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Thursday March 28, 2024

The F-16 opposition

By Hussain H Zaidi
February 27, 2016

Why is India making such a song and dance about the planned sale of F-16 aircraft by the United States to Pakistan? The answer to this question holds the key to appreciating the fundamental character of the Islamabad-New Delhi equation in which even a slightest gain made by one is seen as a big loss by the other.

Subject to a nod from Congress, the US administration will sell eight F-16 jets along with related equipment to Pakistan to shore up its counterterrorism capability in a $699 million deal. The country already has a fleet of 70 F-16s. New Delhi has vociferously voiced concerns that the addition of the aircraft to Islamabad’s war machine will tip the security scales in South Asia in favour of Pakistan and that the equipment, instead of being used for the avowed purpose, may be deployed against the country’s eastern neighbour.

How much weight does the Indian argument carry? For both Islamabad and Washington, the case for the F-16 deal is strong and simple: Pakistan is fighting a drawn-out war against extremists. Given that religious extremism is a global problem and the north-western part of Pakistan has been an epicentre for terrorism, world powers have the obligation to help Pakistan put down the menace. Washington has provided substantial aid to Islamabad in the course of the war on terror, and very recently the Obama administration has sought Congressional approval for $859.8 million, including $265 million for military hardware and assistance for Pakistan.

Outlining the rationale for the F-16 deal, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “We think this is a capability that will help Pakistan in its counterterrorism effort and we think that’s in the national security interests of the United States.” Echoing the same view, a State Department spokesman said: “We believe it’s in our vital national security interests to support Pakistan in carrying out its efforts to destroy these terrorist networks, and we believe it’s an important partner in the region in achieving a stable and secure Afghanistan.”

Is Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign not in New Delhi’s national security interests as well? India, or for that matter any other country, cannot deny that they stand to gain if the diabolical forces of extremism are weakened. Such forces constitute a potent threat to world peace and India itself has been their target.

That said, India challenges the very rationale for the F-16 transaction. It holds that the fighter jets will not be used to crush militancy and may, instead, be used to bolster Islamabad’s defence capability relative to New Delhi’s. And India is not alone in adopting such a stance. Many an American congressman, not to speak of a former Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, share the Indian view.

The Indian argument is built on two possible premises. First, the F-16s are not really needed by Pakistan for counterterrorism. Second, even if they are needed, they will be diverted to another purpose. The first premise is untenable. The unconventional war that Pakistani troops are fighting against their own people puts a high premium on striking with precision. Since the terrorists’ hideouts are located in residential areas, there is always a danger of civilians being killed in military operations. Civilian casualties – or collateral damage – need to be avoided also because they detract from society’s wholehearted support, which is so vital to winning the war against terror. In a word, the greater the precision strike capability of the air force, the more effective the counterterrorism campaign. And F-16s are by all accounts a vehicle for enhancing that capability.

The second premise arises out of suspicions over Islamabad’s anti-terrorism role. The Pakistan establishment has often run the gauntlet of criticism, not least from the US, for running with the hare and hunting with the hounds; for fighting terror but at the same time patronising certain militant outfits, such as the Haqqani Network and the militants in Indian controlled Kashmir, and using them to carry out clandestine activities in the neighbouring countries of India and Afghanistan.

In the past, the Pakistan establishment’s quest for so-called strategic depth necessitated that some militant groups should continue to be used as strategic assets in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Let’s not forget that it was Islamabad that had facilitated the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan in 1996, after its disappointment with Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in the hope that the student militia, which had sprung up in seminaries in Pakistan, would serve as an instrument of strategic depth. Accordingly, a distinction was made between good militants and bad militants.

The search for strategic depth turned out to be disastrous, as the strategic ‘assets’ proved an existential threat. Against this backdrop, the present military establishment claims that the Operation Zarb-e-Azb is being carried out at full steam against all militants and that no outfit, including the Haqqanis, has been marked for preferential treatment.

Even if we admit that the Indian argument is valid, it’s difficult to infer that the new F-16 consignment, in case it is made available to Pakistan, will be capable of altering the security balance in South Asia to Pakistan’s advantage. For one thing, India is way ahead of Pakistan on all quantifiable indicators of conventional military strength: the number of military personnel, fighter aircraft fleet, tanks and submarines. India’s defence budget is at least five times greater than Pakistan’s – the latter being the largest importer of arms in the world.

Besides, if the sale of eight fighter jets can alter the strategic balance in the region, one can logically conclude that India is preciously placed vis-à-vis Pakistan. This, however, is not the case, as India remains the most powerful state in the region. In Washington, the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency also sought to dispel the Indian impression by arguing that the proposed deal will not change the security balance in the region.

What lies behind the Indian stance is its desire to dictate to the neighbouring countries what their strategic interests should be and how they ought to be pursued. Some time back, New Delhi expressed similar concerns about the sale of F-17s to Sri Lanka. Such a stance only drives India and its neighbours apart. This also explains why India, despite being a regional power, has not been able to assume the region’s leadership. For the latter to be possible, a country needs to command the trust and respect of its smaller neighbours and not their fears or suspicions.

For decades, Islamabad and New Delhi have been entangled in a zero-sum game, which has no winners. Such an approach is illogical but, like all illogical things, it is tempting. In the context of the proposed F-16 transaction, Indian policymakers know very well that the deal doesn’t pose any threat to their country’s security but they can’t help playing to the gallery. In such a scenario, any hope of the two nations making significant headway in sorting out bilateral issues remains at best a delusion.

The writer is a graduate from a western European university.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com