The News on Sunday: Kindly apprise us of the role of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII)?
Dr Khalid Masud: Article 223 clearly defines the functions of the CII, which include making recommendations to Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the principles of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
It was also decided that the CII shall submit its final report within seven years of its appointment, and shall submit an annual interim report. The report, whether interim or final, shall be laid for discussion before the parliament within six months of its receipt, and Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), after considering the report, shall enact laws within a period of two years of the final report.
TNS: Was its creation justified, or still is?
KM: To understand why such a council was needed and how its role was conceived and why was it not given significance, one needs to look at the early history of Pakistan and the politics in this country. The constitution became a problem immediately after the creation of Pakistan. Looking at the debates in the assembly, one finds that non-Muslim minorities and liberals were in favour of a non-religious constitution. Quaid-i-Azam was corresponding with constitutional experts in the United Kingdom. The problem was not simply about a debate between religion and secularism. Ethnic, provincial, and influential landlords and princely states were also raising questions about their status. The only shortcut was to appeal to Islam, ousting of powerful minority groups, and a strong hand dealing with princely states; hence the Objectives Resolution in 1948.
Ulema were very strong in East Pakistan and, hence, a strong support for an Islamic constitution. Prior to the formation of the CII, two other institutions were constituted to deal with the problems relating to the constitution: Law Commission in 1956, and a Board of Talimat Islamiyya. The tussle between the reformist members likes Dr Hamidullah and Dr Muhammad Asad on the one hand and Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and Sulayman Nadvi on the other, made these efforts controversial.
The Ulema offered 22 points, probably in 1952, as guidelines, which suggested an alternative to the Objectives Resolution. Later, the Ulema organised themselves into political groups and provincial politics used them. In 1953, religious groups demonstrated their strength in Lahore. It was headed by Ahrar, an associated group with Jamiatul Ulema in India, later joined by Jamaát-e-Islami and Ahal e Sunnah. It was seen as a mass movement for Islamisation.
Until now, the Ulema, as a political group, stood discredited due to their opposition to the creation of Pakistan. This movement showed their strength among the masses. Until this show of power, the Islamic literature published at that time was divided into two groups: the reformists and the traditionalists. Jamaát-e-Islami came forward and countered the reformists. Gradually, Islamic laws emerged as the most crucial issue in constitutional debates.
The reformists like Dr. Fazlur Rahman called for re-interpretation of the Islamic legal tradition to make it compatible with time. The traditionalists, like Maulana Ihtishamul Haq Thanawi, insisted on adopting Fiqh as the law of the country. Ayub Khan appointed Dr Fazlur Rahman as Director of the Central Institute of Islamic Research established in 1960 to assist the Council of Islamic Ideology established in 1962. Rahman was one of its members.
In the beginning, the Council consisted mostly of lawyers and judges, with a few Ulema. The tension between the Ulema and reformists that led to the failure of the Board of Ta’limat, expressed itself more aggressively in the Council. On the recommendation of the Law Commission, Muslim Family Law 1961 was introduced as an ordinance. The religious group led by Maulana Thanawi opposed it. After its establishment, the Council continued its debate. Maulana Thanawi and Rahman as members were prominent. The Family Law could not be amended but the religious opposition forced the government to oust Rahman from Pakistan.
TNS: How was the council given a new lease of life under the Constitution of 1973?
KM: Political pressure by religious groups in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government led him to include Islamic provisions in the Constitution of 1973. A full chapter on the Council, with the increased number of religious scholars, affected the composition and functions of the Council. During Ziaul Haq’s regime, Islamisation of laws began. Even though the constitution advised otherwise, the number of religious scholars increased, and the Chairman of the Council was no longer required to be a judge as the earlier rules prescribed. To cut the story short, the Council’s role is advisory, but its reports and recommendations are never debated on in the parliament, even though required by the Constitution. Increasingly, political governments have used this body to appease the Ulema. Its role was limited to review of laws and law-making. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and other government institutions frequently refer queries to the Council. It has affirmed the conception of the council as "dar al-Ifta", or the fatwa body of the government among the public.
TNS: It is said that the CII has completed its main task of reviewing laws. What is its role in future?
KM: The CII completed review of laws made between 1726 and 1990 and submitted its final report in 1996. The Council has followed two principles in reviewing the laws -- repugnancy and implementation. The report submitted in 2008 updated reviews done till 2006. Approximately, more than 95 per cent of existing laws were declared Islamic. The Council also recommended amendments and revision in those laws, which were not strictly in accordance with the Qurán and Sunnah.
About implementation of Fiqh (sectarian laws interpreted by the jurists), religious groups do not recognise ‘repugnancy’ as an authentic method. They consider Fiqh is Sharia.
These interpretations have been done by the Imams, nobody can replace them. The CII recommendations are not discussed in the parliament because the Ulema do not recognise parliament’s authority to legislate Sharia. They simply demand implementation of these recommendations. The government does not want to take the risk taking these recommendations to the parliament because these recommendations may attract criticism from some quarters and this criticism may annoy religious groups.
TNS: History shows that the role of CII has also been political, as appointments are made on political grounds, obliging various religious groups.
KM: This has been quite apparent. But, it became more obvious under Bhutto and Zia. Under Asif Ali Zardari, Ulema who were office-bearers of political parties were appointed. The present regime is continuing this policy. The Ulema do not see this as a conflict of interest.
TNS: What has been the impact of the CII decisions and recommendations? Though they are not binding, they create a social impact on the society, stirring different debates.
KM: Only a few recommendations of the Council have been implemented. The Council had an active role under Zia. Recommendations are not binding, but the Constitution prescribes a timeframe for the parliament and government to present, discuss, and finalise the debate. Under Zia, the state established Federal Shariat Court with almost the same functions. That sufficiently shows how important the CII is for the state and government of Pakistan.
TNS: How do you see the recent decisions of the CII on child marriage, DNA, polygamy, etc.?
KM: A majority of the Ulema in Pakistan would agree with the CII recommendations. Even those Ulema who condemn terrorism, support Taliban on the enforcement of Sharia. On these particular issues also, the Ulema support the CII position. This is politics of law.
TNS: Do you think the CII needs to be revamped?
KM: A more crucial question is whether there is a serious political will for moderation and containing extremism. My experience is that there is no political will for reforms in Islamic law. Islamic modernism as a school of thought has lost its relevance today. The choice is not between moderates and extremists; it is between Islamists (that includes Jamaát-e-Islami and all religious parties) and secularists.
(The interview was conducted via email)