The nuclear journey

May 2021 marks 23 years of the nuclear voyage that India and Pakistan have travelled together since 1998 to establish and maintain nuclear deterrence along with frequent occurrences of crises.

One can argue that the nuclear weapons have been successful in preventing war between India and Pakistan yet tensions and risks have increased in the region. This makes one wonder at how different the South Asian nuclear voyage was from that of other nuclear-armed states, notably the US, the USSR/Russia, Britain, France and China (the de-jure nuclear-armed states also known as the P-5 who tested their nuclear devices before the signing of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968).

The nuclear expedition of the US (1945-1968) and the USSR (1949-1972) embraced rapid development and diversification in nuclear force and novel technologies to bolster deterrence. However, these developments were not free from introducing new risks of nuclear first-strike, rapid retaliation, pre-emption and fears of escalation of conventional to nuclear crisis/war into the strategic calculus of superpowers.

Amid these developments, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was an eye-opener that taught superpowers a hard-earned lesson that their cities were at nuclear risk as a result of the fog of misjudgement, miscalculation and/or miscommunication. Furthermore, with the Soviets’ approaching strategic parity with the US, Washington along with the Nato states changed its priority to keep fewer fingers over the nuclear button, and endeavoured to lower the risk of nuclear war by engaging in and promoting arms control negotiations and agreements bilaterally and multilaterally.

By 1972, several bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements were negotiated and signed, reflecting an understanding among nuclear-armed states that you cannot go along nuclear development pathway without talking about arms limitation and control. Importantly, the Soviets and the Americans negotiated the ABM Treaty despite the fact that the Soviets’ ABM defence was a major threat for Britain, France and China which had much smaller deterrent forces whereas the US with a heavy inventory of multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) could saturate Soviet defence.

To neutralise their gravest threat, both Britain and France developed systems to penetrate through the Soviet defences. For instance, Britain worked to modernize its Polaris force to penetrate the Soviets’ ABM system. Paris developed a missile (S-3) capable of better penetrating anti-missile defences. On the other hand, China during the initial decades was slow to develop strategic thinking that could incorporate nuclear weapons in it. It was the change in leadership (Deng Xiaoping in 1977) that transformed traditional people’s war thinking to war under new conditions, and expedited work on force modernization.

Despite similarities in the overall P-5 attitude towards quantitative and qualitative nuclear force development and arms control, some of the P-5 states displayed distinct characteristics during the initial decades. For instance, Britain decided to maintain only a sea-based deterrent force as compared to other states that continued to develop and modernize triad nuclear force. In contrast to other states, China maintained its no-first use policy from the very beginning. Likewise, French understanding about arms control was different from that of the Americans, Soviets and English.

A strict comparison between the P-5 and India-Pakistan developments in their initial decades might not grasp the landscape of South Asian nuclear expedition so far. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned developments in the P-5 nuclear inventory and attitude do provide some basic sketch against which one can assess South Asian nuclear journey. In comparison to these five nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan have not done little to catch-up with the pace of weapons development and diversification.

Both states developed and are aiming to develop ground, air, and sea-based deterrent forces along with demonstrated intent in exploring the area of emerging technologies for strategic purposes. However, Pakistan initially faced conventional imbalance that increased the salience of nuclear weapons; gradually this salience was adjusted over time with qualitative improvement in Islamabad’s conventional arsenal. Moreover, to achieve strategic parity with Indian advancements, Islamabad devised a spectrum doctrine along with missile inventory. Regardless of these competitive developments to balance weapons and doctrinal innovations, nuclear South Asia, unlike the P-5, is facing a challenging situation of recurrent crises and lack of progress in the field of arms limitation and control.

Since overt nuclearization, both India and Pakistan have experienced major crises which added new dimensions to the existing fragile security situation — including the possibility of fighting a limited war and carrying out surgical strikes under a nuclear overhang and the likelihood of capable non-state actors bringing two nuclear-armed states eyeball-to-eyeball militarily in a crisis.

The competitive weapons and doctrinal developments in South Asia not only help manage the need to address strategic parity but also aggravate nuclear risks in region. This competition becomes intense, especially for Pakistan given its stringent economic conditions. Regardless of economic challenges, Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear deterrent — suggesting the critical significance of nuclear weapons for the country’s security.

Due to stringent economic conditions, Britain was once faced with the choice to give up its Polaris programme to survive economically. Britain however continued to retain and modernize its nuclear deterrent to neutralise the Soviets threat and to keep the power balance within Europe, demonstrating how significant nukes are for power and security. Despite the critical significance of nuclear weapons, though, the P-5 engaged in the bilateral and multilateral arms control process. India and Pakistan too thus need to demonstrate progress on arms control to help reduce nuclear risks.

The writer is a London-based writer and teaches at King’s College London.

Email: shaheensalma7@gmail.com