A few years ago, I was teaching ‘rational choice theory’ in international relations to a class of students. The theory, in the interest of brevity, claims that the actions of actors in international politics can be explained through understanding their rational self-interest.
On this particular occasion, a student asked whether it was possible to determine what actions might be understood as rational or otherwise. I thought it was a good question and instead of giving an off the cuff response, I said I would read and think and perhaps answer on a later occasion.
The prevalent postmodern explanation would, of course, be to largely agree with the student and admit that rationality and irrationality are subjective concepts shaped by power relationships and by one’s own positionality. However, I am sure anyone who teaches a class of undergrads would agree that students at that level are rarely convinced by less definitive answers. Searching for a more definitive answer forced me to think deeper and in more concrete terms.
The reply that I eventually arrived at and shared with the class was that rationality cannot be understood by merely looking at the actions of individual actors. Instead, rationality of an act should be judged on the basis of whether the act has the probability of bringing about the results that are expected from it. An irrational act, therefore, is one that has no way of achieving the outcome for which it is purportedly initiated. Taking an extreme example, the act of suicide bomber is irrational for most people when seen from the point of view of preservation of life as the foremost goal of an individual. However, for the suicide bomber, the act is rational since the intended outcome is not the preservation of the attacker’s own life but creating fear or taking out a target. Therefore, to repeat, a truly irrational act is one that has little or no probability of achieving the results for which it is apparently intended.
The issue of blasphemy and relations between Pakistan and France prompted me to think about this idea of rationality and whether as a state and society we understand the choices that we have, the ways in which we can act and the potential outcomes of those actions.
So, to use this framing, we know one part of the equation. We know that the intended outcome of our actions is to prevent blasphemous materials being published in France and for the French government to refrain from patronizing individuals and organizations involved in promoting such blasphemous materials.
It appears, however, that there is a lack of clarity regarding how to act to achieve this objective. The spontaneous response was to demand the expulsion of the French ambassador. Such diplomatic act would then supposedly mean that Pakistan would sever all diplomatic relations with France because, as we stand, I do not expect the next French ambassador to renounce the actions of the French government. And if we keep sending back French diplomats, I do not think we can continue to have diplomatic relations with the country.
Coming back to the intended outcomes, would severing relations with France mean that organizations and individuals in France would be prevented from publishing and promoting blasphemous content? Expelling the ambassador would be cathartic, but I believe we would also lose whatever leverage we have over the French government.
The question that the reader would naturally ask: if we do not terminate our relations with France, then what are our choices? Or, to use my framing, what is the rational choice geared towards achieving the objective of preventing blasphemy towards persons and symbols Muslims deem sacred?
In my opinion, we need to reinvent the reasons why Muslims demand respect for their sacred persons, places and symbols. Currently, the demand for respect is rooted in the position that such blasphemous acts are sacrilegious and therefore hurt the sentiments of Muslims. The demand sounds fair and reasonable. However, France, like most other Western countries, is a constitutionally secular state. And the idea of sacred does not exist there as it does in Pakistan.
In my view, the better position would be to link the issue with growing Islamophobia and victimization of Muslims in France and elsewhere. Why do multiple European countries have laws against the Holocaust? Why are antisemitism or the use of racial slurs social taboos, even when there are no legal protections against them? Because the discussion around these issues has been framed around historical oppression, present discrimination and, in the absence of safeguards, potential future victimization.
We need to reframe the discussion regarding blasphemy and the targeting of Muslims in the Western world along similar lines. And there are strong legitimate reasons for such a demand. We need to push forward the idea that those who promote blasphemous materials are individuals and groups motivated by a hatred of Muslims and the identity that they represent. For instance, the French magazine Charlie Hebdo has repeatedly depicted an image of common Muslims that has incited Islamophobia. We should frame the issue of this depiction of Muslims and Islam as an issue for the security and status of Muslim societies rather than one calling for limitations of freedom of speech.
It is my conviction, therefore, that the best way to prevent blasphemy towards what we deem sacred is to engage with the West and to point out that the people who promote these depictions are not motivated by freedom of speech but by their hatred of Muslims and their refusal to coexist.
The writer is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Peshawar.
Email: aamerazagmail.com