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Friday March 29, 2024

Equality, compassion and the state

The notion of equality among members of any society is one that concerns political ideals of social justice in the civilised world. It also concerns the assertion of the fact that all men are, as members of the same species, essentially equal, and that inherent differences among men, such as

By Khayyam Mushir
August 04, 2015
The notion of equality among members of any society is one that concerns political ideals of social justice in the civilised world. It also concerns the assertion of the fact that all men are, as members of the same species, essentially equal, and that inherent differences among men, such as of ability, economic circumstance, general health, colour etc should naturally be overlooked in constructing social arrangements that have, as their political ideal, an egalitarian or just distribution of resources among all members of a society.
These complex principles have concerned moral philosophy from time immemorial to the present day. Across the world they have been answered by nation-states in different ways, through differing programmes of social reform and welfare or through the dismissal of the requirement for any and all such programmes, or through political disingenuousness that serves to significantly retard the aims of such programmes, if not to entirely thwart their achievement.
As a lay student of philosophy I have been inspired most by the position taken by the philosopher Bernard Williams, who holds as his personal ideal a moral consideration of human beings, who are “pure subjects, the bearers of various predicates”; on this ideal Williams desires social arrangements that recognise to the maximum extent possible that everything else about human beings, the characteristics that make them inherently different from each other, internal and external, are no more than fortuitous, and in some cases even changeable conditions.
Williams, in his seminal essay on the subject ‘The Idea of Equality’, recognises that this approach to social justice that would require lawmakers and rulers to cast aside any and all considerations of inherent or contingent or empirical differences between human beings is fraught with impracticality. He states that it is no different from the ideals embodied in Immanuel Kant’s celebrated conception of the Kingdom of Ends, wherein each member of the kingdom is a free, rational and moral agent and thus deserving of equal respect, irrespective of contingencies that do ordinarily distinguish each such member from the next.
Williams concedes that Kant’s injunction to “treat each man as an end in himself and never as a means only”, while indeed noble, comes “at a high price…that requires the detachment of contingencies from moral worth”, which in the practical realm would lead to the improbable requirement in any program of social reform, to outline in its mission statement, the concept of man as a rational, moral agent being “a transcendental one”; it would in effect be equivalent to turning a blind eye to the essential empirical aspects of each man’s duty and responsibility in society, as a free and rational, moral agent.
Nevertheless, Williams urges us to recognise that resources or goods or services in any society are limited, while large sections of any such society will desire to have access to them. For resources that are naturally limited, such as positions of prestige that come from high intellectual ability and education – say, the chair of Philosophy at Birkbeck University – it would be easier to provide a satisfactory explanation to those who are unable to achieve such positions on the grounds that they have not been able to demonstrate the required ability or intellect or do not possess the requisite education.
The problem arises when we consider resources that are contingently limited such as water in Pakistan, which can only reach the homes of those who have access to a water source and a delivery mechanism to their place of residence. In such a scenario, the state cannot come up with an excuse to defend its inability to provide this basic amenity. The problem becomes more complex when we consider resources that are fortuitously limited, such as electricity in Pakistan, which has to be rationed among the larger sections of society, despite the ability of most such sections to utilise it through their electricity connections; in such a case the state may only try and defend itself or lie, or turn a blind eye to the problem, all of which are tactics that have been and are exercised by successive governments in our country.
The aim, Williams proposes, however, of any social programme ought to be the achievement of the ideal of equality of opportunity if not absolute equality itself. The achievement of equality of opportunity will require the avoidance of any arbitrary or a-priori exclusion of any section of society, since it is inevitable that some exclusion will be necessary. This poses a moral dilemma: if electricity has not been produced by the national grid, in say the month of July, owing to the circular debt crisis, to the extent required to power every home in Islamabad city then the electricity authorities will be forced to ration the distribution of available electricity. If this system of rationing – and that is how it currently functions – favours only those sectors of Islamabad city where the rich and the connected reside, it may be described as an absurd and an unfair system of rationing since it chooses to deliberately discriminate among sections of the city’s populace based on their economic circumstance.
Consider also the equality of opportunity available to any ordinary citizen of Pakistan in their ability to access justice. Since the mechanism of the courts is designed to favour only the affluent and powerful, this presents us with a unique situation where the resources of justice – courts, judges, lawyers and their law-books – while apparently in abundant supply, are essentially inoperative and fail to impart real justice and only pose to be doing so. In such a scenario, for the ruling party and judiciary to claim that justice is available, in the words of Williams, rings hollow to the point of a contemptuous cynicism.
Williams posits that such discriminatory systems of distribution function by recognising but ignoring that differences between various sections of society – such as wealth distribution – are changeable, and could be altered through the state’s intelligent and compassionate structuring of its social programmes. He then offers the solution that while equality of opportunity will almost always require some exclusion, the ideal social programme will combine equality of opportunity with notions of men’s inherent equality as subjects, as human beings, recognising their right to the best possible distribution of resources, one that increasingly aims at correcting the imbalances we witness in most societies and countries across the world, arising from discrimination, hate, condescension and corruption. It would be a noble ideal, worth striving towards even if not entirely achievable at once.
Williams has been criticised for his inability to factor the notion of liberty into his philosophical arguments. The philosopher Robert Nozick, as an example, dealing with the subject of equality in his paper ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ roundly dismisses Williams for ignoring the actions of free men, who by choice often favour promoting unequal distributions of resources and cannot be compelled by any moral argument from not doing so – consider the doctor who only wishes to provide medical services to the rich and sets up his clinic in the richest neighbourhood of a city.
Any condemnation of a moral sort, in such a case, would be hard-pressed to resemble anything other than the whispered gossip of the envious. Conversely, Williams’ arguments gain traction when we consider John Stuart Mill’s examination of liberty, wherein he distinguishes ‘liberty’ as being free choice that is exercised only once it is ensured there will be no harmful impact on society, from the concept of ‘licence’, which ignores such considerations. In Mill’s criticism of the latter, to defend the former, we also see the shades of Williams’ arguments for a moral and compassionate conception of equality.
More importantly, Williams’ paper provides much food for thought about Pakistan and its history of 68 years. We have always remained far from achieving the position where our ruling elite would engage in serious compassionate consideration of our masses, a debate that would inspire the creation of effective social programmes aimed at rural uplift.
Our defunct and neglected public sector development programmes provide damning testimony, instead, of the wilful and contemptuous disdain for the poor and disenfranchised. While this contempt and neglect endures, as our ruling elite continues its loot and plunder of the country, engaging only in the hollow posturing and lies that have continued to define political office in Pakistan, the rampant social and economic inequalities of our country are achieving a critical mass that forebodes an irreversible and sudden end to the frayed ties that yet manage to bind us together into a nation.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
Email: kmushir@hotmail.com
Twitter: @kmushir