ne may argue that Pakistan’s challenges are mutually nonexclusive and interrelated. It is not easy to address any single issue or challenge in isolation. While acknowledging the interconnected nature of Pakistan’s challenges, the impact of these issues on the population varies.

Economic concerns, notably, wield significant influence over the political landscape. The echoes of past voting patterns, such as the desire for a third party (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf) in 2018; the hope for an end to power outages (under Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) in 2013; and sympathy for the Pakistan People’s Party-Parliamentarians in 2008, following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination; show the enduring impact of economic issues on voter behaviour, and can be heard in the run-up to the forthcoming elections.

Challenges for the national economy have intensified in recent years, both at the macro and micro levels. Macro-level issues, including food and fuel-driven inflation; depreciation of rupee against major currencies; unsustainable debt levels; declining creditworthiness; low foreign exchange reserves; minimal foreign direct investment; meagre saving-to-GDP ratio; high indirect taxes; a substantial fiscal deficit; and very high-interest rates, are impacting human development and human capital indices, pushing a large number of citizens down the socioeconomic ladder.

Barring the last few months, when some course correction measures were taken administratively, thanks to the support of the SIFC, Pakistan’s economic strategy in the recent past has been inconsistent, particularly in dealing with the International Monetary Fund. The focus on securing a single tranche from the lender of the last resort and deviation from agreed reforms led to a series of economic shocks for the masses.

The pattern continued until the current stand-by agreement was secured. However, by the time the SBA was secured, it was already too late for a large number of citizens feeling the heat of an avoidable economic meltdown.

How did we come that close to a default? Who had what role in bringing Pakistan to where it is today? What needs to be done in the future to avoid a default etc, are irrelevant questions for most of the voters. The majority of voters is interested instead in finding the answers to questions such as whether the deterioration on the economic front can be reversed? Can the cost of living come down? Can a unit of electricity or gas and a litre of fuel again cost what it used to a few years ago? Can the rupee- dollar parity go back to what it was a few years ago? Can the masses buy food at the price they were paying a few years ago? The answers to these questions shape the economic aspect of electoral campaigns.

One simple answer to these questions is “yes.” Almost all political parties are using this answer to lure their voters. The promises range from doubling the salaries of government servants to providing free electricity to the consumers using up to 300 units per month (PPPP); bringing the food, fuel and dollar prices to the level where they were in 2017 (PML-N); and breaking the “shackles of the IMF” and saying goodbye to modern interest system (Jamaat-i-Islami).

While political parties make grand promises, crucial details about how these pledges will be fulfilled, the timeline for implementation, and the implications for the nation remain largely unaddressed. The electorate, eager for economic relief, is buying into these promises without a clear understanding of the practicalities or the potential costs.

Let’s assume that one or a coalition of political parties, with the right intention to fix Pakistan’s economic woes (provide relief to the masses), comes into power after the elections. How would the election outcome impact the economy?

That depends on who has done the homework on crucial details of the abovementioned questions.

Before answering this question, let us consider the two things that any government, irrespective of political affiliation, will have to do immediately after coming into power. The next government will have to get the final review of the current standby agreement of the IMF completed in March 2024. Likewise, it will have to prepare the federal budget for the next fiscal year within three months after coming into power. In other words, willingly or unwillingly, the next government will have to engage with the IMF.

Any government with a plan ready for the next IMF programme can turn that engagement into an opportunity for successful negotiations. For me, one indicator of the level of preparedness will include a pragmatic plan to minimise the burden of policy reforms on the economically marginalized sections of society. An early engagement with the IMF will help the government complete that review successfully. It will also help the government to incorporate its vision of any targeted subsidies/social protection in the federal budget that it will have to present three months later.

One possible scenario is similar to 2013, when the PML-N approached the IMF immediately after coming into power and capitalising on IMF’s trust in the government strengthened Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators. This may be the best-case scenario. Any party/parties aspiring to form the next federal government should have an indigenous plan for negotiation with the IMF ready. Once they form the government, they should try to secure the next package before the current SBA expires (at the end of March 2024). Along with fiscal consolidation measures, that plan should clearly spell out how the burden of reforms on the economically marginalised sections of society will be minimised.

Such an approach becomes even more important as the new government will be responsible for the last review of the current SBA. An early engagement with the IMF will help the government complete that review successfully. It will also help the government incorporate its vision of any targeted subsidies/social protection in the federal budget that it will have to present three months later.

Any delay in engaging with the IMF due to unrealistic promises made to the electorate or attempts to find funds from bilateral partners while bypassing the IMF will make the process of macroeconomic recovery more painful.

In the current global political economy, there is no viable alternative to the IMF. If the IMF is not engaged before April 2024, the federal budget will become a prior condition for the next programme. To avert a looming default, the government will then have to make abrupt economic decisions setting aside its campaign promises.

Another factor affecting the economy after the elections will be how well the new government can use the SIFC mechanism. In the best-case scenario, to capitalise on the success of administrative measures taken during the last three months, the SIFC membership will be broadened to include the leaders of opposition in the National and Provincial Assemblies at the appropriate level. This collaborative engagement - seeking doable alternatives from the opposition when faced with economic policy rejection will be essential for the government.

The path to economic recovery after the elections lies in decisive and early engagement with the IMF; transparent policy-making; and inclusive collaboration through mechanisms like the SIFC. Refraining from making unrealistic promises before elections and balancing any promises made with practical solutions will be pivotal for Pakistan’s post-election economic trajectory.

The writer heads the Sustainable Development Policy Institute. He posts his opinions on X at @abidsuleri