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Friday March 29, 2024

A signpost to the old ways?

By Nasim Zehra
February 10, 2016

At a recent press conference in Islamabad, Maulvi Abdul Aziz announced ‘forgiveness’ for Gen (r) Pervez Musharraf during whose regime the 2007 Lal Masjid Operation was conducted. Aziz said he forgave Musharraf and all those “characters” involved in the operation and also those who had spoken against him.

Maulvi Aziz said he forgave the former military ruler despite opposition from his family members. It is unlikely that such a press conference would have been conducted without prior planning. Obviously some of those in important quarters must believe that a public pardon by Maulvi Aziz would reduce the prevailing threat levels to the former general’s life. Interestingly, in a November 11, 2013 television programme Maulvi Aziz had said: “I have forgiven General Musharraf...I will even embrace him…but on the condition that the Quran and Sunnah is imposed in this country…” Nothing went beyond the programme.

However, Maulvi Aziz’s latest ‘pardon’ for Pakistan’s former military ruler and army chief, Musharraf, is a confusing – even if expected – act that raises two critical questions. How did we arrive at this? And what is this likely to do for the three word miracle solution to Pakistan’s endless problems…the ‘rule of law’ solution?

First, how did we arrive at this? Essentially, the pardon presser followed a host of recent events involving Maulvi Aziz. These included Maulvi Aziz and his supporters in several verbal feuds with several citizens’ groups, a demand from several citizens’ groups and individuals that the government take legal action against Maulvi Aziz and his supporters, who directly or indirectly condoned or supported Daesh. Citizens also launched campaigns demanding the government place Maulana Aziz under arrest to be tried for charges of threat and intimidation.

Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar’s December 18 public claim that there was no case registered against Maulvi Aziz provoked several activists to challenge the minister publicly. At least four FIRs lodged against Maulvi Aziz, including one by a police official were widely publicised. In police records Maulvi Aziz had been declared an absconder.

This public pressure did prompt Maulvi Aziz and the government into action. Maulvi Aziz issued a video message on his website making public his alleged experience with the ISI. He used the sectarian card and accused an ISI brigadier and individuals of fomenting trouble against him. But Maulvi Aziz was hopeful of improvement in his situation based on a “good meeting” he had with an ISI major who visited him.

Regarding the question of the FIR against him, he said that he had been advised to go to court and get pre-arrest bail but he was spiritually guided to not do so. Within a few days of this video message, Maulvi Aziz again took to cyber space. He uploaded another video message, apologising for the earlier video and for involving the ISI. His final act perhaps before holding his pardon-for-Musharraf presser was his filing of an FIR against several civil society activists he claimed were potentially threatening his life.

What followed Maulvi Aziz’s pardon-presser was also important. Dissent from within the family surfaced publicly. Haroon Rashid, the son of Maulvi Aziz’s brother Abdul Rasheed, who was killed during the Lal Masjid operation, claims he was approached in 2014 by someone on behalf of Musharraf – asking for forgiveness. Haroon maintains after his refusal his ‘character assassination’ followed. Haroon insisted Musharraf is “still a culprit of the Lal Masjid and of the entire nation.”

Meanwhile, Lal Masjid lawyer and head of the Lal Masjid Shuhada Foundation Tariq Asad has accused Maulvi Aziz of trying to cover “the military dictator’s excesses through maulvi dictatorship.” Irrespective of the Aziz pardon, he has sought to continue the ongoing Lal Masjid cases in court.

This then raises the question whether these out-of-court developments related to Maulvi Aziz and to the broader issue of the Lal Masjid operation, influence the effort to enforce rule of law in Pakistan? Numerous petitions related to the Lal Masjid operation have long been awaiting settlement in court, including those seeking diyat for those killed in the operation, construction of Jamia Hafza, conducting criminal inquiry against authorities proven to be involved in the operation, and investigation of Maulvi Aziz’s charges of the number of students killed in the operation. Tariq Asad’s plea in court has been that the court’s earlier directions on the operation have not been fulfilled. There are also petitions in court calling for fresh inquiry, for determination if the ‘authorities’ were involved in the operation, as well as the demand to conduct criminal inquiries.

Meanwhile, the court has at its disposal the Lal Masjid Commission report. The court entered the fray when Justice Bhagwan Das too suo motu action and the first court hearing on the Lal Masjid operation took place in July 2007. In October Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry issued the first order asking an FIR be filed, blood money be given, and Jamia Hafsa be reconstructed. Subsequently, the Lal Masjid Commission report was written which maintained that only 103 people were killed, upheld the government’s right under Article 247 to call in the army, and maintained there was no evidence of mass graves or of women killed. Several sections of the reports, based on eyewitness accounts, were sealed to ensure protection of the witnesses.

Critics of Maulvi Aziz’s ‘pardon-Musharraf presser’ are within their constitutional and legal rights to criticise Maulvi Aziz’s pardon announcement while Maulvi Aziz is within his right to announce a pardon. Equally, former military ruler Musharraf is within his right to ask for forgiveness. Similarly, the filing of several petitions filed in court by Tariq Asad is also a legal move.

But the question that we need to ask within the context of upholding rule of law in Pakistan is whether a personal level agreement or the slow-moving court matters around the Lal Masjid operation will help settle the many endless controversies that surround the Lal Masjid operation? Will this approach also help settle the critical question of constitutional responsibility and the authority of the state while enforcing its writ? How citizens’ rights are balanced with using force to uphold the writ of the state are also questions that need to be answered while bringing the Lal Masjid issue to a closure.

Side settlements will not do. Instead, as we are witnessing, side settlements generate more controversies and confusion. It lends power to non-state actors and weakens rule of law. The public perception of the state being a confused entity gets strengthened; it multiplies existing confusion about the politico-ideological direction of the state and encourages divisiveness within society.

The ultimate platform for settlement of the damaging controversy that lingers around the Lal Masjid operation is the Supreme Court of Pakistan. All petitions related to the matter must be taken up on a regular basis to come to a collective and early conclusion. Until the court engages actively, the Lal Masjid issue will be handled, mishandled and used and misused by those with vested interests – adding to the existing confusion on issues of security, rule of law, ideological moorings etc.

New narratives are generated from new but organically rooted thought, action and resolve. Old ways don’t create ‘new narratives’ that everyone now seems to be demanding 24/7!

The writer is a national security strategist, visiting faculty at NUST and fellow at Harvard University’s Asia Centre.

Email: nasimzehra@gmail.com

Twitter: @nasimzehra