attention, which Isis starves for. Rezgui deployed the ‘Fidayeen’ manoeuvre, denoting guerrilla warfare of those who ‘sacrifice themselves’. Sousse and Bardo dented Tunisia`s tourism industry which accounts for 15.2 percent of GDP.
Tunisia is under fire for birthing the Arab Spring. Tunisia is a target for Isis, especially because it is one of the only post-Arab Spring states that successfully incubated a secular government set-up. Disenfranchised Tunisians, unhappy with secularism trickle into neighbouring Libya, which is a visceral Isis recruitment breeding ground. Also Isis wants to attack Tunisia frequently to muscle-flex its supremacy over a rival UqbaIbnNafi Brigade, part of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As a result of violence incited after Sousse, Prime Minister Habib Essid officially declared that he would close down 80 mosques that remain outside state purview.
Finally, a suicide bomber, Abu Suleiman al-Muwahed, blew up the Kuwaiti Imam Sadiq Mosque, killing 27 Shia worshippers. That the mosque is located a stone’s throw away from Kuwait’s interior ministry is no coincidence. Kuwait’s being part of the anti-Isis alliance and their air bases like the Ali Al Salem air base, designated for operations by the US air force is what irks Isis. Isis also wants to destabilise the relative social cohesion of Kuwait, which is one of the few countries where Shias and Sunnis live in harmony, where Shias make up 23 percent of Kuwait’s population.
The common thread weaving together all such terror is the theocratic fascism of the Islamic State, which has claimed responsibility for both Tunisia and Kuwait. Isis may be medieval in their beliefs but are uber-modern in their execution. What occurred on June 26 is no coincidence; it constitutes careful calculation. It is evidence of sophisticated logistics, an effective global network, aligned co-ordination and social media savvy. Isis’ corrosive heart bears arteries worldwide. US intelligence indicates that 20,000 foreign fighters have flocked over to the Isis nest, including at least 3,400 westerners, ready to behead humans or blast themselves up at a moment`s notice, anywhere on earth.
Operationally speaking, the three attacks accentuate the heterogeneity of radical terrorism today, in terms of tactics deployed and in their selection of targets. Terrorism is not monolithic, it is a fragmented moving target, which makes it all the more challenging an affront. There is ‘homegrown’ radicalism, especially common in the west, such as the Charleston shooting with Dylann Roof.
Then there are ‘exported’ hardened brainwashed Isis/Al-Qaeda type operatives, with global networks and capabilities, involving militant training overseas, like the Kuwaiti suicide bomber. What makes Isis tough to defeat is that coalition forces cannot deploy conventional maneuverist warfare, utilising air force to capture delineated land and disrupt supply routes. Coalition forces cannot easily use a frontal assault, due to the ever-adapting battle lines of the Isis insurgency. The capability required for Isis type insurgent guerrilla warfare is more high-tech, agile and spread-out. Also in asymmetric warfare against Isis, traditional forces withdraw as these wars are deemed too costly and protracted.
Above all, this is a rhetorical warfare of ideas, being waged deliberately over traditional and electronic media. Surely a long-term generational challenge, where ideological counter-radicalisation campaigns, education, civil society led social mobilization movements need to proliferate, promoting plurality, inter-faith harmony and addressing economic and foreign policy grievances. Better screening of social media platforms, international suspicious activity reporting hotlines and youth-led electronic campaigns are needed. Along with a plethora of other measures, it is high time to exercise soft power and restraint in foreign policy along with a fairer redistribution of resources in the Middle East.
A key motivation for the Isis attack was that they recently suffered setbacks on the battlefields of Syria and especially in central and Northern Iraq, in cities like Tikrit. Nobody wants to join losers. So to preserve their recruitment and relevance, Isis have to deviate attention from those territorial setbacks by inflicting gruesome attacks abroad, especially on soft civilian western targets, which gives them cheap and immediate publicity. Such attacks keeps them in the media spotlight, fuels their recruitment drive, propagates their divisive anti-western propaganda, and continues their image of initiative, of shocking, of reshaping the world – which is what they have done with alarming alacrity.
The writer is a freelance contributor. Email: ozerkhalidyahoo.com
Twitter: ozerkhalid