hile India has muddled through and achieved political stability through repeated electoral cycles acceptable to losing political contenders, Pakistan has failed to achieve the same. A smooth transfer has always been a challenge. The migrants during the Partition, hailing from Muslim minority areas of India, had left their political constituencies on the other side of the border and were not as invested in elections. Prime minister-designate Liaquat Ali Khan was not even a member of the constituent assembly. He and five others were elected as legislators in place of six members from East Bengal, who vacated their seats for them.

Consequently, as described by Mohammad Waseem in his book, Political Conflict in Pakistan, a “persistent, perilous and devastating conflict between two elite groups in Pakistan: the state elite and the political elite” emerged. The former was identified with the ‘establishment’ led first by the civil bureaucracy, and later, by the Army; the latter was represented by the political parties and the parliament that draw on the constitutional edifice as the chief source of legitimacy. This conflict has been a perennial obstacle in the way of consolidation of democracy and smooth succession of power in the country.

After a decade of bitter political wrangling, two leaders in exile, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, signed the Charter of Democracy in London in 2006. This charter demanded that the parties not solicit the support of the military to gain power or to dislodge a democratic government. The signatories also pledged a smooth transfer of power to winners of a fair and free election. Resultantly, the elected parliaments of 2008 (led by the Pakistan Peoples Party) and 2013 (led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) were able to complete their tenures, although some prime ministers were sent home through the Supreme Court.

Sadly, political polarisation resurfaced with a vengeance through the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf and has aggravated after the elections of February 2024. The political contenders on both sides of the aisle, the PTI and the government, have recently initiated a process of political dialogue. Political dialogue is always a tenuous and tedious process marred by pressure tactics, foul play, bad patches and threats as well as compromises and promises. Given the complexity of political negotiation, and sometimes its long-drawn process, the people are condemned to live through promise and despair.

The ongoing political dialogue is no exception, particularly since the decision remains unclear. There seems to be no common cause or agenda among the political forces. Instead, the negotiating parties have their separate wish-lists. The PTI wants its leaders and workers to be delivered from politically motivated cases and prisons while the government is more interested in achieving a semblance of political stability and thereby, the attainment of economic stability. The government seems to have realised that without a reasonable level of political normalisation, it would be impossible to sustain economic gains and stability.

However, both sides are determined to stick to their political narratives. Therefore, a trust gap exists. Both sides fear undermining their political narrative(s) as this could result in a potential decline in their political following and loss of popularity. The PTI keeps on saying that they would not go for any deal (favour). Rather they are demanding justice. The PTI is interested in gaining relief from the courts because this will save face. They can then declare ‘justice attained’ and not a deal they have been demanding. The PTI demand for judicial commissions explains this. If a judicial commission is set up, the PTI gets a temporary relief from repression immediately and a potential permanent relief in the long run.

The establishment seems to have realised the necessity of normalisation with the PTI given the volatility of the security situation on the western border. However, the establishment seeks to strike a deal on its own terms, from a point of strength. The PTI realises that the two provinces are going through a serious security situation and that the security forces need public support to win this war against extremists and separatists. On the other hand, the PML-N wants all political players to be involved in the dialogue process and share its political price. All political parties have been subject to similar repression at various times.

The major interest of the ruling coalition and the establishment is the continuation of the existing political apparatus. They want the political arrangement to continue and the government to complete its term. The ruling coalition and the establishment seem to have realised that political repression against the PTI should stop and its leadership should be politically engaged. The military is paying a heavy price for the heightened polarisation and needs greater goodwill among the masses. The recent meeting of army chief in Peshawar with leaders of a wide array of political parties is a case in point.

The PTI has also realised that it may not have an option other than engaging with the establishment. The military establishment is tight switched with the worsening security situation due to increasing hostilities with the Taliban and Chinese concerns regarding the situation in Balochistan. With President Trump back in office, there is an additional concern that the government might need to engage with the PTI under pressure from abroad.

The writer heads the History Department at the University of Sargodha. He has worked as a research fellow at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He can be reached at abrar.zahoor@hotmail.com. His X handle: @AbrarZahoor1