really been more efficient in punishing those responsible for the carnage on Samjhota Express.
The big powers are well-known for their double standards. We, on the other hand, relish living in the past. Memories of bonhomie between Ayub Khan and the Kennedys have been revived with the re-publication and internet sharing of photos of Ayub and Jackie Kennedy in an open limousine on Lahore’s Mall Road. Earlier Jackie had surprised Washington society by hosting with her husband a state banquet for Ayub in the historic Mount Vernon mansion, once the residence of George Washington.
In retrospect, Ayub and the latter military rulers could not fathom that Pakistan’s alliance with the US would be highly prone to developments around Pakistan. Major shifts in the US stance towards Pakistan took place after the border war between India and China and then the 1965 war between Pakistan and India. On both occasions, the US demonstrated its preference for India, disillusioning Ayub Khan.
Pakistan moved closer to China thereby upsetting Washington. Years later, it was America’s softening towards Beijing with Pakistan’s help that would help Pak-US ties. Nixon’s famous tilt towards Pakistan was considered critical in checking India’s aggressive designs on West Pakistan after the fall of Dhaka in December, 1971.
Zia’s draconian martial law facilitated the Indian lobby in undercutting Washington’s ties to Pakistan. Yet the same Carter who had flown over Pakistan while visiting Delhi and Tehran lost no time in schmoozing Zia to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. US concerns for democracy and human rights were put aside while gradually stepping up cooperation with Pakistan to serve America’s global interests.
Pak-US ties, in general, have been stronger under the Republican presidents. Ronald Reagan’s victory in the presidential election of 1980 and his avowed aim of defeating the evil empire (in Afghanistan) ensured a swift upgrade of military as well as economic ties with Pakistan.
This phenomenon was repeated after the terror attacks of September, 2001 with the marked difference of the US and its allies physically occupying Afghanistan, asking Pakistan to join in the war on terror. This was easier said than done because of Pakistan’s close ties to the Taliban and its tolerance of Osama bin Laden. Thus began the US refrain of ‘do more’ to Musharraf, signalling dissatisfaction with the efforts deployed to degrade Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Musharraf’s attempts to do more on the one hand annoyed the jihadi sympathisers and on the other provoked Al-Qaeda and its affiliates to assassinate him. Musharraf was deterred from launching all-out operations against the jihadis, giving Benazir an opportunity to make a pitch for US support which materialised in the form of National Reconciliation Ordinance-NRO, clearing the way for her and Nawaz’s return to Pakistan.
Benazir’s tragic assassination and the rise of Zardari, the ouster of Musharraf and the election of Obama brought about a major review of US policies in the region. Keeping with the Democrats’ tradition, the US has moved closer to India and distant from Pakistan. Washington wants to convey its dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s good and bad Taliban optics and its inability to crack down on sectarian and anti-India groups.
Pakistan’s bold decision to launch a major operation in North Waziristan and some other areas to defeat the jihadis has not fully convinced the Americans. Washington’s public diplomacy, while praising Pakistan’s operations against the militants, has not abandoned its ‘do more’ demands. This is discomforting in view of the army chief going out of his way to improve communications with the US. He has almost assumed the role of Pakistan’s top diplomat, eclipsing the prime minister and the Aziz-Fatemi duo at the Foreign Office.
Historically speaking, Pakistan’s foreign partners are accustomed to our army chiefs assuming the role of the country’s top diplomat. There was the familiar practice of generals wearing the twin hats of the country’s head of state as well its army’s chief. Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf enjoyed this dual role with consequences on the country’s fortunes that are well known. However, the high-profile diplomacy being conducted by Gen Raheel Sharif in the presence of a sitting civilian government is unprecedented.
Yet, Obama continues to align positions with India to bear pressure on Pakistan to take its anti-militant operations to their logical culmination without exceptions. It is difficult to recall a comparable situation when Pakistan was placed at such a disadvantageous position in the Pakistan-US-India triangle.
We should not hope for a respite as US economic and political stakes in India are only going to grow, not diminish. In economic terms, India is the United States’ next frontier to conquer. Our leaders, civil and military, must remain steadfast in their security and foreign policies to serve the nation’s best interests. With new jihadist threats like Al-Baghdadi on the horizon, there can be no let up in rendering the extremist narratives unfashionable.
It is also time the civilian side assumed its proper role as the country’s voice on military matters if the country is to be taken seriously. The army chief’s forays into diplomacy may assure our foreign partners about his earnestness but it may be seen as undercutting the civilian government’s credibility.
The civilian leadership has many failings and the point has been brought home to the extent that hardly anyone proclaims more democracy as a solution. But that should not become a pretext to undermine what we have covered on the road to democratic rule.
Email: saeed.saeedkgmail.com