The ongoing strife in Afghanistan makes the conflict a ‘wicked problem’. In 1973, design theorists Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber coined the term ‘wicked problem’ to describe an issue with no clear solution despite repeated efforts to resolve it.
The current Afghan security crisis exemplifies such a problem, possibly due to the way it has been framed. Some insights into this complex situation may emerge by addressing a few tough but relevant questions that most analysts have avoided.
Three key questions must be answered to better understand the motives, actions and apprehensions of the primary actors in this conflict. The first pertains to the motives of both external and internal actors who serve as catalysts for the ongoing turmoil. A crucial aspect of this inquiry is whether peace in Afghanistan aligns with the interests of major global and regional powers. While peace benefits Afghans and their immediate neighbours, including Pakistan, a state of controlled chaos may be more advantageous for the US and its regional ally India.
The US and India's preference for instability is rooted in the theory that denying connectivity to major regional and global infrastructure projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves their strategic interests. China, Pakistan, and, to some extent, the Central Asian States stand to lose the most from such disruptions.
For the US, maintaining a low-cost strategy of controlled instability while retaining influence through financial aid – amounting to $87 million per week – to a financially struggling Afghan Interim Government (AIG) is a pragmatic approach amid a worsening humanitarian crisis.
For India, Afghanistan serves as a strategic base for fomenting unrest in Pakistan through violent non-state actors (VNSAs) like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and Iran grappling with its own survival challenges, China remains the only major power capable of acting as a stabilising force in Afghanistan. However, despite the clear advantages of engaging with Afghanistan, China's primary focus on Taiwan and the South China Sea limits its willingness to take on an active security role in the region.
Regional security initiatives such as the Moscow Format and the Afghanistan-China-Pakistan Forum lack the influence to resolve the crisis, as China and Russia remain preoccupied with their own security and economic priorities. This leaves the Afghans to manage their own security and economic struggles. Isolated on the global stage and cut off from formal banking channels, Afghanistan relies on a ‘conflict gig’ economy, surviving through an informal financial system and humanitarian aid from the UN and a few other nations, including the US.
If the US aims to sustain managed chaos in Afghanistan, then freezing Afghan assets while injecting just enough liquidity to keep the AIG operational makes strategic sense. The change in US leadership presents new challenges for Afghanistan unless Washington fundamentally shifts its approach to regional peace and security.
The second major question is whether the AIG is capable of maintaining stability and unity in Afghanistan despite international isolation and internal divisions. The Afghan leadership is split into two main factions: ideological purists led by Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada in Kandahar and the Sirajuddin Haqqani group in Kabul. Meanwhile, remnants of the former Northern Alliance are regrouping as the National Resistance Front (NRF). Various VNSAs, including the TTP, ISIS, and smaller militant groups, are also vying for influence. At the same time, AIG factions are leveraging these militant groups for their own strategic gains.
The Kandahar faction recognises the need to match the military strength of the Haqqanis in anticipation of a potential future civil war, which is becoming increasingly likely due to deep differences in security, governance, and ideological outlook between the factions. As a result, the AIG factions, the NRF and the VNSAs are all preparing for an eventual conflict driven by these irreconcilable divisions.
The third crucial question concerns Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan and the management of security challenges originating from Afghan territory. Pakistan has long borne the brunt of Afghan irredentism, regardless of the political or ideological orientation of Afghanistan's leadership. This irredentist stance, combined with the presence of 17 divided tribes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, has resulted in persistent border violations and a thriving culture of financially lucrative illegal activities. Over time, such activities have gained quasi-legal status, operating openly despite the presence of border control, immigration and law-enforcement agencies from both countries.
To address these issues, Pakistan must dismantle the patronage networks enabling illegal activities along the border, both within government structures and beyond. The governance and law-enforcement vacuum left after the merger of the tribal districts must be urgently filled through effective state intervention and livelihood-focused development initiatives.
Political ownership of security and development in these merged districts is essential to relieve the military and paramilitary forces from governance responsibilities, for which they are neither trained nor constitutionally mandated.
Finally, trade restrictions should be eased to facilitate smooth and unrestricted commerce between the two countries, fostering ‘trade communities’ with a vested interest in maintaining peace along the border. A potential solution to Afghanistan’s wicked problem may lie in economic and trade-driven stability, supported by connectivity initiatives such as the Trans-Afghan Railway project linking Uzbekistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
The end of external interference, the resolution of internal Afghan conflicts, and the elimination of illicit economies resulting from Pakistan’s governance vacuum in the merged districts could finally pave the way for lasting peace in Afghanistan.
The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: rwjanjhotmail.com