Comment
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a 48-member group that seeks to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that could lead to nuclear weapons development. Interestingly, it was formed in the aftermath of India’s 1974 nuclear test that shocked the world. The 48 members of the NSG include the five nuclear weapon states, the US, the UK, France, China and Russia who originally formed the group but are not signatories to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the rest of the 43 member states have signed the NPT.
As it is, Indians, over the years, have been trying to get into the NSG, which they believe will allow them to lay hands on state-of-the-art technology, which can be applied to lots of uses. India is being chiefly supported in its endeavors by the Obama administration and some other countries while China is strongly opposed to India’s inclusion in the group.
On the other hand, a recent New York Times editorial openly opposed India’s inclusion into the NSG. It said that India's membership of NSG is "not merited until the country meets the group's standards." The NYT said that as part of a 2008 deal signed with the US during the Bush era, India promised it would be "ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices" as other member states, but has fallen short by continuing to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. It advised India should be required to meet the NSG's standards, "including opening negotiations with Pakistan and China on curbing nuclear weapons and halting the production of nuclear fuel for bombs".
While the Indians are trying tooth and nail to get into the elite NSG club, their inclusion without adhering to the NPT, CTBT and other rules formed for the membership of NSG would be a mockery. At the same time, it is no longer possible for the world to ignore Pakistan’s membership to the NSG. To be exact, Pakistan nuclear track record in the last one decade has been better than India’s. Pakistan has adopted all kinds of safeguards to secure its nuclear installations and built foolproof mechanisms in this regard.
Ernie Regehr, in his research paper published in The Ploughshares Monitor in 2008, had warned against one-sided approach that supports India over other nuclear powers. Writing about the Bush administration’s support to India, he said on Selective Nonproliferation: “With this decision, key players in the nonproliferation regime have bought into the Bush Administration’s policy of selective nonproliferation. Nonproliferation efforts, thus, are not to be guided by a set of rules that applies equally to all, but are to be based on judgments about good guys and bad guys. States that are regarded, or are being courted, as friends to key powers are allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.
For those outside the select circle, it is an all-options-are-on-the-table commitment to prevent proliferation. The rule on which the NSG has heretofore been built – no trade or cooperation with any state that does not place all of its nuclear programs and facilities under safeguards – is now to be applied selectively. There are no special powers of insight or clairvoyance required to know what Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan will be thinking.” The words stand true even today.
The NSG members should not make an exception to rules for one state. It should not happen that one nuclear state is admitted by bypassing all rules while the other nuclear state is opposed. Commercial and geo-strategic reasons should not override the principles followed by the group. The step would compromise the credibility and effectiveness of the elite cartel.