The ‘identity’ as a social construct defies any plausible definition -- not because it is a complex cognitive category but because it is in the state of permanent flux.
In simple terms, identity may be described as the articulation of the ‘self’ but that too is an extremely loaded phrase. One can, of course, list the constituents of national identity, that is, an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. But, the question pertaining to the conditions under which national identities have been formed in the Western world, in particular, in the 19th century remains controversial.
For Benedict Anderson, for instance, the important factors in the creation of collective identities, which he famously calls "Imagined Communities", are the decline of religion and the rise of vernacular language encouraged by print capitalism.
Ernest Gellner, on the other hand, considers "the rise of industrial society" crucial to the creation of cultural homogeneity, that demonstrates itself in the form of nationalism.
Eric Hobsbawm distinguishes the nationalism of governments from the nationalism of people, and argues that what ordinary people felt about nationality became political consequences by end of the 19th century.
The way the question of national identity is addressed in Pakistan is different from such theories that deal mostly with Western polities.
The process of identity formation in Pakistan can be understood by employing the postulate of Edward Said, who saw it as a course of action in which the ‘identity’ is ascertained by establishing opposites and ‘others’, whose actuality depends on the continuous interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from ‘us’.
The official (national) narrative is, more often than not, implicated in the politics of ‘othering’. Thus in the official narrative, religion (Islam) is the principle constituent of our national identity which creates the boundary between Pakistanis and the ‘other’.
It is not hard to know who that ‘other’ usually is, though in recent years it fluctuates between India (Hindus) and America (Jews and Christians). Obviously both these states are perceived as if they solely represent the religious interests and all their policies and perceptions are clouded by religious prejudice against Muslims in general and against Pakistan in particular. Theoretically, ‘Urdu’ has been projected as the cultural signature of a Pakistani which also serves as the medium of expression for the South Asian Islam.
Thus the national identity is configured through Islam, Urdu and Hindu (or currently Christian, Jew and Ahmadi) as the ‘other’. That way quite a complex process of identity formation has been made into a spectacularly simplistic affair.
Regional, ethnic and linguistic plurality has therefore been rendered superfluous.
What ought to be borne in mind is the sectarian exclusivity that the contemporary version of Islam has been subjected to. The identity embedded in religious ideology is then bound to be fractured because of its sectarian orientation. Instead of providing much-needed glue, unfortunately religion has turned out to be a divisive instrument. Besides, it seems to be the only case where national identity’s relationship with the history and geography is highly tenuous.
That probably is the reason why Islam as an ideology on which the identity and nationalism are predicated has no geographical roots. Pan-Islamic agenda in its essence runs counter to any idea of a nation-state, bound by the geographical frontiers and historical antecedents.
Importantly, the ideological narrative has been appropriated by proponents of militant Islam. Hence, the religious ideology, propounded as the centrepiece of our national identity, has been deployed against the state by the anti-state actors.
Ironically, the militant Islam and the state of Pakistan are clearly at cross-purposes.
So far, the prospect of Urdu, as the marker of the national identity in future, is not promising. The era of star laureates has gone by. The succeeding generation of literary figures come across as mediocre when compared with predecessors like Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Noon Meem Rashid, and Majeed Amjad.
The last great novel in Urdu was produced by Allahabad-based author Shams ur Rehman Faruqi, Kai Chand They Aar e Asman. The creative impulse could not be transferred from one generation to the next. In terms of quality in almost all the literary forms and genres, decadence is quite tangible.
Worryingly Urdu as a medium of instruction at the school level appears to be giving way to English as it is evident from the mushroom growth of English-medium schools in the urban centres. One must not rule out the likelihood of English becoming the language of Pakistani urban bourgeois in 15 years. Hence, the second marker of Pakistani national identity will be striving for its survival unless some immediate measures are taken from being consigned to marginality.
The affirmation of the self by ‘othering’ on the basis of religion remains to be the only sustainable identity marker in Pakistan. Since the state sponsored narrative about the national identity gives centrality to religion, therefore, general perception formed in Pakistan about other nationalities is religion-centric. For us, the Indian is a Hindu, the American or the British is either Christian or in some cases Jew. That is how we perceive ourselves as well as others which needs a serious soul searching on our part.