Outsourcing nuclear alarmism

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme often becomes the focus of international media through ‘engineered’ controversies. In one recent attempt, it was accused that Saudi Arabia could possibly purchase nuclear weapons ‘off-the-shelf’ from Pakistan. In another media story, the Isis claim of buying a nuclear device from Pakistan received unprecedented media coverage from all over the world.
This indicates the choreographic ingenuity of the sponsors of such malicious campaigns, intended mainly to discredit Pakistan as a responsible nuclear weapon state.
The Isis controversy was based on a story published in their propaganda magazine Dabiq; it was claimed that the organisation has billions of dollars in banks and could acquire nuclear weapons from “corrupt officials in Pakistan.” It does not require a genius to decipher the malicious intent of the perpetrators of such slanderous stories – aimed at discrediting Pakistan and those working in the nuclear programme. Interestingly, while the Isis ambition to acquire nuclear weapons received unprecedented media attention, no one raised the issue of their financial resources. The billions of dollars that the discredited organisation claimed to have in its bank accounts could not be in Pakistan.
On the Saudi-Pak nuclear controversy, the spokesperson at Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed it as “entirely baseless and mischievous.” Likewise, the official Saudi response was that “the ministry does not comment on rumours and speculations.” This should have put the matter to rest but some continue to remain sceptical by raising concerns that may need to be addressed.
Mark Fitzpatrick, a very well-respected scholar who has written extensively on Iran’s nuclear negotiations aptly argues that: “Pakistan has strong strategic, political and economic incentives to keep its nuclear weapons to itself.” He nevertheless fears

that the “Saudi money could lure Pakistan’s nuclear scientists to give it a head start of developing weapons technology.” There is also concern over Pakistan’s Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) to cover its scientists.
One would agree with Fitzpatrick that Pakistan would have no plausible incentive to engage in such a deal with any country. We have a modest nuclear weapons programme that is sufficient to meet its requirement against a specific threat. The genesis of Pakistan’s weapons programme and the development of its nuclear posture has the singular objective of neutralising the existential challenge the country faces from its large eastern neighbour. Pakistan neither has the capacity nor the political or strategic advantage to offer its nuclear weapons to any other country, including Saudi Arabia, which also has a strong ongoing strategic and defence partnership with the US and other western countries to meet its security needs.
Fitzpatrick’s other concern of monetary gains that could possibly lure some scientists from Pakistan may merit some reflection. First, would it be possible for one or two, or even a small group of scientists, to build a nuclear weapons programme in a country with negligible nuclear industrial base and that too without that being noticed by interested parties in the immediate neighbourhood and by the significant US presence inside the kingdom?
In a hypothetical scenario, if it were possible to lure a group of scientists, why do they have to be from Pakistan? Such scientists could possibly be bought from around the world, especially from countries with considerably large nuclear enterprises. A more recent example is the case of a Los Alamos scientist Pedro Leonardo Mascheroni, who offered to build nuclear weapons for Venezuela for money.
Fitzpatrick’s dossier of 2007 on international nuclear black markets had identified more than 30 companies and middlemen who were involved in illicit nuclear trade from different countries that included: South Africa, Switzerland, Malaysia, Netherlands, Turkey, Germany, Pakistan, United Kingdom and Japan.
No other nuclear country has offered so much transparency to its nuclear management system as has been done by Pakistan. These efforts, nevertheless, seem to have little effect to assuage the accusations that are based on speculations and politically oriented. The continued onslaught against Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the western media also coincides with the shift in US approach towards the region, where India is being propagated as an important stakeholder and a potential bulwark against China, for which Pakistan’s potential to challenge India’s hegemony may need to be neutralised.
In an earlier oped piece, Pakistan’s former ambassador Munir Akram had outlined the possible contours of this strategy. According to him, in the first phase, concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear programme would be spread through media and diplomatic channels, which would be followed by demand for assurances and constraints from our side. These would then be translated into Pakistan-specific binding commitments through international institutions such as the UN, which could subsequently be used to limit Pakistan’s ability to challenge India’s coercive approach towards its relatively small neighbours, especially Pakistan.
One could argue against this hypothesis but in view of the growing influence of India on US policymaking this seems a plausible roadmap to help India establish itself as an unchallenged regional hegemon. However, it would be unwise to consider that a country that had persistently demonstrated its resilience to counter much bigger challenges to its nuclear programme in the past would ever compromise on its vital national security interest.
Nevertheless, there may be a need to remain vigilant about the motives behind such malicious propaganda which mostly emanates from our immediate neighbourhood but has been ‘outsourced’ to generate misperceptions through global outlets.
The writer is a visiting research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the opinion of any institution.
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