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WEEKLY
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| The Afghan cauldron |
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Monday, November 16, 2009
Talat Masood
President Obama during his election campaign and even before that had maintained that Iraq was a wrong war and Afghanistan the right one. Now he seems to be having second thoughts.
There are two views in Washington with several variables in terms of troop strengths and strategy. Vice President Joseph Biden, President Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel and the US ambassador in Afghanistan are opposed to increased troop levels and resources as Afghanistan is considered a black hole. They would like the US to engage in counter-terrorism and do a phased withdrawal. Gen McChrystal, the operational US commander in Afghanistan, in his strategy review recommends an increase in the strength of the international force, development of Afghan security forces rapidly and maximum priority to governance. Gen McChyrstal has recommended induction of at least 40,000 additional troops. Admiral Mullen and Gen Patreaus endorse Gen McChrystal’s assessment.
Irrespective of whichever strategy is adopted its success will largely depend on the Afghan government’s ability in providing good governance, something that has been grossly missing in the past. President Karzai has to seriously focus on building state institutions and vastly improving governance. The Afghan army and police force are not in a position to provide security on their own. The goal of the US military to train 50,000 additional army and the police force from 84,000 to 160,000 by next year seems unrealistic to most experts.
Corruption and inefficiency are rampant at all tiers of the government. Corruption, especially at the top, is highly demoralising for the Afghan people and plays into the hands of the Taliban. These are serious challenges and to succeed in Afghanistan would require meticulous planning and deliberate execution spread over years. The question arises, will the US and the ISAF have the patience to stay for years to bring their policies to fruition?
Gen McChrystal in his review has also stated that the ISAF is poorly trained for counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, the majority of ISAF contributing countries have already indicated that they would be pulling back their troops within two to three years. The other question is, will the Afghan people accept foreign domination for an undefined period? Regrettably, in comparison, the Taliban are better motivated and trained in guerrilla warfare, and are fairly autonomous and depend on local support to fight foreign forces and generate funds to sustain the war effort.
Fraudulent elections have also cast serious doubts on Karzai’s legitimacy and Doctor Abdullah Abdullah’s withdrawal from the second round of elections could further accentuate the ethnic chasm. The Taliban will exploit these divisions and make it more problematic to build a national army, police force and administrative structure. After all, it is ultimately the political stability and support of the people that would determine Afghanistan’s future. Foreign support can go that far but the real burden of stabilising Afghanistan rests on the local and national leadership.
The prospect for failure of Afghan enterprise cannot be ruled out and will be a huge setback for Pakistan because of its symbiotic relationship with Afghanistan. The Pakhtun population in Pakistan exceeds that of Afghanistan and the two are closely interlinked. Their bonds since the Afghan jihad have further been cemented. It is not just the tribal and extended families which have their interests but transportation activity, trade, presence of nearly three million refugees, radical groups on both sides and those associated with criminal economy have developed their own networks and brought the two countries closer.
If the Taliban take over most of the southern and eastern part of Afghanistan it will give greater space to Al Qaeda to operate. More importantly, it could give a boost to the Pakistani Taliban and make the task of the military more difficult in carrying out counterinsurgency operations. The people who are generally supportive of the military and intensely oppose the coercive and brutal ideology of the Taliban could be marginalised.
Pakistan’s economy and social structure because of disturbed conditions in FATA and the NWFP would suffer and terrorist activities will increase. Pakistan has always supported the rights of Pakhtuns in Afghanistan but the reverse blowback of Talibanisation has the potential of turning a wide cross-section of Pakhtuns against the Pakistani state if conditions do not stabilise. It could also have a negative impact on relations with India.
The defeat of militant forces in the region on the other hand can hasten the positive transformational process that has been underway in Pakistan since the emergence of the lawyers’ movement. It will also create a favourable environment for the economy to grow and political institutions to strengthen and instil confidence in the people and armed forces that they can succeed against heavy odds.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general. Email: talat@comsats.net.pk
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ISSN 1563-9479 
