal violence as a tool of dominance and exclusion.

This Islamophobia is deeply entwined with a state-sponsored obsession with Pakistan, which the BJP has systematically weaponised for political gain. Anti-Pakistan sentiment has evolved from a historical rivalry into a central plank of India’s domestic politics, media narratives and cultural production.

From leveraging the 2019 Pulwama attack to inflame nationalist passions and win elections, to vilifying opposition figures as Pakistani sympathisers and channelling this hatred through Bollywood blockbusters and news outlets, the BJP has fostered a climate where hostility towards Pakistan and Indian Muslims reinforce each other This radicalisation is now entrenched in popular consciousness, with hate speech normalised and militaristic slogans echoing at rallies. The resulting convergence of anti-Muslim bigotry and anti-Pakistan chauvinism is not just politically expedient—it is ideologically central to Hindutva nationalism and shows no signs of abating.

The ideology of Hindutva, as championed by the BJP and its parent organisation the RSS, is inherently structured to preserve upper-caste Hindu dominance, often at the expense of lower-caste communities. Paradoxically, the party has managed to secure significant support from Dalits and OBCs through symbolic inclusion, religious mobilisation and welfare initiatives that obscure its elitist underpinnings. By incorporating lower-caste deities and folk heroes into a broader Hindu narrative and promoting cow protection and cultural revivalism, the BJP has offered these communities a sense of visibility and belonging— if not genuine empowerment. However, the 2024 general elections exposed the limits of this strategy.

In states like Uttar Pradesh, the BJP suffered significant losses due to rising unemployment, inflation and a growing backlash among Dalits and backward castes against economic marginalisation and threats to constitutional protections. The electorate signalled a fatigue with hate politics and a renewed interest in addressing material inequalities and democratic erosion.

Nonetheless, this electoral setback does not herald a substantive shift in India’s foreign policy under Modi’s leadership, especially towards Pakistan. The BJP’s ideological project is still tied to portraying Pakistan as a perpetual enemy, an external extension of its internal Muslim “other.” This positioning provides both a rallying cry for Hindu unity and a justification for militaristic posturing.

Given the party’s reliance on nationalist sentiment and security rhetoric—particularly during election cycles—no serious engagement or détente with Pakistan is foreseeable during Modi’s tenure. Pakistan should anticipate further diplomatic hostility, media demonisation and potentially escalatory military actions, especially in times of domestic pressure within India.

The most rational course of action for Pakistan therefore is not to nurture unrealistic hopes of reconciliation, but to strengthen its military preparedness, fortify strategic alliances and maintain vigilance against both conventional and hybrid threats emanating from across the border.

The writer is a tenured associate professor and head of the Department of Economics at COMSATS University Islamabad, Lahore Campus.