The climate negotiations in Belém are in for a difficult second week
f COP29 in Baku was seen as a Finance COP, the COP30 in Belém is being termed an Action COP. As COP30 reaches its midpoint, those following the discussions are still uncertain whether this summit will become yet another talk shop or mark a genuine turning point. Give it another week and the final communique will tell us whether the conference delivers meaningful progress or simply repeats the familiar cycle of high rhetoric and limited results. Convened ten years after the Paris Agreement and returning to Brazil 33 years after the Rio Earth Summit, where the UNFCCC was conceptualised, this COP was always going to be symbolic. However, symbolism alone cannot halt the rise of seas, the melting of glaciers or record-breaking heat. What matters now is what survives the final text.
The early adoption of the agenda was a procedural victory, avoiding a familiar deadlock over what to discuss. But some politically charged issues, like the “transition away from fossil fuels,” were shifted into the new “action agenda”— a stream that allows progress without requiring consensus. This may expedite action, but it risks sidelining contentious topics just when they require full debate and commitment. Lack of consensus means that the fossil fuel lobby can do whatever suits it without taking into account those who agreed to shift to clean energy.
The Global Goal on Adaptation is one of the more promising developments. Negotiators are close to agreeing on a framework that will, for the first time, track and measure how countries are adapting to climate impacts. This will be a structural shift as it will turn resilience into a core metric of climate ambition rather than an afterthought.
However, without money, frameworks mean little. The new $1.3 trillion climate finance goal for 2035—including $300 billion annually for adaptation—exists only on paper. Turning it into reality requires clarity on sources, timelines, and enforcement. The proposed roadmap from Baku to Belém suggests innovative tools such as wealth taxes, fossil fuel levies and reformed multilateral lending. But none of those are binding yet.
The Loss and Damage Fund, once heralded as a historic breakthrough, is also under scrutiny. While officially operational, it remains critically underfunded and administratively slow. Its current commitments total less than $800 million. This amount is a tiny fraction of what vulnerable nations need after climate disasters. Even more worrying is the fact that many of the recipient countries are still struggling to handle the bureaucratic procedures to access even modest sums.
The Belém Action Mechanism, proposed by the G77 + China, reflects growing frustration. It seeks to institutionalise a just transition process under the UNFCCC, ensuring labour protections, technology transfer and finance that does not deepen debt. Developed countries have yet to support it fully, but the proposal signals a broader demand from the Global South that climate transitions must also be equitable and locally owned.
The Loss and Damage Fund, once heralded as a historic breakthrough, is also under scrutiny. While officially operational, it remains critically underfunded and administratively slow.
Geopolitics is never far from the surface.
The absence of a US federal delegation has left a leadership vacuum, filled in part by sub-national actors like California. In contrast, China has stepped up: hosting methane talks, boosting renewable exports to the Global South and joining a coalition to harmonise carbon markets. Along with other developing countries, it rightly criticised the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The idea that environmental considerations should not be used to discriminate against the market access of developing countries has been a flash point in multilateral negotiations since the WTO days.
The European Union, for its part, remains active but overstretched. With internal divisions, the rise of right-wing political parties in most countries and competing crises, its climate diplomacy is less central than it was in Paris or Glasgow. That said, it continues to push for transparency, fossil fuel reduction and scaled-up finance, especially through institutions like the EIB and Green Climate Fund.
Meanwhile, science is catching up with diplomacy. UNFCCC head Simon Stiell confirmed that new nationally determined contributions (NDCs) could reduce emissions by just 12 percent by 2035, relative to 2019 levels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says cuts of at least 43 percent are needed by 2030 to stay below 1.5 degree Celsius. The gap between pledges and planetary limits is growing, not shrinking.
Civil society, indigenous movements and youth groups have injected urgency into the summit. From protests at the entrance to flotillas on the Amazon, their message is clear: climate justice cannot be delayed. The pressure is helping to anchor issues like land rights, WASH (water, sanitation, hygiene) and health security into adaptation plans.
All this sets the stage for a difficult second week. The presidency will need to clarify how the blended agenda will function, particularly in terms of finance and the transition to fossil fuels. Consultations are ongoing, but clarity is elusive.
Where does this leave Pakistan?
Pakistan has updated its NDCs and aims to generate 20 percent of electricity from solar by 2026. It is working with the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Nature-based adaptation efforts, like Recharge Pakistan, show promise. However, the country remains heavily vulnerable to climate shocks—from floods to heatwaves—and reliant on external financing to implement its plans.
Pakistan’s priorities at COP30 should be threefold: secure disbursements from the L&D Fund; ensure its NDC and RSF-linked reforms receive support; and back the Belém Action Mechanism to promote a fair transition. These goals align with broader developing country
interests and require diplomatic coordination with G77, China and sympathetic blocs in Africa and Latin America.
COP30 may still fall short. But its structure, tone and emerging tools suggest that it has the potential to move from symbolic to substantive. That will only become clear once the negotiations are over in Belém.
The writer heads the Sustainable Development Policy Institute and is a member of the Asian Development Bank Institute’s Advisory Board. His LinkedIn handle is Abidsuleri.