By Ikram Sehgal
Both the ministers were in favour of detonating a nuclear device, but were genuinely concerned about the possible reaction in these countries. Our diplomatic channels maintained this would be favourable -- my input would reinforce in a small way their own counsel (among many others) to Mian Nawaz Sharif for going ahead with the nuclear tests. Brigadier Salik's assertion about Sartaj Aziz being opposed to the May 28, 1998, nuclear explosion is definitely hearsay, more so it is wrong. There is a lot of difference between hearsay and being an actual witness to an event.
I travelled to three countries (all except Saudi Arabia) is pursuit of this exercise. Bangladeshis were mostly vehement in venting their feelings that if Pakistan really had the bomb and was not bluffing, it had better go ahead with the nuclear tests, or else face the humiliation and scorn being heaped on them already by the Indian media. My friends among the khakis, both serving and retired, espoused a different reasoning in the absence of a nuclear deterrent and given India's demonstrated hegemonistic tendencies, the chances of a conventional war would increase substantially.
My Sri Lankan 34th PMA course mates, Major Generals Ananda Weerasekera and Siri Pieris, Adjutant General and Chief of General Staff respectively, articulated what the current thinking was among Sri Lankan intelligentsia -- Pakistan had no option but to respond, a PAX INDIA-NA would otherwise become the order of the day in South Asia. Even though the uninvited landing of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) on Sri Lankan soil had been papered over by a treaty giving post-facto sanction to what was actually a full-fledged Indian invasion, the Sri Lankan army felt deeply humiliated. Ananda and Siri reflected the feeling pervasive in Sri Lanka, a failure to react would make Pakistan subject to nuclear blackmail.
My friends in UAE reacted quite differently to what was being said in their print media; the endless quoting of the jingoistic gloating of some Indian leaders (and what they planned to do with Pakistan). Unless Pakistan went ahead with quid pro quo nuclear tests, they would as Muslims feel humiliated. I noted on May 23, 1998: "One was shocked to hear an influential person, who is a genuine friend of Pakistan, speak of India as a genuine 'emerging' nuclear power because they have dared to explode the bomb and yours is still a bluff, at least in Arab eyes." Others in Abu Dhabi and Dubai more or less reiterated the same feelings, maybe not so explicitly, but in a similar vein.
Based on these actual observations, I had written on May 23, 1998: "India continues to wallow in self-satisfaction and outright conceit. Satisfaction that not only that world reaction has been contained but that some countries have actually accorded grudging respect, satisfaction that there seems to be a tacit acceptance of India's new position as a credible nuclear power. And India has used this world ambivalence to good effect. They are the only country in the world to directly threaten another with nuclear consequences in case of war and then have gone on to escalating the crisis even further, directly threatening Pakistan with war over Kashmir. Given the BJP penchant of carrying out their manifesto agenda/threats this is not something to be dismissed as mere rhetoric. India is presently riding high on its new pedestal as an emerging nuclear power, with scant regard for world opinion and even less for world economic sanctions. Like Nazi Germany, India is relishing world appeasement, this approximates the universal responses to each Nazi occupation/annexation pre-World War 2 leading to the infamous 'peace' of our time when Chamberlain signed away Czech freedom in 1938 at Munich in a bid to appease Hitler. Will the world similarly allow the extinction of Pakistan to appease India? Appeasement always fails as it serves only to whet the appetite of the likes of Hitler and India's responses vis-a-vis Pakistan are now not a matter of concern anymore, they are a grave threat."
To further quote May 23, 1998: "We want to be recognised in the world as an equal nuclear power (to India), is it not a fact that by asking Pakistan not to explode the bomb such tacit recognition (by the US) has already been given? However the issue is not the bomb anymore, a direct threat to Pakistan's security has been made by so-called responsible Indian leaders, a major escalation that Pakistan cannot avoid, not without the risk of 'Balkanisation' on the pattern of the other South Asian countries. The options are whether to explode the bomb and 'eat grass' or not test the nuclear device and 'eat humble pie'. As much as I personally feel that other alternatives must be explored, Mian Nawaz Sharif's options have been reduced to do or die, that is, die a lingering death vilified by his countrymen. Even for a populist leader economic consequences are important, the same people exhorting him to explode the bomb will be the first to turn against him in misery-time. Such war-gaming he must have done, left now with no other option, he may opt for 'Gotterdammerung' for Pakistan, to die with sword in hand rather than face the thousand cuts of a coward."
Mian Nawaz Sharif made us Pakistanis proud by taking the calculated risk in 1998 and not vacillating or taking the road of appeasement. This he did at great personal and political danger to himself. With the hindsight of sorry experience, why does the "man of steel" now choose, at crucial and defining moments, to vacillate politically and, by default, appease, thus literally putting the concept of honesty and integrity that is the bedrock of any nation at risk? Are our boys in Swat and FATA dying in order to shore up the documented corruption that stands legitimized by the NRO?
If anybody knows where the Mian Nawaz Sharif who took the historic step of May 28, 1998, without any fear resides presently, please do inform us of his whereabouts immediately -- or alternatively, find us someone with a little more spine.
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com