The Indus River system, lifeline of Pakistan’s agriculture and economy, became the subject of one of the most consequential international water treaties of the 20th century.
Formally signed on September 19, 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) allocated the three eastern rivers – the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – to India, while granting Pakistan exclusive use of the three western rivers – the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. This division, mediated under the auspices of the World Bank, was hailed internationally as a model of cooperation between two bitter rivals. Yet within Pakistan, the treaty has long been criticized as a hurried concession that compromised the nation’s long-term water security.
The essence of this controversy was a sharp divergence between two leaders: President Iskander Mirza (1956–58) and General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958–69). While Mirza resisted the Bank’s proposals, insisting on binding guarantees and preservation of Pakistan’s historic irrigational rights, Ayub adopted a pragmatic, even hasty, posture that quickly led to settlement.
I attempt to explore that divergence, showing how Mirza’s sense of duty to Pakistan’s future clashed with Ayub’s eagerness to conclude a deal – and how the latter’s haste has left Pakistan grappling with worsening water issues decades later.
The Indus basin rivers are civilisational arteries. Irrigation works on the Sutlej and Ravi sustained Punjab’s canal colonies before partition. Post-1947, nearly 80 per cent of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture relied on waters flowing from India. Any curtailment risked economic collapse.
For Pakistan, the canal waters issue was therefore existential. As early as 1948, when India temporarily cut off supplies to Pakistan, it became clear that water could be wielded as a weapon. Against this backdrop, negotiations under World Bank mediation began in 1951, stretching over a decade. The Bank’s eventual formula was simple: India would receive exclusive rights to the three eastern rivers, Pakistan to the three western rivers. But behind this ‘practical’ allocation lay profound inequities. Much of Pakistani Punjab’s irrigation network was tied to the eastern tributaries. Without massive replacement works – dams, link canals, storage reservoirs – Pakistan stood to lose.
Archival evidence shows that the World Bank itself, more than India, pressed hardest for a ‘clean partition’ of the rivers. As early as 1954, its aide-memoires proposed assigning the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej entirely to India and the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan, admitting this “did not emerge from the Indian proposal as such” but was the Bank’s own attempt to impose clarity.
As governor-general (1955–56) and president (1956–58), Iskander Mirza took command of negotiations during crucial years. His stance was shaped by two principles: (i) Pakistan’s historic rights over the eastern tributaries could not be abandoned lightly; and (ii) any settlement had to guarantee secure, timely, and financed replacements for lost waters.
World Bank records capture Mirza’s clarity. An aide-memoire of March 24, 1956 recorded Pakistan’s formal objection: “no assignment of the Sutlej waters can be contemplated unless the proposed Mangla replacement reservoir is commenced with international financing”. These were not isolated complaints but consistent red lines. Pakistan repeatedly demanded: One, garanteed replacement storage – international financing for Mangla and Tarbela. Two, timely canal link construction so that eastern canal colonies did not dry up before works were completed. And, three, transitional flows – continued supply from India during construction.
As US diplomatic reporting summarised in early 1956, Mirza’s position was stark: “Pakistan cannot accept any settlement which deprives her of the historic use of the eastern tributaries without ironclad replacement guarantees”. Mirza’s firmness was not confined to closed-door negotiations. In October 1957, his remarks reverberated across the Subcontinent.
According to Undala Z Alam’s study in ‘The Geographical Journal’, India’s minister of irrigation and power acknowledged before parliament that the Pakistan president had warned: “any action by India calculated to cut off waters flowing to Pakistan would be considered as an act of aggression and that Pakistan would meet aggression by aggression”. Delhi, anxious to preserve a negotiating climate, sought to downplay the warning, noting that “in order to maintain a favourable atmosphere… the government of India does not propose to take any notice of the speech, at this stage”. Yet the episode underscored Mirza’s image as a hardliner determined to safeguard Pakistan’s rights, even at the risk of escalating tensions.
Even under pressure from Washington and the World Bank, Mirza stood firm. A World Bank working note of March 1959 observed that “President Mirza has indicated unwillingness to place his name on any accord which does not recognise Pakistan’s prior rights to the Ravi and Sutlej”. Pakistan’s official counter-draft of July 1958, transmitted with Mirza’s approval, insisted that “India may not unilaterally commission hydroelectric works on the western rivers without concurrence of Pakistan”.
This was no mere obstructionism. Mirza was protecting Pakistan’s long-term survival, refusing to sign away rights for short-term diplomatic applause.
Mirza’s ouster in October 1958 brought General Ayub Khan to power. Unlike his predecessor, Ayub was willing to embrace the World Bank formula with minimal resistance. Within 18 months, he signed the IWT alongside thenIndian PMr Nehru and Bank President Eugene Black.
To be continued
The writer is the author of ‘Honour-bound to Pakistan in Duty, Destinyand Death. Iskander Mirza. Pakistan’s First Elected President’s Memoirs from Exile’. He can be reached at: syedkhawarmehdi1812gmail.com