By Arif Nizami
It is obvious that the US president is in a desperate hurry to wrap up Afghanistan in consonance with Washington's declared strategic goals. Obama's foreign policy is in a shambles. With the Palestinian President Mehmood Abbas' recent decision to quit in protest against lack of progress in resumption of peace process with Israel and the much-trumpeted dialogue with Iran a non-starter, Obama urgently needs a success story.
The situation in Afghanistan is looking more and more like a quagmire for the west. Casualties and the levels of violence have increased in recent months. Consequently, with Britain being the second largest contributor of troops increasingly demoralised and the rest of NATO members' being non-committal, the goals in Afghanistan are being scaled down.
When Obama took the oath earlier this year, everyone was hopeful that he would be an agent of change. He appointed Richard Holbrooke as his special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan who has visited Islamabad and Kabul frequently during the course of the year with mixed results. At the outset, New Delhi showed Holbrooke the door by refusing to accept any mediatory role by the US between India and Pakistan.
Being a personal friend since the days of Zardari's exile in New York, Holbrooke has been smooth sailing in Islamabad. But the same could not be said about his relations with General Kayani to the extent that, much to the chagrin of his bosses in Washington, he failed to anticipate the Pakistan Army's opposition to the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB).
A bigger debacle for Washington has been the fraud-ridden Afghan elections. Here also Holbrooke faltered by failing to dissuade Hamid Karzai from committing widespread rigging to the extent of inexorably damaging his legitimacy and US credibility.
Karzai's main opponent Abdullah Abdullah's last-minute withdrawal from the runoff elections that were taking place after open bullying of the former by Holbrooke has further eroded his credibility as an effective leader. So much so that the US ambassador to Kabul has written to President Obama not to send more troops as the corrupt Karzai government simply did not have the capacity to absorb them. In this backdrop, Pakistan is in a nut-cracker situation. On the one hand, there is Afghanistan that is fast spinning out of control and on the other is an increasingly desperate US administration, which considers Islamabad's unquestioned support essential to its success. Before mid-term congressional elections a year from now, the democratic administration has to show results based on a clear exit strategy. Failure in Afghanistan, although not of Vietnam proportions, will be an election issue clearly jeopardising president Obama's control of Congress.
The Pakistan military can rightfully claim that its operation in South Waziristan has been a success in the sense that it has cleared the area of Taliban militants. Admittedly, there has been heavy collateral damage both for the army in terms of lives lost as well as for the Pakistani nation, which is reeling under consistent and incremental suicide attacks since the operations started.
Despite successes in Swat and South Waziristan duly acknowledged and appreciated by the US, it wants the Pakistan military to go for the kill in North Waziristan where it perceives the Al Qaeda leadership is holed up, presenting clear and present danger to vital interests. However, the military establishment is reluctant to fight this decisive battle for the simple reason that not only it will be bloody but because it will mitigate Pakistan's long-term strategic interests
The army sees western interest in Afghanistan as transient, ranging from short to at the most medium. As In fact, the British foreign secretary said the other day: "it is not a war without end" while the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has declared that the US has no long-term stake in Afghanistan. The initial NATO goal to defeat the Taliban has now been modified to a face-saving exit. This is not possible without cutting some kind of deal with the Afghans and it is becoming increasingly clear that despite his well-attended inaugural, Karzai cannot be part of such an arrangement.
In order to succeed in its scaled down goals in Afghanistan, Islamabad's cooperation to go full steam against Al Qaeda in North Waziristan and against the so called Quetta Shura is critical to the US. However, the Pakistan military is reluctant to shift its strategic paradigm.
It still perceives India as a major threat to its interests and, for this reason, would be hard pressed to fight a battle of attrition with the Afghan Taliban, thus creating a two-front situation for the future. It seems unwilling to go for Al Qaeda leaders Jalauddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar operating from Pakistan's so-called badlands.
The US wants India and Pakistan to mend their fences so that the two can play a role in Afghanistan. This is not an easy task given the Indian reluctance to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan and Islamabad, seeing an Indian hand in Balochistan and in Afghanistan along its borders. Obama also wants China to play a role in improving the India-Pakistan ties.
When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will travel to Washington soon on a state visit, the US is likely to press upon him the need to improve ties with Islamabad by opening a meaningful dialogue. The Indian prime minister is unlikely to play ball as, in contrast to Pakistan, Washington has little or no leverage with the Indians. New Delhi would like Islamabad to stew in its own juice by keeping the pot boiling rather than take a long-term view of things. And to be fair, our own intelligence apparatus does not come out clean about its perceptions of Indian intentions and consequent actions.
Increasing, tension between the civilians and the military further complicates matters. Zardari put up a brave face in the recently held CEC meeting of the PPP, declaring it is too early to write his political obituary and that he will fight back. Some circles claim that there are elements in the army who want a government of national reconciliation. No one disputes the need for restoring the supremacy of the parliament, and a clean and transparent government. However, tinkering with the system by outside players would be tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bath water.
According to a US television network, the Obama administration is worried about weakening of civilian institutions as it was complicating America's Pak-Afghan strategy. It is a fact that the Zardari government is seen as leaning too heavily on Washington for support. The US, in its own way, has tried to support the civilian set-up by committing $1.5 billion a year for non-military programmes as well as through the IMF bail-out for Pakistan. All this is at a price for Islamabad's support for US's strategic goals in the region. How the civilians and military can reconcile these goals under an agreed strategy is the biggest challenge for all the stakeholders.
Next November is the deadline not only for the US but for Pakistan as well. This is the time when General Kayani will retire. A few weeks before him the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, General Tariq Majeed will retire. Earlier in March the same year, ISI chief Lt General Shuja Pasha will also retire. General Kayani could be offered a one-year extension but, in all likelihood, he will be loath to accept it. How this will play on civilian military relations and the war on terror is not hard to guess.
The writer is a former newspaper editor. Email: arifn51@hotmail. com