As Pakistan renews its proposal for a bilateral agreement on non-testing of nuclear weapons, the world community remains mum on the issue. This issue has held up progress on the non-proliferation agenda for more than two decades now.
It is interesting to note that the Obama administration has shown a marked reluctance to pressurise India into accepting a mutual ban on nuclear testing. The dangers that emanate from India’s growing nuclear weapons programme, including its unnecessary focus on the submarine-based leg of nuclear triad and desperate attempts to catch up with the strengths of Chinese military power, cannot be ignored due to an explosive mixture of terrorism and unresolved territorial disputes in the region.
Arms control advocates have repeatedly suggested denuclearisation of the region in the past but is that a realistic solution looking at the intransigent behaviour of the Indian government? South Asia is an emerging source of future nuclear terrorism, thanks to India’s unchecked nuclear ambitions.
Totally unaware of the enormity of its actions, New Delhi is all set to increase its nuclear stockpiles exponentially in the coming years. But the United States and the rest of the international community remain silent spectators to this continuing proliferation.
The Indian government is building a top-secret nuclear city in southern Karnataka to produce hydrogen weapons. The stated goals of building a huge nuclear complex in Challakere are, among others, to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and maintain a robust naval presence in the region. Once completed in 2017, the project would emerge as the largest complex of weapons and aircraft testing facilities, nuclear-research laboratories, and gas centrifuges.
The alarming fact about this project is that, in addition to using the facility to produce huge stockpiles of uranium for thermonuclear bombs, India’s nuclear establishment also plans to modernise its nuclear warheads in existing military stockpiles. India is one of only three countries in the world that continue to produce fissile material for nuclear warheads.
This must be stopped forthwith. India’s fast-evolving force posture is in completion violation of the global non-proliferation norms. Similar concerns were raised last year too in a number of media reports that said that New Delhi could covertly use its uranium enrichment facility at the Indian Rare Metals Plants near Mysore to produce much more weapons-grade uranium than it needed to fuel its ballistic missile submarine in the future.
However, the reason such media reports always fail to raise alarm in Western policymaking circles is that New Delhi, unlike Pakistan, is helping the US counter China’s emerging power and military role in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is hoped India will shape Asia’s balance of power in America’s favour. This is why the Obama administration has consistently turned a blind eye to India’s dangerous nuclear ambitions. This is not, of course, the first time the international community has sacrificed its non-proliferation objectives to immediate geopolitical goals.
The development of thermonuclear weapons, also referred to as hydrogen bombs, in South Asia is such a dangerous step that it would destroy strategic stability in the region. Thermonuclear weapons are considered to be one of the most powerful nuclear weapons and have much greater explosive power.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, thermonuclear weapons “derive their explosive energy from the combined power of nuclear fission and fusion. An initial fission reaction generates the high temperatures needed to trigger a secondary- and much more powerful- fusion reaction.”
Serious apprehensions have rightly been expressed in subsequent media reports that India’s provocative decision to further expand its offensive nuclear capabilities could unsettle neighbouring countries. It is also widely expected that China and Pakistan will respond by increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals at a fast pace or by further lowering their nuclear red line.
India’s failure to be transparent about its nuclear ambitions could cause broader destabilising military effects in the region. A rapidly growing nuclear programme without enough security would definitely provide the necessary incentives to terrorist organisations to steal nuclear weapons or fissionable materials. Lack of precise information in India regarding the exact number of nuclear weapons and quantity of fissile material further increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
The issue regarding the level of nuclear secrecy has become a serious subject matter in deliberations by the UN General Assembly’s First Committee at the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences (RevCon). Some ‘recognised nuclear-weapon states’ voluntarily submit reports on their nuclear activities but there is absolutely no transparency in the non-NPT states.
New Delhi is oblivious to the fact that, in its desire to emerge as a major military power, it is playing with fire. It has become almost impossible for all nuclear states to ensure the absolute security of their arsenals. India’s sensitive nuclear materials are highly vulnerable to theft, given a large number of unguarded nuclear facilities.
If media reports are to be believed, nuclear weapons are stored in more than six states and incidents of attempted theft of low- or semi-enriched uranium have been reports multiple times since the early 1990s.
The global community needs to refocus its attention on the need to improve transparency regarding exact quantities of fissile materials and their production history. The growth of India’s nuclear programme is not related to its security needs; we must stop pretending otherwise.
Two main points emerge from this brief discussion. First, Indian policymakers are unable to appreciate the gravity of the volatile security situation in the region. Second, India has assumed an aggressive military posture over the past few years, lowering the nuclear threshold in South Asia.
It is time for India to step away from its intransigence and seriously engage with Pakistan to resolve all long-standing issues including the Kashmir dispute. Indian civilian and military leaderships have to understand that there will be no winners in a nuclear war in South Asia.
Email: rizwanasghar5unm.edu