A major political reshuffle appears imminent in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). But will it effectively revive the legitimacy of the prevailing political settlement among the people of AJK?
Prima facie, this seems unlikely, as the current crisis reflects deeper underlying structural and institutional issues that are often overlooked. As a development economist studying AJK, I identify two major structural challenges that have shaped the region’s socioeconomic development. First, the issue of ‘symbolic autonomy’ and second, the systemic exclusion of the working and middle classes – particularly young people – from meaningful participation in economic processes.
These issues are deeply interconnected and reinforce each other through a persistent feedback loop in AJK. In this article, I explain that unless these underlying issues are addressed, the crisis in AJK is likely to deepen further.
In recent years, soaring prices of essential goods and utilities have fueled widespread frustration, sparking protests across every district of AJK. Although inflation has been a nationwide issue across Pakistan, why has mass mobilisation occurred only in AJK? This can be partly explained by the convergence of these two underlying factors: symbolic autonomy and economic exclusion.
The issue of ‘symbolic autonomy’ stems from AJK’s unique legal status. AJK is not a province of Pakistan, nor is it recognised as a constitutionally defined region under Pakistan’s 1973 constitution. Instead, it is a self-governing administrative territory with its own president, prime minister and legislative assembly. This is generally seen in a positive light by the people of AJK as they feel pride in their local autonomy and distinct identity.
But there is a flip side: AJK’s autonomy is highly constrained and regulated by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. It is important to note that, unlike Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the people of AJK have no direct say in who gets elected in Islamabad (the federal government of Pakistan, including the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs) or in the National Assembly or the Senate of Pakistan.
In other terms, a lived experience of being a resident of AJK is mediated by a dialectic of neither fully autonomous nor fully integrated. This dialectic has produced a unique sociopolitical consciousness among the people of AJK, which is centred on pride in its symbolic autonomy but frustration over its structural and institutional limitations. Therefore, a large number of people in AJK, including young people, are deeply invested in both abstract and concrete questions of autonomy and recognition.
While the people of AJK express aspirations for greater autonomy and improved governance, the ruling elites of AJK appear primarily concerned with preserving their political dominance by embedding themselves within the patronage networks. As a result, a perception has become pervasive in AJK’s polity: that the existing political elites of AJK are simply compliant clients of Islamabad. The recent wave of mass protests is, in effect, a public vote of no -onfidence on all mainstream political parties of AJK, whose politics of convenience and inability to imagine alternatives to neoliberal policies and patronage politics have eroded their legitimacy.
AJK has also been largely excluded from processes of economic development. At the same time, some socioeconomic and educational indicators in AJK are better than those in mainland Pakistan. But it is rarely mentioned why they are better. It is because of the unique sacrifice people of AJK are making – a mass exodus of men from AJK in search of employment opportunities.
To illustrate this point, I rely on this simple statistic of the male-to-female ratio, which is reported in the population census. According to the recent census data, this ratio is 95.22 in AJK. This means that there are 95 males for every 100 females in AJK. In comparison, the average male-to-female ratio in Pakistan is 106. Further, in some districts of AJK, such as Kotli, Bagh and Poonch, these ratios are 90, 91 and 92, respectively. What does this mean?
Men in AJK have no option but to leave AJK for employment opportunities. In other words, these are ‘missing’ men who are not abducted but rather victims of economic exclusion and underdevelopment. Thus, the lack of employment opportunities within AJK is one of the defining aspects of its economic exclusion.
Now, the pressing question is: what can be done? This leads us to the notion of the ‘New Vision’ for development in AJK. A way forward for Islamabad is to offer a New Vision for AJK that addresses the underlying structural issues related to autonomy and economic exclusion.
On the issue of autonomy, Islamabad must promote performance optimisation and democratisation of the bureaucratic structures of the state to facilitate improved public service delivery for the residents of AJK. People in AJK are frustrated by the perks and privileges enjoyed by political and state elites. To address this issue, transparent, participatory and performance-based budgeting processes should be implemented to align public spending with the priorities of local communities.
Similarly, this new vision has to address the underlying causes of economic exclusion. For example, more than 80 per cent of the population of AJK lives in rural areas, and mountainous geography isolates rural communities and restricts access to basic public goods. Overcoming geographic exclusion is a prerequisite for economic participation.
Under the New Vision, Islamabad must prioritise universal access to basic public goods in AJK. This can be achieved through public works programmes that develop sustainable infrastructure – such as roads, bridges and digital connectivity – to better integrate rural communities into the region’s economic development. This will directly contribute to strengthening the productive capacity of AJK’s local economy. Rather than relying on state-directed, top-down approaches, which have historically failed to revive the AJK economy, community-led, bottom-up strategies should be promoted. For example, community-driven cooperative farming initiatives – where local communities pool their land, labour and capital – can enhance agricultural productivity and improve economic outcomes for everyone in the community.
Access to credit is often cited as one of the biggest challenges faced by residents of AJK when starting new business ventures. This issue can be addressed if the State Bank of Pakistan mandates banks in AJK to expand access to affordable credit for small-scale processing units and eco-friendly industries, including tourism. Together, these initiatives have the potential to stimulate economic growth and generate localised employment opportunities for both men and women in AJK.
One thing is clear: a business-as-usual approach – such as the ongoing political carousel, which merely papers over the cracks – will not appease the people of AJK. The pressing question for Islamabad, therefore, is whether it will continue to side with AJK’s entrenched elites or respond to the genuine needs and aspirations of its people.
X/Twitter: khandahnish Email: dkhanfandm.edu
The writer is assistant professor of economics at Franklin & Marshall College, USA. His research examines issues related to economic development in AJK.