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WEEKLY
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| Impact of 9/11 war on tribal society |
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Sunday, June 01, 2008
Khalid Aziz
It is an accepted fact that global wars not only transform combatant nations but also drastically change civil societies within them; the 9/11 war has changed the nature of the Pakistani state by shifting it towards the right. This article examines how the war has dealt a serious blow to tribalism as a social formation.
The tribal areas, with a population of 3.5 million and the size of Belgium, always took pride in being different and possessing one of the oldest tribal systems. The tribesman fought British attempts to subjugate them when Britain was the sole superpower, much like the US of today. The special status of the tribal areas was confirmed when they became part of Pakistan in 1947. Today that status is protected under the Constitution.
Pakistan's policy has been to integrate the tribal areas into the NWFP through development. It failed to achieve it in the past 60 years because of a lack of commitment. Our failure in consolidating the state has now resulted in generating a crisis of major proportions. The militancy in FATA is fuelling the war in Afghanistan and also destabilising Pakistan. In this upheaval not only have the tribes lost their proverbial freedom but they have themselves become the object of aggression by the militants under the guise of jihad.
Only a few days ago, I received an email from an educated tribesman who disagreed with my plea that the only solution for FATA was its immediate merger into the NWFP. My conjecture is that Pakistan's failure to incorporate FATA into the NWFP was driven by its desire to use this strategic territory for influencing events in Afghanistan. In the 1980s FATA was used for jihad against the USSR. Later, the goal in FATA was to install a government in Kabul friendly to Pakistan. In playing this strategic game Pakistan benefited by obtaining money for development and military assistance. It enriched the elite at the expense of those living on the borderland.
In December 2001, when Pakistan failed to prevent the fleeing al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban from settling in South Waziristan and Bajaur. This created the circumstances which made the tribes dysfunctional and thus fuelled the militancy which now threatens to engulf the NWFP too.
However, like votaries of an extinct system, tribesmen still speak of protecting their customs and traditions. They still speak of following Pukhtunwali, which they proudly describe as their lar, or path for survival and salvation. However, they fail to see that all that has changed. The British failed to end tribalism in a hundred years, and Pakistan failed to do so in sixty years. However, the militants have succeeded in doing this in only seven.
The Tribesmen have taken pride in maintaining social cohesion and political freedom based on the principal of collective responsibility. If any offence was committed on government-controlled tribal territory, like roads or other installations, the responsible person was easily hauled up for punishment through the help of the tribes. Not anymore.
The militants have taken abode in several agencies and what they have invariably done is to superimpose their version of Shariat in place of tradition. This has seriously eroded the concept of collective responsibility. In turn it has led to a weakening of the political agent and has thus paralysed the system of law based on the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which is anchored within collective responsibility.
The main supporters of control through the concept of collective responsibility were the maliks and the tribal administrators. However, this support base has been eroded by the systematic murder of maliks. Since 2004, more than 300 important maliks have been killed.
Four things happen when the militants enter an agency. First, they begin collecting taxes through donations. Second, the elite of the area are either killed or they flee to other parts of the country. Most of such tribesmen have taken refuge in Pakistan's urban centres with their relatives and friends. The third change is the creation of a dispute resolution system dispensing quick and cheap justice. Fourth, the militants organise their administration on a non-tribal basis. They are not constrained by tribal or clan distinctions or the jirga system. They just appoint their trusted men. I am now certain that tribalism based on one's position or on inheritance is now dead in FATA.
How is the militants' system of management different from the much maligned former jirga system? A recent example from the Musa Khel area of Mohmand Agency will explain the situation.
A couple of weeks ago three hardened ruffians, who were also minor maliks of the tribe, were arrested from their homes by a group of local Taliban and taken to their headquarters at Kandaharo.
Nothing was known about them for a couple of days till the families succeeded in locating a person of influence living in Peshawar, the son of a religious scholar from Afghanistan. He provided a letter to the family members of the three detained Musa Khel elders for their release by the militants. The Taliban honoured the recommendation and they were released. How does this episode differ from what used to happen in the past?
In the first place, the political agent would have been unable to make arrests so deep in the agency. It thus shows that the militants have a more effective span of administrative control. Secondly, influence still plays a role in intercession, except that now the religious lobby is more effective than the former agency elites comprised of the maliks or other influentials of Peshawar, who would intercede in such matters as they did in the past. Thirdly, the Taliban neither care nor use tribal jirgas for achieving their purpose. They impose their will to break the back of potential resistance directly as in a district and without the help of a jirga.
In following such an approach the militants are ignoring the traditional society in tribal area. A tribesman can no longer take for granted that he or his children would live the lives of their forefathers. Rapid social transformation is taking place. In this regard the militancy has brought a revolutionary social change which not only challenges the traditional administrative structure but is also obliterating tribalism. The process I describe is present in large parts of tribal areas today.
Therefore, does it make sense to demand the revival of the political administration of the type prevalent prior to December 2001? The answer is in the negative. The dynamics of war has made the old system irrelevant and it cannot be resurrected.
The objective of policy now should not be the revival of the previous model of political administration but should instead be how to re-engineer tribal areas which will allow Pakistan to re-gain control over them? This will be best achieved by political reform including the introduction of the Political Parties Act, an empowered local government and a community driven development strategy. In the second phase one can think of merging tribal areas into NWFP. Why do I say that?
It is only in this manner that the new forces in the tribal areas can be harnessed and involved in self-governance. I believe the emotions that we are witnessing in tribal society today, though sympathetic to the Muslim cause in Afghanistan, also exhibits a class phenomenon transposed on the rhetoric of the war on terror. It is a revolt.
It is not going to be easy to win the ground back from the militants since their slogan now is introduction of the Shariat instead of a reformed FCR. It is also likely that their future demand will be for a separate province. That will be extremely de-stabilising for the region.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com
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ISSN 1563-9479 
