The mother of all U-turns

We are in the middle of a massive shift in global opinion – what we here call a U-turn. The arc of this turn is so wide that it is not easy to point out. But its pull is constant, unflinching and global, and one by one it will affect us all.
When I was a young man first grappling with the world around me I found it neatly divided into countries and these countries were then placed in two perfectly constructed blocs – one good, the other bad. We were then, through an accident of geography, part of the ‘good’ bloc. And then, as any movie buff will tell you, the good bloc won. (Or, as any good historian will tell you, the winning bloc was good.) Nevertheless, the important thing for us when we were young was that we were good and that we were victorious.
The benefits of being good came our way in the shape of dams and canals and F16s and a seamless civil-military relationship which was very civil and very military.
Then, after 1989, as the bad bloc finally capitulated in Berlin, Kabul, Tehran, and Phnom Penh the world lost its singular purpose and all capitals were free to pick and choose policy in a new world. It became possible for western travellers to again cross into Eastern Europe, cross back into Turkey, cross again into Central Asia, jump across into China and then to Asia proper. This was something I could not have imagined as a child.
We too saw changes beginning in 1989. Democracy came back and the civil-military relationship began to morph. Decisions became more difficult to take; continuity of policies became difficult. We deregulated for two years and then back-tracked for the next two only to restart again for another two years. GDP growth crashed from eight percent to two percent, then climbed to five percent, then crashed to two percent, then doubled to four percent and then crashed again to two percent within a short space of only nine years.
In these confusing 90s we became friends with India (Rajiv/Benazir)

and then almost went to war with them (nuclear explosions) and then became friends again (Vajpayee in Lahore) and then actually went to war (Kargil). We went from a prime minister who was considered a security risk to a prime minister who could have become amir-ul-momineen and back again and again.
But in all this confusion, in all this flow and ebb of the 90s, two aspects were consistent in their direction. The first was our alienation from the west. Spurned by the west’s sudden departure after victory in the cold war, sanctioned for our nuclear ambitions, we chaffed and quibbled and increasingly became suspicious of everything western. We no longer wanted to be on the winning team and the winning team did not want us to be with them.
The second area of our consistency since the 90s has been our support for jihad. For reasons which were logical in the short-term, we supported jihad. These two trends, which have now become more a part of our psyche than of our foreign policy, were sealed together when we became one of only three countries that accepted the Taliban regime against all pressure from the west. The Taliban were good and the west was bad. Even 9/11 – which forced the west to grudgingly adopt us again – did not change these two trends.
But all trends are but trends. They have a shelf life. It is my opinion that we will now see a reversal of both these trends.
There are those who are sceptical of Pakistan’s sudden resolve against the Taliban – both good and bad. Christine Fair of Georgetown University makes a cogent argument that Pakistan will not move against all jihadis. I too believe this to be the case today. However, I also believe that we will, in time, move against them all. Similarly, it is impossible today to imagine that public opinion in Pakistan and the west will one day become as cosy as it was in the days of the cold war. But I strongly believe that it soon will.
I believe that a global U-turn is now in the works. The U-turn is not yet complete but its arc is now discernible.
I believe the defining struggle of the coming decade is not the struggle between western powers and eastern powers. I believe the defining struggle of the next decades will be the struggle between governments and ungoverned spaces; between nation states and stateless groups.
Inspirational ideas accelerated by today’s technology allow motivated individuals to run circles around old bureaucracies and standing armies. This has been proved by Al-Qaeda, by the Taliban, by Isis, by Wikileaks and by Edward Snowden. In this new struggle, all nation states will look to each other for support; for the enemy is not some other government – but the lack of any government. The old world order, intact now for the last few centuries, will fight to retain order and all nation states will have to play their part.
The map of the world will again become two-toned. Responsible nation states with recognised governments will be clearly marked and lawless areas struggling for recognition will also be easily discernible. Responsible states will be part of one team and pirates, anarchists and jihadists will be part of the other. And the world will not be defined by a clash of civilisations but by a fight between civilisation on the one hand and the forces on the periphery of this one civilisation on the other.
And the state of Pakistan too will have to choose its role in this struggle. We will then finally be forced to decide whether Pakistan is the name of a nation-state or the name of a cause, of a never-ending jihad. When the choice before us is made so stark by world order itself, we too will choose order. And we too will then begin to roll back our sanction for jihad.
At the same time the west too, out of necessity, will realise our central role in controlling anarchy; in our understanding of the levers of jihad; and we will again become allies (not in the reluctant post 9/11 sense) but in a voluntary, genuine sense. And the mother of all U-turns will be complete.
Twitter: OmarZafarullah