The American Role in Pakistan (1947 - 1958)

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BOOK NAME: The American Role in Pakistan (1947 - 1958)
AUTHOR: M S Venkataramani
PUBLISHER: Vanguard Books Ltd
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 1982
The following excerpt has been taken from Pages: 16 — 20
“On 1 May 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, received two American visitors at his Bombay residence. They were Raymond A. Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State, and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in India. Jinnah asserted that under no circumstances would he accept the concept of an Indian Union since the Muslim League was determined to establish Pakistan. He sought to impress on his visitors that the emergence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan would be in consonance with American interests. Pakistan would be a Muslim country. Muslim countries would stand together against Russian aggression. In that endeavour they would look to the United States for assistance, he added. Jinnah coupled the danger of ‘Russian aggression’ with another menace that Muslim nations might confront. That was ‘Hindu imperialism.’ The establishment of Pakistan was essential to prevent the expansion of Hindu imperialism into the Middle East, he emphasized.
JINNAH’S SPECIAL EMISSARY SUBMITS MEMORANDUM
“Early in October Laik Ali sought a meeting with Winthrop W. Aldrich, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase National Bank. Laik Ali told the banker that he had a message for him from Jinnah. The Government of Pakistan would like to offer a ‘proposition’ that Chase National should represent it ‘in connection with commercial matters ... that might have to do with the future development of the economy of Pakistan.’ Aldrich responded that before accepting such a relationship Chase National would want to assure itself that the State Department would have no objection to the course. ‘He also asked Laik Ali to give him a comprehensive document setting forth what exactly Pakistan wanted. The visitor subsequently gave Aldrich the document that he desired. The same document was subsequently to be submitted by Laik Ali to the State Department. Laik Ali did not know that the Department had already received a copy from Aldrich along with a report concerning Laik Ali’s visit.’
“On 8 October 1947, Pakistan’s first Ambassador to the United States, Ispahani, presented his credentials to President Truman. Launching into an ethnological exposition, the Ambassador described Pakistanis as descendants of the great Muslim emperors of India, who originally came from the steppes of Central Asia and the Caucasian mountains — the original homes of the ancestors of the American people! The President did not hasten to acknowledge any bond of common ancestry. ‘We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might naturally benefit our two countries and the world. ...’ Truman said.
“And the rulers of Pakistan took the President at his word! Ispahani wasted no time in seeking an appointment with senior officials of the State Department for himself and the special emissary of Governor General Jinnah to discuss a matter of great urgency. On 17 October, the Ambassador and Laik Ali were received by Willard L. Thorp, Roy Thurston, and two other representatives of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. Laik Ali told the officials that the Government of Pakistan desired to receive from the United States a loan of $2 billion. He then made a presentation which, the State Department officials noted, closely followed the memorandum which the Pakistanis had handed over earlier to Winthrop Aldrich of the Chase National Bank. Since the memorandum was to be subsequently handed over to the State Department as the official submission of the Government of Pakistan, it may be appropriate to describe it in some detail at this point, especially the sections relating to defence.
“The memorandum made it clear that the Government of Pakistan was willing to designate the United States as its principal economic and military benefactor. It said:
“Primarily defence, and secondly, economic development are the two vitally essential features of Pakistan’s life and for both of these she has to look firstly to the U.S.A. and then to Great Britain for assistance ... It has been broadly assessed that to enable Pakistan to hold a proper place in the community of nations and to attain a reasonably independent economic position and to allow her to make a fair contribution to the stability of world peace, the Government of Pakistan would need a loan of approximately two billion dollars from the U.S.A. Government spread over a period of about five years. The country would also need the assistance of the large American oil interests to develop and exploit its immense oil resources. She would require help of the experienced technical experts for establishment and development of certain specified industries and would need also a certain amount of preferential treatment in earlier supplies of capital goods. For the purposes of defence, she would need American supplies of armaments, ammunition, naval and air crafts(sic) and facilities to train its personnel in their use.
“Pakistan’s progress and security called for the implementation of a comprehensive programme of industrial development, the memorandum indicated. The country was, however, confronted by a difficult financial situation. The most urgent requirements on the ‘defence side’ were the expansion of existing ordnance plants and the setting up of new plants for the manufacture of certain types of arms and ammunition and of basic chemicals. The implementation of any programme of industrial development depended on Pakistan’s capacity to purchase capital goods and to obtain technical assistance, it stated.
“‘The memorandum offered the interesting justification that US assistance to Pakistan would, in effect, be a contribution for the defence of India against Soviet encroachment. In its external and defence policy ... the proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia, is the most dominant factor. ... If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility.’ The memorandum continued:
“‘If Pakistan is to become strong enough to defend itself, even with the generous assistance of and close collaboration with Great Britain and the United States of America, it will first need to be economically developed and extensively improved, the existing air and military bases modernized and expanded, and new ones established, the production of essential arms and ammunitions enlarged and speeded up and better facilities created for the overhauling and maintenance of aircraft and other more advanced forms of machinery. Living conditions and training arrangements for regular troops will have to be improved, and an extensive system for training recruits will have to be introduced. With advancement of education, improved health conditions and a little better standard of life, and their traditional sense of pride and self-defence revived and stimulated, it is certain that the inhabitants of Pakistan will rise up to any occasion when the occasion does come. What is needed is finance, and more than that, a regular source of finance.’
“It was in this fashion that barely two months after Pakistan was born, the Government headed by Jinnah turned to the United States as ‘a regular source of finance’ for industrial development and expansion of its military forces. In making his presentation on the lines of the memorandum, Laik Ali emphasized that Pakistan ‘presently faced a Soviet threat on her northern frontier.’ He stressed that since ‘presently’ there was little co-operation between Pakistan and India, Pakistan’s military requirements were comparatively heavy.
“The State Department officials listened to Laik Ali’s narration and then gave him the discouraging response that there was no source of credit available to the United States Government to meet the ‘administrative expenses’ of the Government of Pakistan. They however, promised to study the memorandum and suggested that it would be helpful if Laik Ali furnished them a more concise statement of Pakistan’s defence requirements.
“Laik Ali forwarded to the Department two additional papers-one a breakdown of Pakistan’s requirements and the other a justification of the various requirements. They indicated that Pakistan sought $700 million for industrial development, $700 million for agricultural development, and $510 million for building and equipping its defence services. The total amount of approximately $2 billion was sought as a loan to be utilized over a period of five years. Of the $510 million sought for defence, $205 million was specified as being needed to meet anticipated deficits in Pakistan’s military budget. The remaining $305 million was to be expended, as mentioned earlier, in the following manner:
Army - $170,000,000
“To provide for a Regular Army of 100,000 consisting of one armored division, five infantry divisions partly motorized, and a small section of cavalry: and to provide for replacement and remodeling of existing arms and equipment, equipment for ordinance factories, raw materials and payment of personnel.
Air Force - $75,000,000
“To provide for 12 fighter squadrons (150 planes), 4 fighter reconnaissance squadrons (70 planes) 3 bomber squadrons (50 planes) and 4 training wings (200 planes), together with necessary replacements, ground facilities, and payment of personnel.
Navy - $60,000,000
“To provide for Light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 12 coast guard gunboats, 3 submarines, and 120,000 tons of miscellaneous vessels with necessary ammunition, base equipment, etc.”
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