By Zafar Hilaly
Some, like Pakistan, actually sent troops in plain clothes to help their favourite Afghans and make no bones about their eagerness to install a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. America sent a whole army to keep the Taliban/Al Qaeda at bay and ensure that the Tajiks retain a disproportionate amount of power. In doing so America re-animated the Afghan civil war, re-armed the militias and used Afghanistan as a workshop for a new model of hegemony, defined by minimalism and the use of proxies, which it then exported to Iraq.
India, having persuaded itself that Afghanistan was vital for its global ambitions and eager at the opportunity provided to needle Pakistan and outflank it, has spent more than a billion dollars in propping up Karzai. It has also deployed a nest of spooks to keep him safe.
Not to be outdone Iran too has been consolidating relations with its allies in Afghanistan, the Hazaras, and supporting anti-Taliban parties like that of Ismail Khan, conducting incursions and nursing anti-American militants in the refugee camps in Iran. Needless to say where there is Iran there will be Saudi Arabia trying to offset Iranian influence. Saudi support of jihadi groups and the Taliban is well known. However, its major contribution to Afghan woes, and ironically her own, has been the Saudi creed of Wahhabism that Arab proselytisers of the ideology, under the Saudi national Osama bin Laden, are preaching to such devastating effect in Afghanistan and now also Pakistan.
Although their interference in Afghanistan achieved nothing, not security, law, justice, economic development, or the creation of a viable Afghan state but rather further dislocation of the diverse communities that make up Afghan society, these countries seem unwilling to learn from their mistakes. In Pakistan's case this became evident when Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi cautioned Obama's national security adviser, General Jones, against the US withdrawing from Afghanistan without putting in place a broad-based government because of the serious repercussions on Pakistan's security. Qureshi should have known better. It suggests that Pakistan is up to its old tricks of installing a pliable regime in Kabul something that is well beyond its capability and would amount to the kiss of death for such a regime with proud Afghans.
It defies imagination how the Americans can broker anything as complex as a power-sharing agreement between bitterly divided Afghan groups while itself warring against a key component of the future regime. Besides, the Taliban are not interested in sharing power or participating in a government acceptable to the Americans. They are confident that they can defeat the Northern Alliance. They also believe that the Americans will be departing and having failed to worst the Taliban on the battlefield can hardly expect a contrary outcome on the conference table. Hence, the Taliban feel under no pressure to relent in their demand for a complete and unconditional withdrawal of all allied forces; which is the only worthwhile contribution that the US can make to eventual peace in Afghanistan. Of course, when and if the Taliban fail to defeat their local opponents or are fought to a standstill in the war that will follow an American departure, a broad-based government may emerge but only in due course and in the Afghan way, which is as it should be.
Actually, Foreign Minister Qureshi's plea to Gen Jones about installing a broad-based government in Kabul was reminiscent of the meddling mind- set that propelled Pakistan to participate in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union and become enmeshed in the Afghan imbroglio. To extricate ourselves from it, a decade or so later, we had to drop the mujahideen as an ally and adopt the Taliban. Subsequently, in 2001, we took yet another U-turn from the Taliban to the Americans. All of which should have convinced even a novice like Qureshi how ephemeral alliances are and how ill-advised it is to take sides in the heterogeneous melting pot of tribes, affiliations, interests, loyalties and religions that comprise Afghanistan.
Illustrative of the difficulty in deciphering correctly what transpires in Afghanistan, where different groups stand in relation to each other, and how they are likely to interact is the example of the Pakistani Taliban and their Afghan counterparts. Many assume that they are on the same page when, in fact, they are poles apart and conflict between them has often led to bloody encounters. Similarly, those who believed that the Taliban and the Pakistani establishment were natural allies must have been surprised when it became evident that nothing could be further from the truth and that the Taliban were as contemptuously unmindful of Pakistan's interests and counsel as of any other country. The Taliban emerged powerful not because they were helped or trained by Pakistan in the art of war and politics but rather because of their mastery over the Pakhtun milieu. Moreover, the rise of Islamism in Afghanistan was the result of the interplay of domestic and international factors and not love of Islam inculcated into the minds of the Taliban by Pakistan. All that Pakistan's identification with the Taliban did was to earn Pakistan a bad name and the enmity of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan who hated the Taliban for the internal colonialism they practised on non-Pakhtuns.
And if the foreign minister is worried that in case of a hurried American departure from Afghanistan the wrath of the Afghan Taliban will descend on Pakistan then that fear too is misplaced. The Afghan Taliban have enough on their plate in Afghanistan to add to it by taking on Pakistan, as their spokesman said a week ago. In fact, by staying on in Afghanistan America is only reinforcing the xenophobia that has always set the Afghans apart from other subcontinentals, while providing Islamic militancy a fertile recruiting ground for the Taliban cause. Actually, the American presence in Afghanistan and America's unpopularity among Pakistanis has only served to divide Pakistan and lent the cause of the Taliban righteousness and legitimacy in the eyes of Pakistanis that it does not deserve.
America's assistance, valuable, reassuring and welcome as it might appear, is merely prolonging the day when the Pakistanis will have to confront and overcome the challenge posed by the extremists by dint of their own efforts. The battle against extremism is intrinsically our domestic affair. To win we will not only have to eradicate domestic extremists from all spheres of life but also overcome the sluggish pace of political, economic and social progress. For this task competent and strong leadership will be required and the army's effort will have to be augmented by civilian security structures and better intelligence-gathering. Success or failure lies in our hands and not in the complexion of any future regime in Afghanistan or even whether America chooses to stay or leave though the chances of success will increase immeasurably if America does leave and confines its help to funding, appropriate weaponry and economic assistance to offset the costs of the war. If that were to happen our war would become that of America, and not vice versa, which many alas still feel is the case today.
The writer is a former ambassador. Email: charles123it@hotmail.com