Part - II
Where Mirza had stalled, Ayub expedited. Ayub told President Eisenhower that “the talks were going well and would soon result in an agreement” and explicitly welcomed US and Bank financial support.
This represented a complete break from Mirza’s line. US Embassy reporting in October 1958 had already noted Mirza’s constraints, stressing that “even the manner and the timing… will depend upon the advice and assent of the army, as expressed in consultations with General Ayub”. When Ayub seized full power, the negotiations moved swiftly toward settlement.
In retrospect, Ayub’s seemingly bellicose remarks were more a performance for domestic audiences than a negotiating stance. While projecting toughness at home and signalling resolve to India, he was simultaneously assuring the World Bank and Western sponsors that he was ready to conclude a settlement on their terms. This dual messaging allowed him to consolidate legitimacy internally while easing the path to the treaty externally.
Several factors drove Ayub’s approach. Having seized power in a coup, he sought quick diplomatic successes to legitimise his regime. The treaty also unlocked vast international financing for Mangla, Tarbela, and the link canals, reflecting Pakistan’s dependence on foreign aid. At the same time, Ayub made a strategic calculation to prioritise short-term stability with India and the West over long-term sovereignty concerns. However, in his rush for speed and results, he abandoned the safeguards that Mirza had considered essential.
At the time, the Indus Waters Treaty was hailed as a triumph of pragmatism. Yet over six decades later, the cracks are visible. Many of Mirza’s warnings have proved prescient. By conceding the eastern rivers entirely to India, Pakistan lost direct control over nearly one-third of the Indus system, forcing reliance on massive engineering projects to divert western waters into eastern canals.
Delays, cost overruns and maintenance challenges left gaps that farmers felt acutely. Although the treaty nominally barred India from consumptive use of the western rivers, loopholes permitted ‘non-consumptive’ hydroelectric projects. India has since built and planned dozens of dams on the Chenab and Jhelum, and while Pakistan has repeatedly objected in international arbitration, it has achieved only limited success.
Mirza’s 1958 counter-draft had anticipated this danger by insisting that India could not unilaterally commission hydroelectric works on the western rivers without Pakistan’s concurrence – a safeguard Ayub dropped. Rising demand, population growth and climate change have further compounded the problem, leaving Pakistan facing acute water stress.
Exclusive reliance on the western rivers – subject to seasonal fluctuations and upstream projects – has left the country highly vulnerable, whereas Mirza’s insistence on retaining at least partial rights to the eastern rivers might have offered greater flexibility.
Perhaps most damaging of all was the precedent set by Ayub’s haste: it signalled that Pakistan could compromise under pressure. In future disputes, from Siachen to Kashmir negotiations, India and external mediators would recall how quickly Pakistan had settled on water, reinforcing asymmetry.
The water issue was not the only sphere where Mirza prioritised Pakistan’s long-term interests. In parallel, he pressed Britain for Pakistan’s rightful share of colonial records stored at The National Archives in Kew. He argued that without irrigation and land revenue files, Pakistan could not govern effectively.
British records show that Mirza personally instructed his High Commission to pursue the claim, directing in 1957 that “the Pakistani claim to India Office archives not be abandoned under any circumstances”. Though Britain refused to part with originals, Mirza’s stance illustrates his determination to safeguard Pakistan’s interests, even in seemingly technical matters. This consistency, whether in archives or river waters, highlighted Mirza’s worldview: Pakistan must not be relegated to a secondary position, even at the cost of stalemate.
Defenders of Ayub argue that without his decisiveness, Pakistan might never have secured international financing for Mangla and Tarbela dams. They credit him with transforming the Indus Basin into one of the world’s largest irrigation systems. Yet this defence overlooks the cost of the compromise. Dams could have been financed without fully surrendering the eastern rivers or without leaving loopholes in western projects. A tougher stance, even at the cost of delay, might have extracted firmer guarantees.
Mirza, often caricatured as authoritarian and unpopular, emerges in this context as a leader who placed Pakistan’s interests before expediency. His refusal to sign a flawed treaty reflected foresight, not obstinacy.
The divergence between Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan on the Indus Waters Treaty was not a mere quibble over technicalities. It reflected two visions of Pakistan’s future. Mirza, guided by a sense of duty, sought to safeguard long-term sovereignty over lifeline rivers. Ayub, driven by haste and a quest for legitimacy, accepted compromise for short-term gain.
History has vindicated many of Mirza’s concerns. Today, as Pakistan faces worsening water scarcity, Indian dam construction and climate pressures, the shortcomings of Ayub’s settlement are stark. And as contemporary scholarship reminds us, Mirza was not only a cautious negotiator behind closed doors but also a public defender of Pakistan’s rights.
In October 1957, he warned that “any action by India calculated to cut off waters flowing to Pakistan would be considered as an act of aggression and that Pakistan would meet aggression by aggression.” Such words reflected not recklessness, but a profound sense of responsibility: that Pakistan’s survival hinged on its rivers, and no leader could cede them without resistance.
The story reminds us that on existential issues like water, haste can be fatal, while foresight – even at the cost of delay – may be the truest form of duty.
Concluded
The writer is the author of ‘Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destiny and Death. Iskander Mirza.Pakistan’s First Elected President’s Memoirs from Exile’. He can be reached at: syedkhawarmehdi1812gmail.com