Pakistan’s long experiment with negotiating its way out of insurgency has been a catalogue of concessions that terrorists have repeatedly exploited. Talks with terrorists have been tried, measured and found wanting again and again and the ledger of failure is written in the blood of our soldiers and civilians.
This is not an argument for mindless escalation but a call for a realistic, unromantic policy that preserves the state, safeguards citizens and eliminates the conditions in which violent franchises flourish.
The chronology of broken accords outlines the same pattern: an agreement is announced with fanfare, militants use the window to reorganise and entrench, and within months, violence surges to a new juncture. Each episodic pause was not an interlude leading to reconciliation but a tactical respite that militants converted into a strategic advantage.
September 2025, barely into the month, delivered one of the starkest reminders of the human cost of misplaced faith. On September 2, the brutal attack on the Federal Constabulary Headquarters in Bannu cost six soldiers their lives; the wounded Major Adnan Aslam, grievously hurt in that same assault, succumbed on September 9 at the age of 31, adding to the saga of sacrifices our armed forces have become accustomed to. Across South Waziristan, Bajaur and Lower Dir from September 10 to 13, a series of clashes claimed 19 more soldiers, with twelve fatalities recorded in South Waziristan alone. In less than two weeks, Pakistan lost at least 26 officers and men who paid with their lives while the debate over strategy lingered in drawing rooms and party offices.
Why have repeated attempts at dialogue failed? The answer lies in the structural anatomy of terrorism, not as a populist movement rooted in grievance, but as a criminal-terrorist franchise whose survival depends on instability. At its core sits a small cabal of hardliners and commanders who profit from the terror economy: extortion, smuggling, illicit taxation and control of illegal marketplaces. Beneath that command layer are hardened fighters forged in an ecosystem of criminality and battlefield experience; at the bottom are disenfranchised youth, drawn by immediate material needs, coercion, sexual exploitation or the intoxicating allure of hero worship. There is no single, legitimate interlocutor who can credibly bind the network; there is no unified constituency interested in laying down arms for the common good.
Talks operate under a dangerous illusion: that militants are rational actors seeking political redress. That premise misreads their incentives. For many commanders and financiers, negotiations are opportunities to regroup, to fortify supply lines, to claim legitimacy and to extend territorial reach. The voices that insist on talks without confronting these realities risk acting as de facto apologists, whether wittingly or unwittingly, for those who profit from chaos.
Too often, the debate over counterterrorism devolves into partisan theatre. Certain political currents have consistently championed negotiations, sometimes from genuine conviction, sometimes for short-term political capital, and not infrequently because of entanglements that benefit from disorder. When independent investigation traces the money trail, inconvenient truths emerge: vested interests, illicit gains or patronage networks that benefit from a persistent security crisis. Democracy demands dissent and debate, but it also demands that opposition refrain from offering shelter to those who target the state’s very foundations.
None of this implies that the solution is exclusively militaristic or that the state must abandon the long march toward social and economic reform. A coherent, durable strategy must be twofold: a decisive operational campaign to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and a patient, well-resourced program to address the root causes that feed recruitment. On the operational front, military and law enforcement must be empowered to act with precision, guided by intelligence and constrained by humanity. Civilian protection must remain paramount, but that cannot be a pretext for paralysis. Targeted operations that degrade command-and-control, dismantle financing networks and deny sanctuaries are necessary. Simultaneously, international pressure and diplomatic leverage with actors sheltering or abetting terrorists must be intensified.
On the socio-economic front, the absence of state presence in frontier districts and underdeveloped lower-tier urban areas is a glaring vulnerability. Youth without education, employment or hope are prime recruits for an industry that trades in violence. Pakistan must prioritise education, vocational training and accelerated development in regions that have been neglected. Invest in scalable job creation, microfinance for entrepreneurs and civic institutions that deliver justice swiftly and fairly. Provide pathways for reintegration that do not absolve criminality but offer realistic alternatives for those coerced or misled into joining militant ranks. Long-term peace is impossible without building the human capital that undermines the very incentives of violent recruitment.
Equally critical is political coherence. A fragmented polity cannot sustain a long-term counterterrorism strategy. Parties must agree on red lines: no political cover for terrorists, no transactional negotiations that cede writ to violent actors, and a shared commitment to accountability. Parliamentary commissions, independent oversight bodies and transparent audits of security expenditures would strengthen public trust and undercut the robber-baron cultures that feed conflict.
There will be those who argue that negotiation is morally superior or cheaper than conflict. They romanticise reconciliation as an ethical imperative even when the material preconditions for reconciliation are absent. But ethics without strategy is an empty vessel; the moral responsibility of the state is to protect life, uphold rule of law and create conditions for liberty to flourish. Sometimes the moral choice is the harder one: to confront, to dismantle predatory networks and to rebuild societies where violence becomes unattractive and unrewarding.
Our martyrs compel us to act not out of vengeance but out of duty. The men who fell in Bannu, South Waziristan, Bajaur and Lower Dir did not perish to teach us politics; they died to protect the polity itself. Let their deaths be the fulcrum on which Pakistan pivots from episodic, wishful diplomacy to a strategy that blends decisive force, social investment and unsparing political accountability. If the choice is between bargaining with those who betray the nation and choosing strength that protects the vulnerable, the moral and strategic path is clear.
The writer is a freelance contributor and writes on issues concerningnational and regional security. She can be reached at: omayaimen333gmail.com