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| US assistance needs an alternative paradigm |
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Saturday, July 04, 2009
Raza Rumi
The gods are smiling at Pakistan's development industry once again. Such a moment was experienced almost a decade ago when Pakistan's strategic location made it into a hub of post-9/11 investments to secure the world peace. However, this time the United States of America has undertaken a historic step of aiding the civilian government and addressing the structural imbalances such as poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunity that quite rightly fuel militancy and promote factories of suicide bombers. Some would think this is naive in view of the imperial occupation of Afghanistan and the rather schizophrenic and counterproductive policies of the US elsewhere in the Muslim world.
This is not an invalid position taken by the rejectionists of US assistance. But this is an equally naive postulate for it is far more important to invest in civilian governance than hi-tech arms and domestic war machine. Haven't we reaped the disastrous results of investment into a dictatorship for nearly a decade and during the critical decades of the 1960s and the 1980s. The passage of Luger-Kerry Bill worth $1.5 billion has kick-started the injection of aid inflows. We are told that much more is in the pipeline, leading to a situation where the US will be the biggest donor to an ailing, imploding polity. This is the end of the good news.
The other side of the story is that the massive development assistance is going to be administered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the extension of US foreign policy through developmental means. Pakistan and USAID are not new to each other. Until the US had dumped Pakistan as a less important client state, USAID was a big player in the country. It made some vital investments in education, agriculture, livelihoods, to name a few sectors. However, the impact of AID's interventions has been mixed and there are critics who have far more uncharitable phrases to use for the good intentions translated into operational assistance.
The key criticism has been that more than two-thirds of USAID assistance, and in some cases up to eighty per cent returns to the US via its larger than life contractors. To be fair, not all of them are development mercenaries as they on few occasions bring in good expertise and global knowledge on development. One the whole, however, the scepticism and tales of ineffectiveness outweigh the 'success' stories. In addition, the staff and policy-setters of AID have been found lacking in knowledge of local conditions. This is a matter of serious concern for Pakistan where the complexity of provincial and local, formal and informal, are truly mindboggling for the natives, let alone the well-meaning foreigners.
AID also works to promote civil society networks. True that until pressured, the state is not going to change itself but working with the 'shadow state actors' is hardly the means to fix the formal state and its prime responsibility for delivering on entitlements, rights and services. The neo-liberal recipe of letting the private sector and civil society take over state's responsibility is not a blanket solution to the enormity of the challenge in Pakistan.
Remember, this is a state that has tried all the tricks in its post-colonial hat: basic democracies of Ayub Khan, local government patrimonialism of Ziaul Haq, and the most recent devolution hoax under Musharraf. Nothing worked. The social indicators have worsened or stagnated at best. We are at the bottom of the Human Development Index in the region: the education system has collapsed and health care is a luxury item for the affluent. Let us not even venture into water, sanitation and the environment. By all accounts, Pakistan, an over-legislated state, is a regulatory failure. Powerful lobbies and oligarchies dictate their terms for state policy. In such a context, bypassing the state would be a monumental mistake and not engaging with the provincial governments would be counterproductive.
Since 2008, there are elected legislatures well-positioned to drive the US assistance plans. Donors are averse to engaging with elected executive for this requires more time and effort and results in some delays but there is no alternative to this route. For all the development assistance in the last six decades or so has been planned and executed through the unelected executive that is sadly unaccountable to the people and of late has been operating in an environment that places loyalty to political masters over merit and 'career' over the citizen. Indeed, this is a somewhat radical way of managing development assistance but no party, the government, the Pakistanis and the US can take a chance at this critical moment of our existence.
Thus far, there is little evidence to suggest that the US assistance has been pipelined through meaningful and constructive engagement with the elected representatives who despite their lack of experience, unfamiliarity with development jargon and history of corruption are better placed than the usual suspects. The big, fat contracts currently floating in the development marketplace are scary to look at for more of the same has been undertaken in the past by other multilateral and bilateral saviours of Pakistan. Billions of dollars poured in after 2001 to improve Pakistan's governance and at the end of the day it has been civil action movements that have made noticeable impact on the governance culture. Similarly, massive injections of aid in the agricultural sector have been made with little or no results. There is no question that the drafting of strategies and roadmaps is vital for us. But there is absolutely no point in letting consultants write fancy documents what the local actors ought to be doing themselves.
We have enough of policy frameworks, action-plans and sectoral strategies, if only they were to be owned for implementation. Thick and well-written reports are not popular with any executive across the globe. It is political ownership of reform and development agenda that delivers. After all, China and India have transformed themselves with little advice through jargon-ridden, complex frameworks prepared by consultants. This is why the US assistance might run the risk of repeating history if the politicians are not the drivers of change.
Three imperatives are of utmost significance here. First, the design of new programmes must not replicate what has already been done in Pakistan's context. In fact, the earlier designs need to be tested against the touchstones of ownership and appetite for reform. Second, central to the US assistance must be the agenda of enhancing the regulatory capability of the Pakistani state to deliver on its obligations under the constitution. A quick look at the principles of policy of the 1973 constitution would be sufficient for any discerning aid bureaucrat. Lastly, tempting as it may be, the use of US logo in the current climate of anti-Americanism would be a blunder. This is why local partnerships, engagement with Pakistani institutes and academia would be essential. The use of foreign consultants would be a misfit in this situation for Pakistan is neither Afghanistan nor a war-destroyed Iraq where you need development missionaries to alleviate white man's burden. It is a formidable country with outstanding professionals who are victims of an overgrown and intrusive state but with the right mix of incentives they are known to outperform the best of global 'experts'.
The road to hell, they say, is paved with good intentions. If the US administration and its multiple actors do not want a repeat of aid ineffectiveness in scores of countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan, they will have to devise an alternative paradigm for helping Pakistan. Otherwise, the collateral damage for the world and the region would be beyond redemption. Aid failure is not an option; such a luxury alas is unaffordable.
The writer, a development professional and a writer based in Lahore, blogs at www.razarumi.com and edits Pak Tea House and Lahorenama e-zines. Email: razarumi@ gmail.com
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