what famous security experts Mira Rapp-Hooper and Linton Brooks termed the “security trilemma.” In such a situation, actions taken by a state to enhance its security provoke similar response from a third state, thus increasing the likelihood of war.
In an anarchic domain, changes in one state’s nuclear posture can raise security concerns for other nuclear-armed states. The problem arises because, in the second nuclear age, most nuclear powers have to defend themselves against security threats from more than one source.
This is a logical corollary of the fact that the classic deterrence model of nuclear strategy is not applicable anymore. Many regional nuclear powers face different security constraints and relatively complex security environments. Furthermore, there is little evidence to prove that the behaviour of emerging nuclear powers will follow the same patterns of conflict and confrontation that existed during the cold war.
Regional nuclear powers with relatively small nuclear arsenals have different deterrence experiences. For instance, over the past three decades, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons might have deterred an Indian conventional attack, but India could not achieve the same deterrence results, as the 1999 Kargil conflict demonstrated.
Another defining feature of the second nuclear age is the emergence of nonnuclear military technologies, including anti-missile defence systems, anti-satellite weapons, sophisticated cyber weapons, and long-range precision strike weapons. These developments can offset the strategic effects of nuclear weapons but they have the potential to endanger strategic stability by threatening the survivability of nuclear assets.
Missile defence systems, despite being unreliable, have undermined strategic stability by limiting ability of a state to second nuclear strike after suffering a first strike. The success rate of a deployed ballistic-missile defence system (BMD) is supposed to be very low. The Indian BMD does not even provide reliable defence against Pakistani stealth cruise missiles like the Hatf-VII and would surely be unable to provide India’s two cities – New Delhi and Mumbai – a shield against Chinese Dongfeng-41 missile with ‘multiple sub-warheads with separate trajectories.’
If a trident missile is launched to attack an underground WMD laboratory in Iran, it could immediately be recognised by the early-warning systems of Russia or China, much like the launch of an atomic weapon. In such a scenario, the governments of Russia and China would have less than 10 minutes to decide on the appropriate reaction to the real or supposed nuclear attack. An unfortunate chain of events could lead to an order being issued for a nuclear counter-strike before the actual target of the conventional weapon is determined.
Pentagon officials consider that secure emergency communication lines can be used to clear up any such kind of misunderstanding. However, it is also true that, in times of crises, the country planning to launch missile attacks will not be very truthful about its intentions. In 1995, a nuclear war was barely avoided when Russia’s early warning satellites detected a US research rocket shot from a Norwegian island, triggering an alarm at the highest level in Moscow.
Other optimal weapons for the realisation of the CPGS plan are cruise missile, stealth aircraft, and B1 and B2 bombers, but the US air force is not in a position to maintain a worldwide network of airbases in order to reach possible targets expeditiously. Other questions about the ability of intelligence-gathering networks to provide adequate support as well as the capacity of existing intercontinental delivery systems also increase apprehensions.
The pressing requirement for locating underground weapons laboratories or missile launching pads is a foolproof method of gathering and judging intelligence, which is perhaps impossible in most cases. Many critics of conventional prompt global strike programme (CPGS) have also raised the possibility that the US initiative of developing conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles will be followed by similar initiatives in other countries. Thus CPGS could lead to a new type of arms race.
Despite continuing joint efforts by the US and Russia to limit strategic nuclear warheads, technological advances such as CPGS have strengthened the arguments of different lobbies in Moscow that oppose any reductions in nuclear arsenals.
Email: rizwanasghar5unm.edu