he doors of Article 62(1)(f) of the constitution have been knocked on time and time again to apply the qualification criteria for election to Pakistan’s parliament. Article 62 lays down various qualifications for members of the parliament. Article 62(1)(f), in particular, requires a member to be, among other things, of good character, sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen (trustworthy). It also demands adherence to Islamic injunctions and knowledge of Islamic teachings. These criteria have been subject to constant interpretation, leading to significant political consequences.

In 2017, the entire dynamic of this provision was sent into a whirlwind of hefty and tenacious war on its interpretation to determine the disqualification of popular political leaders. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in a historical verdict, disqualified the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif from holding public office under Article 62(1)(f). It stated that a member of parliament should be sadiq and ameen (honest and trustworthy). The bench interpreted this clause in the context of undisclosed financial assets, leading to disqualification for life.

This ruling was significant because it set a precedent for how the vague and subjective criteria of Article 62 could be applied. This sparked debate over the article’s role in Pakistani politics. Critics argued that the broad and somewhat ambiguous language of Article 62 could be used arbitrarily or politically. Its supporters said that it upheld moral and ethical standards in politics. Closely linked to the criteria set out in Article 62 are the conditions set out in Article 63(1)(p) of the constitution, which deal with the disqualification of members of the parliament. This specific clause disqualifies a member of parliament if they have been dismissed from the service of Pakistan on the grounds of misconduct or moral turpitude under any law which is in force for the time being.

In the series of interpretations on disqualifications that would follow, in October 2018, the apex court in the Khwaja Asif case laid down an objective criterion to test the honesty of a parliamentarian by declaring that Article 62(1)(f) could not be applied to every omission or non-disclosure of assets. In 2021, once again, the Supreme Court declared that it had become a consistent principle that not every non-disclosure or mis-declaration could be sufficient to permanently disqualify a member of parliament or a candidate under Article 62(1)(f) of the constitution.

Until very recently, disqualification, once proved, was effective for life. However, in June 2023, the Election Act was amended to restrict such a disqualification to contesting elections as per Section 232 to five years. This amendment was then challenged in the Supreme Court for having violated Article 175 by reaching an amendment in ignorance of an existing Supreme Court interpretation. The verdict was announced on January 8. The ruling was made by a 7-member bench of the apex court, which included the chief justice. The bench abolished the lifetime disqualification rule, restricting it to five years.

There is next to no possibility that the question of morality could ever be determined by an objective criterion.

The disqualification for electoral candidates has varied significantly depending on the country and the nature of the disqualification. Lifetime disqualification was never a concept alien to the world. Disqualifications as a result of criminal convictions are permanent, meaning lifelong, in some cases, especially for offences like treason, terrorism and corruption. In Thailand, individuals who have been convicted of corruption can face a lifetime ban from politics. This policy was reinforced after the 2014 military coup, which saw the introduction of new laws aimed at curbing political corruption. Under these laws, individuals found guilty of corruption offences are not only subject to criminal penalties but also face permanent exclusion from political office. One of the most prominent cases that challenged the lifetime ban on political participation in Thailand involved former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin, who was ousted in a military coup in 2006, was later convicted of corruption charges in absentia. The conviction led to a lifetime ban from politics in Thailand. Thaksin had consistently contested these charges, claiming that those were politically motivated. His case had been a focal point of Thai politics for many years, highlighting the country’s deep political divisions. Thaksin’s supporters argued that the charges and subsequent ban were part of a broader effort to suppress his political influence and that of his party, which had continued to enjoy significant popular support. Despite numerous legal challenges and appeals, both domestically and in international forums, Thaksin remained in self-imposed exile, and his lifetime ban from Thai politics remained in effect. His case underscored the complex interplay between legal rulings, political dynamics and individual rights in Thailand’s political landscape.

Limited-time disqualifications are more common, especially when resulting from violations of ethical or moral standards. For example, in Canada, candidates who fail to submit accurate financial reports can be barred from running in future elections for up to five years. In India, under the Representation of the People Act, convicted individuals are disqualified for six years from the date of their release. It seems that these countries and others have specific criteria that pinpoint the exact conditions for disqualification along with the period of disqualification for each condition.

In Pakistan, it could be corruption, criminal conviction, mental incapacity, dual nationality, treason, insolvency, etc. In the end, a politician, even if not hit by any of these specific conditions, could fall prey to Article 62(1)(f)’s sadiq and amen requirement. These two words remain undefined by law and have triggered constant interpretation of disqualification. In an attempt to blend the Islamic principles with the legal framework of the country, these words were added to Article 62 of the constitution during the regime of Gen Muhammad Zia-ul Haq through the Eighth Amendment in 1985. The terms have roots in Islamic tradition and are considered attributes of good moral character. Good moral character is, and always will, remain subjective. There is next to no possibility that the question of morality could ever be determined by an objective criterion.

The writer is an advocate of High Court, a founding partner at Lex Mercatoria and a visiting teacher at Bahria University’s Law Department.