When religion becomes a defining instrument of the state
Professor Mohammad Waseem, in his presentation at the one-day conference, titled ‘South Asia: Region and Religion’ held at COMSATS in Lahore mapped the history of religio-political propensities in Pakistan in his inimitable style.
He focused on the shift in the relationship between the state and religion. The principal point of inquiry of his scholarly deliberation underlined the role of religion in determining rationale and structure of the state, particularly in Pakistan.
Here, in this article, we will deal with the relationship the state of Pakistan has with religion and its consequences on the socio-political landscape of this hapless country.
At the very outset, state had the agency to determine the status and the role of religion in Pakistani polity. But the equation -- state and religion -- was subsequently inverted. We saw religion gradually creeping onto centre-stage of decision-making, setting the intellectual orientation the Pakistani nationalism ought to have. Those claiming to represent religion began to assert themselves -- in ensuring the primacy of Islam in the process of identity formation of Pakistani populace.
The state conceded space to clerics by allowing Objectives Resolution to be designated as the ‘directive principle’ for constitution-making. The clamours of minority members of the Constituent Assembly were ignored and, as an upshot, the house got divided on religious lines less than two years after Pakistan’s birth.
The passage of the Objective Resolution in 1949 worked as a shot in the arm for the clerics. Vali Nasr reports that Maulana Maududi sent a congratulatory message to Shabbir Ahmed Usmani when he got the news of its passage. Maulana Maududi, of course, saw in its passage the very beginning of ‘Islamism’ a theocratic dispensation of which, according to Olivier Roy, he and Sayyid Qutb were the intellectual proponents.
That event was generally believed as a victory of sorts for the Ulema. However, when the demand for excluding Ahmsdis from the fold of Islam in 1953 was made with extraordinary zeal, the state stood its ground and did not give in to the pressure. Khawaja Nazimuddin, despite being mocked by the political commentators as meek, uncharismatic and riddled with indecision, accepted to be sent packing instead of succumbing to the pressure of the religious operatives.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see Nazimuddin as a politician of resilient character, who tried his utmost to keep politics and statecraft separate from religion. While drawing comparison between him and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the way he succumbed to the pressure of the operatives of Tehreek-e-Khatam-i-Nubuwwat in 1974, the former appears to be a politician of considerable steadfastness.
The force that the clergy came to wield in 1974 made even the leader of Bhutto’s calibre seem absolutely vulnerable. Resultantly, the religious forces acquired the primacy and clout whereby they could determine the fate of the state. Ziaul Haq’s eleven year rule was a watershed in giving free rein to the forces pleading for political exclusion in the name of religion.
The decision taken in 1974 by Bhutto led to Zia’s Islamisation in 1979 which pushed the whole country into the quagmire of obscurantism. For Pakistan, 1979 was a fateful year because the unfolding of international events and their interface with Zia’s ambition to perpetuate his authoritarian rule paved the way for religion to take control of the state with ominous fallout. Shia-Sunni difference was exacerbated in the 1980s which resulted in the open confrontation in the 1990s; thus sectarian difference became the defining feature of Pakistani polity.
The very definition of a Muslim had a sectarian connotation which was then widely professed and believed. Minorities already existed on the margins but now they were practically hounded. Human rights were flouted openly and even the state was not bothered about it. The fact remains that when religion becomes a defining instrument of the state, anarchy and internecine bickering leading to massacres and carnages become the order of the day. Implosion of the state with its undermining impact on the social formation is the inevitable corollary.
In the entire history of South Asia, only once did the religious clergy assume power, in the third decade of the 19th century in the North West, but it could only manage to wreak havoc on the subjects. The strict application of Sharia proved counterproductive because it conjured up social contradiction in the area under Mujahideen’s rule. Sharia undercut the cultural ethos with disastrous effect. Coercion was the mainstay of its rule. Strict adherence to the injunction of Sharia left hardly any space for indigenous culture to operate. Same was the case when Nifaz -i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi established its rule over Swat. Sharia laws tend to displace the centuries-old cultural ethos which was the main impediment.
The point worth underscoring here is that any dispensation with religious injunctions not only leads to socio-political implosion but also spawns international conflict. In the post 9/11 scenario, right wing politics in Pakistan and also in other countries anti-Western paranoia is alarmingly rampant.
The right wing religious factions in Pakistan, unfortunately, have created dissention from within and have spawned animosity from without. Peaceful negotiation is absolutely alien to the right wing political groups. What is really intimidating is the transformation of religious right wing political parties into the militant outfits. Such ghastly acts of violence like killing of schoolchildren in Peshawar became their peculiarity.
Though decrying the existing world order, ironically the leadership of these militant outfits is devoid of any alternative political dispensation to the prevailing system of economy and governance. In view of the analysis of Prof Waseem, one must stick to democratic norms coupled with rule of law. That only is the recipe for our salvation.