S-Iran relations over the last four decades have been tumultuous, marked by confrontation, strategic misgivings and intermittent engagement. As a keen observer of Middle Eastern geopolitics, I have found the bilateral relationship emblematic of tensions between a revolutionary ideology and global hegemonic power. The rupture began with the 1979 revolution, when the overthrow of the US-backed Shah and the subsequent hostage crisis turned a historically close relationship into one of the most acrimonious in contemporary international politics. The United States came to perceive post-revolution Iran as a supporter of terrorism and a threat to regional peace; Iran viewed the US as an imperialist actor bent on breaching its sovereignty.

Over the years, US sanctions and threats of regime change and Iran’s support of various groups hostile to US allies and interests entrenched this enmity. Even when strategic necessity opened channels of communication, such as during the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq—Iran’s insistence on regional autonomy and the US desire for compliance prevented the emergence of lasting cooperation. The nuclear issue, too, became a cause for mutual suspicion, with the West voicing concern about Iran’s potential weapons programme and Iran asserting its right to peaceful nuclear technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The deadlock was partially resolved during the Obama presidency through an unprecedented diplomatic overture.

The Obama administration’s engagement with Iran was a bold recalibration of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Recognising the strategic fatigue from protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the limitations of coercive sanctions, President Obama opted for diplomacy grounded in multilateralism. As a foreign policy analyst, I view this shift as pragmatic as well as a deliberate rejection of neo-conservative unilateralism that had dominated US policy during the George W Bush years.

This engagement resulted in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a landmark accord between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany). The JCPOA was designed to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme in return for phased sanctions relief. Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent; dismantle two-thirds of its centrifuges; and allow intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. From a political economy standpoint, this deal was poised to re-integrate Iran into global markets, especially in oil and banking sectors as the US offered a strategic opening to reshape the Middle East. The importance of the JCPOA cannot be overstated. It effectively averted a possible military conflict; established the most rigorous nuclear verification regime ever negotiated; and laid the foundation for a rules-based order in non-proliferation governance. More importantly, it allowed Iran and the West to talk—a precondition for de-escalation in a region beset with proxy wars and ideological divides.

The consequences of Trump’s withdrawal were both immediate and severe. Iran, cheated, began incrementally exercising options it had agreed to forgo. The US imposed sweeping sanctions, further harming Iran’s economy and alienating moderates in its political system.

However, the JCPOA became a casualty of American domestic politics. In 2018, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the agreement, despite multiple IAEA reports confirming Iran’s compliance. This move was deeply problematic from the perspective of international law and diplomacy. President Trump not only disregarded his European allies, who remained committed to the accord, but also signalled to the international community that American commitments were subject to partisan volatility. The decision was rooted in a disdain for multilateralism and a desire to reverse Obama-era legacies, irrespective of strategic cost.

The consequences of US withdrawal were immediate and severe. Iran, cheated, began incrementally exercising options it had agreed to forgo. The US imposed sweeping sanctions, further harming Iran’s economy and alienating moderates in its political system. Tehran responded by deepening its support for groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and various militias in Iraq and Syria. These developments escalated regional tensions, especially in the Persian Gulf, where incidents involving oil tankers and drone strikes became increasingly frequent.

From a regional security perspective, the collapse of the JCPOA emboldened hardliners in Iran, weakened the pragmatist faction led by then-president Hassan Rouhani, and disrupted the potential for diplomatic spillovers into broader peace initiatives. Importantly, the American policy of ‘maximum pressure’ did not achieve regime change in Iran. Instead, it underscored the failure of sanctions as a standalone strategy.

A shift may now be emerging in the US policy. The new Trump administration has shown interest in reviving talks with Iran, albeit with expanded terms. Indirect negotiations, taking place in Rome with mediation by Oman, reflect a grudging realisation that the status quo is untenable. Iran, for its part, insists on its right to enrich uranium. However, it is also seeking economic relief from debilitating sanctions. The regional landscape has changed so that Iran is closer today to Russia and China than it was earlier and the Arab Gulf states are engaged in their own diplomatic recalibration. In this context, the resumption of talks reflects a pragmatic pivot. The United States cannot afford an unconstrained Iranian nuclear programme, especially as its strategic bandwidth is increasingly occupied by Russia’s regional assertiveness and China’s rise on a global scale. Iran sees an opportunity to regain economic breathing space and reassert itself as a legitimate actor in the comity of nations.

Whether or not a new deal is likely depends on several factors including the scope of the proposed agreement, the credibility of enforcement mechanisms and domestic political climate in both Tehran and Washington. If achieved, a deal could benefit both countries. For the US, it would mark a return to diplomatic credibility and regional de-escalation. For Iran, it would offer economic normalisation and a potential détente with its Arab neighbours. Most importantly, it would re-anchor non-proliferation efforts in diplomacy and multilateral engagement—a principle that is foundational to any stable international order.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and post-doc experience at University of California, Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor at Lahore School of Economics. He can be reached at ejaz.bhatty@gmail.com.