movement and the credentials of the post-Omar Taliban leadership to deliver any promises they might make.
The Afghan Taliban survived the toppling of their regime in 2001 and wave of arrests and killings by the US because of the presence of a central authority and spiritual figurehead. Now that Mullah Omar is no more it can divide the Taliban movement along three different axis: i) an internal power struggle over his successor; ii) formal split between already-present pro-talk and anti-talk elements; iii) and the defection of certain Taliban factions to the IS.
Since the birth of the Taliban movement, Mullah Omar has remained its founding father and ideological figurehead – the ameer-ul-momineen (commander of the faithful.) Also, he was an inspiring symbol that united the insurgent movement. His obscure death away from the battlefield and on foreign soil is bound to contribute to the low morale of the rank-and-file. It will also trigger intense power struggle and infighting within the Taliban ranks. Given the aura that surrounded his towering personality, it will be very difficult for the Taliban Shura to find an equally charismatic replacement for him who can fill the void of Omar’s absence and keep the movement united. Already, there are divisions between the Pakistan-based Taliban deputy chief Mullah Mansoor Akhtar and Afghanistan-based former Taliban military chief Mullah Qayum Zakir.
Traditionally, Mansoor should be the natural successor of Mullah Omar; however, Taliban groups close to Zakir are promoting Omar’s son Mullah Yaqoob as his successor. Given the reservations and opposition to proposal of Mansoor’s succession, two other prominent Taliban figures, Mullah Ubaidullah Akhund and Mullah Bradar Akhund are also under consideration by the Taliban Shura.
The division between the pro-talks and anti-talk factions within the Taliban movement will become more apparent and obvious with Omar’s death. The mid-level field commanders and fighters based in Afghanistan are quite sanguine about a military victory, especially after the 2014 drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan and weakness of the inexperienced Afghan security forces. Their recent military gains in northern Afghanistan provide them all the more reasons to continue fighting and oppose the peace talks. They believe that after having done all the hard work and coming so close to victory joining the peace talks is like breaking their fast ten minutes before the actual time. Meanwhile, the members of the Pakistan-based Taliban Shura are weary of war, travails of exiled life and pressures exerted on them by the Pakistani security establishment. They are keen to return to Afghanistan after reaching a political compromise with Kabul.
A third division in the Taliban movement can arise from those factions that believe in the IS-propounded strain of Takfiri-Salafist jihadism, which is global and not confined to a particular geographical region. This is why the IS will be the natural beneficiary of Mullah Omar’s death. The vacuum resulting from his demise coupled with the power struggle within the Taliban ranks will provide the IS with the ideal opportunity to fill the void and maximise its gains in Afghanistan. Already, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and certain factions of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban have pledged allegiance to the IS.
The death of Mullah Omar will also put to test the recent thaw in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations which started with the inauguration of Ashraf Ghani as Afghanistan’s new president. The Afghan government will certainly become sceptical of Pakistan’s underlying motivations and designs behind the peace process. In this scenario, the centrality of Pakistan as a sincere facilitator of the peace process will come under intense scrutiny. Tough questions will be asked on whether Pakistan wants to be a peace-broker or a power-broker in Afghanistan.
Afghan authorities could possibly confront Pakistan with pressing questions: i) if Mullah Omar died in Pakistan two years back who was issuing Eid messages in his name: and ii) who was managing the insurgent fight in Afghanistan. It will also arm the pro-Indian lobby led by former president Hamid Karzai with the right kind of ammunition to cast aspersions about Pakistan’s intentions in Afghanistan.
Omar’s death will create new uncertainties, complexities and security challenges in Afghanistan which will have a direct bearing on regional peace and stability. It will undermine the US’ plans of exiting the region after ending the violence through a political compromise. The US will have to reconsider its withdrawal plans, moving away from a calendar-driven agenda to a condition-based approach that takes into account the ground realities. Undoubtedly, the lessons learnt from the Syria and Iraq experiences show that the propensity of indulging in proxy wars, uncertain and ambiguous policy decisions leading to impasses, and the abandonment of places like Afghanistan not only escalates existing conflicts, but germinates into further troubles.
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