By By Abdul Jabbar Khan
There is no denying the fact that due to the geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations and compulsions, the Army has invariably been the major contributor in the formulation of our regional foreign policy objectives and the strategies to achieve them, especially with regard to Kashmir and Afghanistan. The Army also has the highest stake in the war on terror that threatens the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan.
As an institution, it is directly bearing the brunt of the terrorists’ onslaught against whom it is engaged and against whom it has achieved tremendous successes by rendering unprecedented sacrifices. So their involvement or being on board with regard to any government policy on security issues and fight against terrorism, is a strategic necessity.
Since the Kerry-Lugar Bill has a direct bearing on the fight against terrorism, our national security , our nuclear programme and the role of the armed forces in eliminating terrorism, it was imperative for the government to have kept the security establishment in the loop with regard to the conditionalities incorporated in the bill. There are credible portents to indicate that the military did use the traditional channels to convey its reservations on certain clauses of the bill, which included personal interaction of the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff with the prime minister and through Defense Ministry.
Reportedly, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majeed also wrote to the government giving an exhaustive assessment of the conditionalities of the bill and their likely repercussions.
The government failed to accommodate the views and also did not take the CJCSC or the COAS into confidence on the contents of the final draft of the bill. Despite the concerns and reservations expressed by the security establishment on the bill, the government never bothered to convene the meeting of the DCC to allow the commanders an opportunity to air their views at the proper forum.
The indifference shown by the government probably prompted the men in uniform to register their dissension publicly. The move is not out of this world.
US and British commanders are on record to have repeatedly made dissenting comments on the policies of their government in Afghanistan and Iraq, while it is perceived that it may have the rules of the business, but the intent and the purpose of this action was not to embarrass the government or show any defiance to its authority, as being impliedly insinuated by some critics.
It was the expression of their honest and well-considered view that certain clauses pertaining to security issues were quite intrusive and seemed more of a statement of indictment rather than support to Pakistan on those particular subjects and also impinged upon our sovereignty.
Take for example the certification required under Section 203 (2) A which reads “ cease support, including by any elements within the Pakistan Military or its intelligence agency, to extremists and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against US or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries “Our government has repeatedly declared that neither any group in the army nor any intelligence agency has any links with any terrorist group. So despite that unambiguous and categorical stance taken by the government, the inclusion of this particular clause reflects the US mistrust in the government of Pakistan and also constitutes an indictment against the army and our intelligence - without whose support and commitment we would not have been able to achieve what we have achieved against the terrorists elements — for their alleged support to the terrorist groups. Hence it is against our declared position on the issue.
Same is the case with certification required under Section 203(1) concerning our nuclear programme, especially with regard to access to the individuals involved in proliferation, which implies direct access to Dr AQ Khan. Pakistan has unequivocally taken the position that it would never allow direct access to the nuclear scientist and it has already completely dismantled the network of the proliferators.
Section 302(a)(13) regarding monitoring also has a conditionality prohibiting Pakistan not to divert its own financial resources to the expansion of its nuclear programme. This section read in conjunction with Section 103 pertaining to audit also authorizes US auditors to investigate and oversee the obligation and expenditure of such amounts. Putting tabs on diversion of US provided funds for the nuclear programme is understandable but trying to stop Pakistan from employing its own resources in this regard, is absolutely untenable and tantamount to scuttling our choices as a free nation.
Another point to be made is that since Pakistan is not a signatory to NPT, it is not bound to accept monitoring of its nuclear programme. The inclusion of this clause in the bill smacks of the hidden designs of the US and the same deficit of credibility of our government.
To be continued