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WEEKLY
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| Mangal Bagh and the fragmenting state |
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Tuesday, July 01, 2008
Khalid Aziz
The tribal areas and the NWFP are inflamed once again. This time the fire is caused by the federal government's decision to challenge the writ of Mangal Bagh, a local warlord of Khyber Agency and who has become a threat to Peshawar and adjoining villages. He has raided villages and killed his opponents. His armed group has motored on the streets of Peshawar's upscale area of Hayatbad. His armed supporters travel in pickup trucks.
Mangal Bagh's group and similar outfits which have proliferated after 9/11, have spread fear by indulging in kidnapping and murder of policemen on a regular basis. Peshawar's residents wonder how long it will be before this country becomes another Somalia. Their concerns are justified because the province is full of expanding pockets of militant- controlled areas. NWFP districts are beginning to resemble the loosely administered agencies of FATA.
The economic and financial consequences of the prevailing lawlessness are akin to the growth of cancer in a body. The government did react when Mangal Bagh kidnapped twenty Christians, who have since been released, from a colony near Peshawar University. But if Pakistan fails to tackle this menace comprehensively it will suffer irreparable damage: it will gradually lose the capacity to raise finances for running services, maintaining the military and undertaking development. Thus, the militants are bad for businesses and taxes.
For instance, Peshawar's only industrial estate is almost shut because of the deployment of the police and the Frontier Constabulary within the industries. These preventive measures may be necessary, but at what cost? The negative impact on growth and employment will be substantial.
The rise of these warlords is not an overnight occurrence. They are the creation of a flawed policy adopted in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan when the Taliban government disintegrated and many of its supporters fled to Pakistan in December 2001. The government's strategy was to capture and hand over foreign fighters, including Arabs, to the US. However, the Afghan Taliban were not arrested; on the contrary, tribes in Waziristan were encouraged to provide them refuge. The Taliban were similarly welcomed and protected in Quetta. This shaking hands with the Devil will continue to extract a heavy price.
The rationale behind this policy was that one day the Taliban may return to power in Kabul and be friendly towards Pakistan because of this help. The final price that Pakistan and its people would pay for such a policy will be substantial. It is a moot point if this bad decision would have been made by a policymaker who knew his tribal history.
Yet another poor decision was when the military was inducted into the tribal areas in 2003. The objective was to deny sanctuaries and prevent the spread of militancy. This decision was also against the principles of the counterinsurgency doctrine. According to it, the best method of fighting insurgents is to use either proxy forces or local forces composed of individuals representing the tribes. Pakistan already relied on the Frontier Corps for the policing of tribal areas, yet this force was outgunned in the fight against the militants, who were better trained and armed.
It is arguable whether the Scouts could have done the job better. But the formula to use local forces for fighting counterinsurgency remains. In the event of weakness we should have opted for strengthening the capacity of the Frontier Corps and developing a military backup based on helicopter-borne forces.
Meanwhile, the introduction of the military into the tribal areas paralysed the tribal system of administration, which is based on the pre-eminence of the political agent and the tribes. The military began developing a parallel horizontal hierarchy based on the advice of shadowy intelligence services. It subverted the dynamics of tribal administration. The governor of the NWFP is the principal political manager of FATA, and even the governor at that time rubbished the political agent of an important agency in a tribal jirga by calling him a "commission agent."
Such immaturity was unknown in the corridors of political administration before 2001. It showed the utter arrogance and contempt of the leadership for the political administration. Everyone is now paying the price for these errors, and the political management system has been crippled permanently as a result.
While Pakistan was adding to the witches' brew by its poor selection of policy, Afghanistan's narcotic production delivered the final blow to the hopes of any success against the militancy in Afghanistan. It provided financial autonomy to the militants. It has made a monster which is growing in strength each year. The militants obtain from $100 to $150 million a year in taxes from the narcotic value chain. In 2001, Afghanistan had 8,000 hectares of poppy fields; in 2007 this increased to almost 200,000 hectares. Today, Afghanistan controls 93 percent of the world's opiates market. Drugs are more than 60 percent of the Afghan GDP, amounting to about $4 billion a year.
Such huge sums of money cannot come from religious donations alone – which is the usual explanation for the source of the militants' funds. Unfortunately, the allies in Afghanistan have been suckered into a questionable policy where they are prevented from poppy elimination.
Many social scientists in the US justify their support for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by giving the spurious argument that stern action will fuel the insurgency, since it will increase poverty. I think this argument is devious. A recent study has found that opium cultivation in Afghanistan is no longer associated with poverty. On the contrary, the most fertile and richest provinces in Afghanistan are also its biggest poppy producers. Drug production is the single biggest embarrassment of the allies' war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Drugs now reach into the highest citadels of state authority in that country.
I foresee that militancy in Pakistan will degrade institutions as long as drug money continues to be pumped by Afghan militants from across the border. One unconfirmed report even suggests that a major objective of the militants is to degrade the security structure so that new markets and trafficking routes are established in the region. It is alleged that one new route being developed is from Kunar in Afghanistan to Bajaur and onwards to Xinjiang in China. Is this the main reason for the militancy in Swat?
So how does the present operation against Mangal Bagh fit in this narrative? He is apparently a fledgling warlord so far. He forced the political administration of Bara tehsil to stop functioning. He will be meted out the normal punishment for such acts, which is the destruction of his home. Earlier, he and his warriors had destroyed Bara tehsil and made it non-functional. He ruled and also dispensed his version of justice. The result was the establishment of a parallel system challenging the state.
As long as the security forces remain in Khyber, the government will hold sway. However, as soon as they leave we can expect Mangal Bagh's retaliation to begin, against both the political and police administrations. It is likely that his criminal activities like kidnapping and robberies will increase. Peshawar will thus suffer even more.
Therefore, the answer clearly lies in strategising a totally new method of policing, based on community support and readying the security forces to fight mobile gangs, rather than ordinary criminals. Internationally, Afghanistan must stop the cultivation of opium or this war will never end, since drugs fuel it. The short-term threat against Peshawar may have been avoided, but deeper security reforms are needed for bringing long-term stability to the region.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research.
Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
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ISSN 1563-9479 
