The politics of agitation

Imran Khan’s call for the long march on August 14 re-affirms that agitation is the most common political tool in the land of pure.

The politics of opposition is articulated through agitation in many post-colonial states. It was deployed against the colonial state to whip up public sentiment for condemning the ‘rule of the alien’, because the ‘locals’ or ‘colonised’ were not appropriately represented in the legislative bodies -- and so considered marginalised, as far as the decision-making process was concerned.

Agitation became systematised after the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, because its exponents, being adherents of Marx’s ideology, espoused antithetical sentiments of the colonised towards the coloniser. Many colonial societies held on to this trend even after they gained independence.

Conversely, those in the government resort to dialogue with the opposition as a modus vivendi in order to ward off any prospect of agitation. That is a saner method of conflict-resolution -- and, in Pakistan’s context, vital for its fledgling democracy to sustain.

In the chequered history of this beleaguered polity, one can point to many instances when agitation was employed either to achieve the demands of opposition or, in some cases, used as a ploy to dislodge the government. The volume and intensity of agitation reflects public discontent with the existing government.

Thus by calling for long march on August 14, Imran Khan has thrown a gauntlet to the Sharifs. It is a daring but portentous move.

In my previous articles appearing in this space, I have often mentioned that we are forced to live in an era of all-encompassing modernity that may have different shades or configurations according to spatial exigencies or varying socio-cultural settings. This has radically changed the way politics is articulated. Although agitation may have a history as old as human civilisation, its modern manifestation was first exhibited during the French Revolution.

But agitation has a tendency to become violent.

Even in this day and age, keeping agitation peaceful and non-violent is a daunting task. The fact, however, remains that ‘agitation’ became an integral part of politics, and a basic human right, in the age of democracy.

In the subcontinent, agitation ab initio was employed as a tool by the Indian National Congress to put pressure on the British government when Lord Curzon announced the plan to partition Bengal in 1905. Agitation yielded positive results when the partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911. Thereafter, agitation was legitimised.

Indian Muslims, imbued with love for pan-Islamism, tried agitation in 1911 when Italian control over Tripoli was approved.

Agitation had been an abiding feature of the Muslim politics in India. Jinnah tried his best to acquaint Muslims with a negotiable form of politics. Throughout his political career, Jinnah preferred negotiation over agitation, despite the fact that he, except for the last 11 months of his life, remained in opposition. Apart from approval for the ‘Direct Action in 1946-47’ which had ominous repercussions not only in Bengal and Bihar but also in Punjab, Jinnah steered clear of any political option that might spark violence.

One cannot dispute the fact that a powerful faction of Muslims, like Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), voiced their political opinion through agitation -- in a style quite contrary to what Jinnah had been observing throughout. That, in fact, was the mode that Congress had perfected under Gandhi from the early 1930s. JUH and Majlis-i-Ahrar and Khaksar Tehreek in Punjab took that leaf out of the Congress book.

Zafar Ali Khan is yet another political figure that carved out a political niche for himself through agitation -- but to no substantial effect.

When Bengalis could not be placated by the Pakistani state during its early days, the natural corollary was violence -- and, with lasting political implications. The government of Pakistan did not consider it worthwhile to bring the aggrieved party to the dialogue table. Instead, they used force -- the upshot of which is an integral part of our history.

But, we have not learnt from these events.

The government of Pakistan must seize the initiative and invite Khan and his peers to the dialogue table. Khan ought to soften his position of obduracy and the government ought to conduct the dialogue from a position of strength, with all stakeholders on the same page -- not as they were in 1953, when disagreements between Nazimuddin and Mumtaz Daultana on the demands of Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm-e-Nubuwat (MTKN) were widely known. Even Abdur Rab Nishtar and Fazal-ur-Rehman had their sympathies with MTKN.

In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave in far too easily to clerics and made the state subservient to religious orthodoxy, a pattern that persists to this day. Bhutto proved to be even more spineless than Nazimuddin who was not even elected through the ballot. By using the political acumen that he was widely known for, Bhutto, as a democratically-elected leader, could have taken the wind out of the cleric’s sails through a prolonged process of negotiation with belligerent band of clerics. But the inability to engage the opposition in a dialogue was a big omission by those at the helm, and the whole nation has paid dearly to such misadventures. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto being the case in point, back in the 1990s.

The present rulers must learn from history and try to resolve outstanding issues through dialogue. In the precarious situation that Pakistan finds itself, agitation such as the long march may unleash an unending spate of violence that this country can ill-afford.

Dialogue is the only viable option. It is for the government to seize the initiative.